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ABSTRACT
Elizabeth J. Menninga: Multiparty Mediation: Identifying Characteristics of the Mediation Dream
Team
(Under the direction of Stephen E. Gent)
This dissertation explores when and how multiparty mediation can help the prospects for peace in civil
wars, considering when additional mediators are desirable and when they are not. While additional
mediators can provide positive sources of leverage, they also increase the risk that forum-shopping,
mixed messages, or free-riding will hinder the negotiations.
I identify three characteristics of mediation efforts expected to improve mediation’s chances of suc-
cess. First, complementary efforts improve the mediation team’s ability to respond to challenges at all
phases of the resolution process, providing three important sources of leverage: contextual knowledge,
economic/military resources, and staying power. Furthermore, complementary efforts reduce the risk of
overcrowding by excluding mediators who do not bring a unique source of leverage to the table. Second,
balanced mediation efforts include mediators biased toward both sides of the conflict. Each side has a
mediator they trust to protect their interests at the negotiating table as well as to protect them if the other
side reneges on the agreement. In this way, balanced mediation can help alleviate disputants’ security
concerns, improving the chances that negotiations are successful. Finally, coordination among the me-
diators should improve the chances of mediation success by maximizing the ability to take advantage of
the additional resources and tools of another mediator while also minimizing the negative consequences
of adding a new party to the negotiations.
To evaluate these expectations, I employ statistical tests on a set of mediation attempts in civil wars
between 1989 and 2005. In these analyses I consider three measures of mediation success: reach-
ing an agreement, overcoming the difficult two-month period post-agreement, and producing a durable
peace. In addition to these statistical analyses, I discuss two cases of multiparty mediation: Angola and
Mozambique. These cases allow for a clearer look at the dynamics of complementary, balanced, and
iii
coordinated mediation during the conflict resolution process.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As a popular conflict management tool, mediation receives great attention from both scholars and
policy-makers. Much of this attention conceives of mediation and its effects in terms of how the media-
tor relates to the disputants or how the mediator influences the disputants’ relationship with one another.
Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004) describe this dynamic, writing that “Mediation is an inherently trian-
gular political process” (23). Mediation, however, frequently involves more than one mediator. In fact,
almost fifty percent of the efforts to mediate civil wars between 1989 and 2005 identified by DeRouen,
Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011) were multiparty mediation efforts.1 Focusing on conflicts in Africa,
Zartman asserts that “Africa does not lack mediators...African heads of state do more than stand ready
to be of assistance—they rush forward in numbers” (Zartman, 2000, 142). Thinking of mediation as
triangular necessarily collapses multiple third parties into a single actor. Multiparty mediation, how-
ever, not only changes the nature of the mediator; it changes the nature of the mediation. Understanding
the process of mediation therefore requires understanding the connections and interactions among the
mediators as well as the connections and interactions between the mediators and the disputants.
To the extent that the presence of multiple mediators is considered in the literature thus far (see
e.g. Beardsley (2011)), the conclusions drawn are often pessimistic: multiparty mediation decreases the
chances of mediation success. This conclusion might seem intuitive at first, given that mediators face an
incredibly challenging task. Disputants turn to mediators for assistance when they are unable to resolve
their differences bilaterally. They recruit mediators to help them both find common ground as well as
rebuild enough trust (or develop sufficient monitoring and enforcement mechanisms) that both sides are
1I define mediation in line with Bercovitch and Houston (1996). They define mediation as “a reactive process of conflict
management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization
to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the
authority of law” (13). While this definition is quite broad, I believe it captures the important aspects of mediation while also
distinguishing mediation from other conflict management tools, such as arbitration or peacekeeping.
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willing to put down their weapons in pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Multiparty efforts add additional
complexity to the mediation process, facing several unique challenges not present during single-party
mediation, such as forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding among the mediators (Crocker,
Hampson and Aall, 1999a). The civil wars in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau attracted many mediators
and are prime examples of what happens when mediators fail to coordinate and send different signals
to the disputants. Despite these challenges, however, multiparty mediation does sometimes succeed.
In Angola, the Troika (composed of the United States, Russia, and Portugal) worked with the United
Nations to broker the Lusaka Protocol (Hare, 1999). In Mozambique, a multiparty mediation team
including the Community of Sant’Egidio and Italy helped negotiate a lasting peace agreement (Bartoli,
1999).
Moreover, the presence of the Troika was considered an important part of the resolution process in
Angola. Hare (1999) cites United Nations Special Representative Beye as telling the Troika representa-
tives, “It is not certain that the mediators will be able to bring peace to the Angolans, but it is perfectly
clear that they will never achieve it without our help” (658). So why do mediators seeking to improve
the prospects for peace embrace multiparty mediation in these cases? When do the benefits of multiple
mediators outweigh the costs? I argue that while all mediators face tough obstacles to peace, the right
mix of mediators can improve the chances these obstacles are overcome. More, however, is not always
better. The composition of the mediation team2 has meaningful implications for the likelihood an agree-
ment is reached, the probability an agreement is implemented, and the expectation that the agreement
will last. While multiparty mediation efforts face a challenging task, understanding the dynamics of
multiparty efforts gives mediators the tools necessary to respond to these challenges and capitalize on
their strengths. The better prepared and designed the mediation team, the better the team’s chances of
success.
Importantly, even a perfectly designed and executed mediation effort might not succeed. Mediators
cannot control every aspect of the conflict environment and many factors outside the mediators’ control
could send the disputants away from the negotiating table and back to the battlefield. Thus, even the best
2It should be noted that I use the terms “mediation effort” and “mediation team” to refer to a group of mediators involved in
the same conflict at the same time. This phrase does not necessarily imply that these mediators are actively working together or
coordinating their efforts. Coordination among the mediators varies substantially from mediation attempt to mediation attempt
ranging from strongly coordinated efforts to completely uncoordinated efforts.
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designed mediation team is not a sufficient condition for peace. The right mix of mediators, however,
can improve the chances.
Identifying when and how additional mediators improve the chances for success has important im-
plications for policy-makers as well as states, international organizations, and other international medi-
ators. Potential mediators have to select in which conflicts they are going to invest time and resources.
This forces third parties to prioritize in which conflicts, if any, they desire to intervene. These pressures
can lead to redundancy in conflicts where many potential mediators have interests and can marginalize
other disputes in which the belligerents are ready to negotiate. A more refined understanding of how
an additional mediator helps (or hurts) chances for resolution will help third parties better allocate their
resources. Understanding what makes for an effective mediation effort will help identify cases in which
an additional mediator would provide meaningful support or resources, thus improving the chances of
success. Likewise, it could help states and organizations identify cases in which their presence would
only detract from current efforts, decreasing overcrowding in those conflicts and freeing up resources
for other crises.
This dissertation explores what the ideal mediation team looks like. In order to develop expectations
regarding which types of mediation teams will be most effective, Chapter 2 considers the role mediators
play in conflict resolution, the obstacles blocking resolution, and the various tools mediators can use to
help the disputants overcome the obstacles to resolution. In short, I argue that multiparty mediation is
a heterogeneous club good in which desirable members of the club improve the chances of overcoming
the obstacles to resolution while undesirable members complicate the negotiations without providing
new sources of leverage or influence, diminishing the chances for successful resolution.
From this framework, I identify three characteristics of mediation that should encourage successful
conflict resolution: complementary sources of leverage, balanced biases, and coordination. A com-
plementary mediation effort brings together multiple sources of leverage that the mediators can use
to overcome the obstacles to successful settlement as well as avoids unnecessary mediators that only
complicate the mediation process. A balanced mediation effort, in which there is at least one mediator
biased toward each side of the conflict, provides the multiparty effort unique advantages unavailable in
a single-party context. Balanced mediation is uniquely positioned to benefit from mediator biases while
not exacerbating disputants’ security concerns. Coordinating mediation efforts protects the mediation
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attempt from the risk of free-riding, mixed messages, and forum-shopping. Coordination enables the
mediation effort to take advantage of the mediators’ sources of leverage and influence while mitigating
the complexities additional mediators bring to the table.
The success of a resolution process can be conceptualized along many dimensions; this project de-
fines successful mediation by the kind of agreement reached at the end of the mediation attempt, as well
as whether the mediation attempt results in halted violence and a durable peace. Chapter 3 outlines the
research design used to test my hypotheses, operationalizing these measures of success as well as the
mediation characteristics of interest. Chapter 4 evaluates the hypotheses generated in Chapter 2, em-
pirically testing the effectiveness of complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation in producing
successful mediation outcomes. In Chapter 5, case illustrations of the mediation processes in Angola
and Mozambique provide a deeper look at these characteristics of mediation and how they helped con-
flict resolution processes in these countries.
Mediation and Conflict Resolution
As mediation has become a popular strategy to resolve crises, both international and civil, it has
received substantial scholarly attention. These works range from studies of who offers to mediate, to
when combatants accept mediation offers, to how mediation improves the chances of reaching a stable
settlement. From these various studies, scholars have learned that mediators with historical linkages to
the disputants are more likely to offer their services (Greig and Regan, 2008). Additionally, supplying
mediation incurs costs for the mediators. These costs range from administrative burdens and operational
expenses to reputational damage if the process fails, to the opportunity costs of foregoing intervention
elsewhere (Terris and Maoz, 2005). These costs lead Clayton and Gleditsch (2014) to conclude that
potential third parties are most likely to offer mediation when they have a stake in the resolution of the
war and believe that their intervention will improve the chance of resolution.
Not all offers of mediation, however, are accepted. Melin, Gartner and Bercovitch (2013) discuss a
strategic dilemma of mediation: the characteristics of the conflict environment that make third parties
more interested in mediating (intense conflicts, high likelihood of an agreement being generated, and
ties to the conflict) are also those characteristics that make mediation less attractive to the disputants.
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They consider the incentives to offer mediation and to accept mediation in tandem, providing a better
picture of what leads to mediation onset. Also exploring when mediation is accepted, Terris and Maoz
(2005) find that disputants are most likely accept mediation in highly volatile conflict structures. Ad-
ditionally, governments are reluctant to accept mediation as agreeing to mediation tacitly legitimizes
the rebel group (see e.g. Clayton and Gleditsch, 2014; Melin and Svensson, 2009). This discourages
governments from agreeing to mediation unless the costs of negotiating are outweighed by the benefits.
While most scholars assume rebels are almost always willing to mediate as mediation bestows legiti-
macy upon the non-state actor, Beardsley (2011) asserts that rebels also have incentives to be reluctant
to agree to mediation. Beardsley argues that mediation reduces the control that rebels have over nego-
tiation outcomes, especially given the power asymmetry that is typical between a rebel group and the
government (154). Sometimes this loss of control can be advantageous. When disputants know that
the resolution will require unpopular concessions, combatants are more willing to accept mediation,
using mediation as political cover Beardsley (2010). This reluctance to accept mediation indicates that
mediation is adopted in the most difficult conflicts where bilateral negotiations are difficult to imple-
ment and the costs of continued fighting are high (see e.g. Svensson, 2007a; Greig and Regan, 2008).
Importantly, these studies of mediation onset all indicate that mediation is not selected into randomly.
Therefore, while many mediated agreements fail shortly after signing, this does not necessarily indicate
that mediation is ineffective.
As Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) stress, mediation is typically used in the most difficult cases, those
that the disputants cannot resolve bilaterally. Once there, however, mediators provide resources and
leverage that can encourage resolution. Gartner and Bercovitch refer to this as mediation’s competing
“selection” and “process” effects. Once these selection effects are controlled for, the positive process
effects of mediators on the negotiations are more easily visible.
Effects of Mediator Bias
Mediation’s process effects have become the focus of scholars seeking to understand how and when
mediators are able to navigate the obstacles to peace and help belligerents find common ground. The
obstacles to peace are often divided into two categories: problems generated by private information and
credible commitment problems. Scholars interested in both sets of problems have identified mediator
bias as a useful mechanism for overcoming these obstacles. Svensson (2009) summarizes the four broad
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mechanisms by which biased mediators are expected to be more effective than neutral mediators. First,
they have incentives to protect their prote´ge´s. Second, they can reveal information. Third, they have
the necessary connections and influence to pressure their ally to make unpopular concessions. Finally,
they are capable of “counterbalancing the asymmetry in the concession-making process” (448). While a
wealth of scholarship has explored these different mechanisms, I focus on the role of bias in overcoming
information problems and alleviating commitment problems.
Kydd (2003) focuses on the role of mediators in overcoming the information problem. Kydd argues
that mediators that are biased toward one side are able to communicate (and be believed) when counsel-
ing caution to their preferred side. In a related argument, Maoz and Terris (2006) assert that mediators
with strong interests in the conflict are more motivated and prepared to resolve the conflict, but that this
sometimes comes with mediator preferences for a solution that does not agree with the belligerents’
interests (411). Focusing on mediator credibility, Maoz and Terris argue that the more credible the me-
diator, the less intrusive the mediator will be in the negotiations and more successful the mediation will
be. Crescenzi et al. (2011) provide three mechanisms that increase a mediator’s credibility by increasing
the mediator’s costs of deception. They assert that democratic mediators face greater costs to lying and
are thus more credible, that a strong democratic community increases the costs of deception, and that
the more connected the disputants are to the international community (through common membership in
International Organizations) the greater the costs of deception as well.
Savun (2009) empirically evaluates the relationship between the mediator’s ability to provide rel-
evant information to the disputants in international conflicts and mediator success. Savun considers
the strength of the mediator’s military intelligence agency, diplomatic relationships in the region, and
military alliances (factors she expects to correlate with having more relevant information), finding that
informed mediators are more likely to produce an agreement than uninformed mediators. In an empir-
ical study of mediation in international conflicts, Savun (2008) finds that biased mediators (defined as
having preferences that align with one party over the other) are more likely to be successful at generating
a ceasefire or peace agreement in international conflicts, providing some support for these theoretical
expectations.
This literature highlights that, unfortunately, revealing information to the combatants and generat-
ing an agreement that is perceived as legitimate (and thus more likely to stick) are often at odds with
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one another. An impartial mediator has difficulty credibly communicating with the disputants. The
disputants know that if the mediator’s primary goal is to generate peace, then the mediator has an incen-
tive to misrepresent the opposition’s resources and minimally acceptable demands in order to pressure
the disputants into an agreement. Instead, states providing support to either of the disputants or actors
that prefer an outcome more in line with the preferences of one side over the other can play an impor-
tant role at the negotiating table. Because of their known bias, biased mediators have less incentive to
misrepresent the opposition’s strength or resolve.
When the mediator is biased toward one side, however, the other side is more likely to see the
mediation as unfairly tilting the agreement toward the preferred side. As Zartman (1995) phrases it,
“mediators need not be impartial, but they must deliver the side to which they are perceived as close;
they must not be perceived as selling a proposed agreement that is biased in their friends’ favor” (21).
This is incredibly difficult (if not nearly impossible) for a single mediator to do. Every concession in
favor of the mediator’s preferred side is an opportunity for the opponent to reject the agreement on
grounds of bias.
These drawbacks of bias and concerns about legitimacy encourage scholars like Carnevale and Arad
(1996) and Beber (2012) to believe unbiased mediators are more effective. Because biased mediators,
despite perhaps being able to reveal information to their ally under some narrow circumstances, are
unable to communicate credibly with the other side, Beber (2012) argues that biased mediators are
actually less effective at resolving conflict than unbiased mediators. Beber asserts that only unbiased
mediators can credibly reveal “conflict-relevant” information (399). Beber provides qualitative evidence
from international conflicts in support of these assertions. Carnevale and Arad (1996) agree that the best
mediators are neutral (having no preference over the outcome) and impartial (having no preference over
the disputants).
Comparing the selection of mediation against other conflict management techniques (good offices
and arbitration), Gent and Shannon (2011) consider how bias influences the technique chosen and the
content of negotiations. Interestingly, they find that biased third parties are more prevalent in less intru-
sive techniques (good offices and mediation) and that biased third parties address a more narrow range of
issues than unbiased mediators during the settlement attempt. Gent and Shannon conclude that unbiased
third parties are more effective, because disputants invite unbiased third parties when they want more
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intrusive strategies with a greater chance of success to be employed. In a study of super power media-
tors, Favretto (2009) argues that the extent of the mediator’s bias influences outcomes. Strongly biased
mediators are more effective because their threats (and promises) to use force to secure a settlement
are more credible than a weakly biased mediator. She asserts that impartial mediators will actually be
more effective than weakly biased mediators because impartial mediators will not use coercion, looking
instead for agreements the disputants are willing to accept without enforcement.
Others, concerned with the role of bias in overcoming commitment problems, assert that biased
mediators can alleviate disputants’ fears during the transition period in which they are particularly vul-
nerable to defection. Svensson (2007a) empirically explores the relationship between mediator bias and
mediation success, concluding that third parties biased in favor of the government have a positive effect
on delivering a negotiated settlement while mediators biased toward the rebels have no significant effect.
He explains that the peace process shifts power relationships over time, taking power from the govern-
ment and giving it to the rebels (180). Therefore, mediators that are biased in favor of the government
are able to assuage the government’s fears of being exploited by the rebels. Biased mediators are in
a better position to assuage these fears than impartial or neutral mediators as they can more credibly
promise to protect their side during the implementation phase. Interestingly, Svensson (2009) finds that
rebel-sided mediators are more effective at generating power-sharing and third-party guarantees than
mediators that favor the government. As third-party guarantees have a positive impact on conflict res-
olution (Walter, 2002), the direction of the mediator’s bias has interesting implications for mediation
outcomes.
The literature on mediator bias considers, theorizes, and evaluates the bias of singular mediators.
These studies assume a single mediator is present in each effort. In this dissertation, I build upon the
bias literature by considering the role of bias in multiparty mediation efforts. In short, I argue that
mediation efforts that include a mediator biased in favor of the rebels and a mediator biased in favor of
the government are more effective than efforts that are neutral or have one-sided bias. Balanced efforts
are able to take advantage of all the benefits of bias identified in the literature while also increasing
the mediation’s effectiveness and legitimacy by providing protection and influence on both sides of the
conflict.
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Mediator Leverage and Mediation Strategies
Mediators employ a variety of strategies and tools to influence disputant behavior. Touval and
Zartman (1985) divide the strategies employed by the mediator into a three-fold typology based upon the
level of involvement of the mediator in the negotiation process: communication-facilitation, procedural,
and directive. Bercovitch and Houston (2000) consider the effects of the choice of mediation strategy on
outcome, finding that communication-facilitation strategies are most common while directive strategies
are most effective at generating an agreement. Quinn et al. (2013) confirm this finding that mediators
are most effective in negotiating agreements in ethnic conflicts when using a more intrusive strategy.
Beardsley et al. (2006) tell a more nuanced story confirming again that manipulation has the strongest
effect on reaching agreement but also that facilitation decreases the tension between the combatants
post-crisis more than the other strategies.
These findings raise an interesting question: if directive strategies are most effective, then why are
they not also the most common? Perhaps a partial answer to this question is that not all mediators are
capable of utilizing more intrusive strategies, making the strength of the mediator important. Beardsley
(2009) explores when and why weak mediators intervene in conflicts. While weak mediators still bring
some positive benefits to the negotiating table, they are limited in the resources they are able to expend.
Beardsley defines strong mediators as great powers, groups of states, and the United Nations; all other
mediators (other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), states that are not major powers, individuals
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)), Beardsley considers to be weak. Beardsley finds that
weak mediators are more likely to be involved in conflicts that are peripheral to the international system
as well as conflicts in which the belligerents have incentives to negotiate insincerely. Svensson (2007b)
looks at the effect of mediator strength on mediation outcomes, dividing mediators into “power” medi-
ators and “pure” mediators3. Power mediators, according to Svensson, have the leverage to influence
the disputants using carrots and sticks, but do not necessarily have the requisite skills to address the
underlying causes of the conflict. Pure mediators lack carrots and sticks, but might have the necessary
knowledge and influence to navigate the deeper sources of disagreement. Svensson concludes that a
3Power mediators refer to those that have resources or specific interests in the conflict. Pure mediators lack both resources and
specific interests in the conflict (232). While using different terminology, Svensson’s operationalization of power mediators
and Beardsley’s operationalization of strong mediators is very similar. Svensson includes the permanent five members of
the United Nations Security Council, regional powers, former colonial powers and neighboring states as power mediators.
Beardsley looks at mediation in interstate wars while Svensson is interested in intrastate wars.
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combination of power and pure mediations is optimal, finding that the combination has the strongest
positive effect on signing a peace agreement relative to no mediation.
These positive effects of mediation, however, come at a price. Beardsley (2008) discusses the time-
inconsistency problem that mediation can generate. The presence of mediators in a negotiation process
changes the environment of the negotiations, the dynamics between the disputants, and the relative pay-
offs of continued conflict compared to peace. As Rothchild (2008) states, “Leverage is derived from the
parties’ need for a solution they cannot achieve on their own. To the extent they depend on a mediator to
facilitate an agreement, they strengthen his or her ability to reward cooperative moves and raise costs on
inaction” (107). Kuperman (2008) discusses ways that mediators can encourage negotiations, including
offering side payments that generate “mutually enticing opportunity” (10). Kuperman also warns that
such manipulation by mediators can backfire. By using their influence and resources to manipulate the
negotiation environment, mediators are able to induce cooperation and produce an agreement between
the disputants. Reaching an agreement, however, does not necessarily lead to peace. Beardsley (2008)
finds that mediated successes are generally short-lived. The durability of these agreements is limited as
the long-term incentives and preferences of the belligerents are often unchanged, increasing the risk of
war recurrence.
The time-inconsistency problem highlights the importance of mediators addressing the commitment
problems belligerents face both during and after the negotiations. Moreover, the mediator best qualified
to assist during the negotiations might not be the best mediator to assist in the implementation phase.
Different mediators have different strengths and different sources of leverage, or influence, over the
disputants. Recognizing these different sources of leverage, scholars have considered the comparative
advantages of different mediators. Gartner (2011), for example, argues that regional organizations are
better able to mediate civil wars and produce a lasting peace than other international mediators because
member states share political and cultural features with the disputants, enabling them to more easily
build trust. Furthermore, neighboring states are more invested in the conflict’s outcome as they have
more to lose if the conflict spreads across borders. Bercovitch and Houston (1996) make a similar
argument in their assessment of mediation in international wars. Organizations are better prepared to
navigate the negotiations while neighboring states have greater incentives to remain after an agreement
is signed and assist in the implementation of the agreement and the transition to peace.
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Different types of mediators, therefore, have different tools they can bring to the negotiating table
and thus have different impacts on mediation outcomes. Kaufman (2006) argues that focusing on the
need to overcome information or commitment problems ignores the symbolic roots of the conflict, es-
pecially in ethnic conflicts, asserting that resolution requires acknowledging and reconciling the deeper
“intragroup symbolic politics” (47). Kaufman cautions against mediators focusing exclusively on insti-
tutional responses urging more contextual considerations of the conflict instead. Cohen (1996) argues
that the culture of the mediators matters as well. For a mediator to bridge the gap between the disputants,
the mediators must understand what barriers to communication exist between the disputants. Mediators
from a different culture or negotiating tradition, Cohen asserts, will struggle to overcome these barri-
ers. Cohen provides qualitative evidence for the impact of the mediators cultural misunderstandings on
producing peace agreements.
Reid (2015) builds on the idea that the effect of mediation will be context specific. Importantly
not all weak/pure mediators have the same available tools. Reid (2015) characterizes mediator leverage
along two dimensions: capability and credibility. She characterizes capability leverage as a mediator’s
ability to use military/economic resources to compel/coerce the combatants. Credibility leverage is
a softer set of tools where the mediators use past experience and relationships with the disputants to
help them navigate the peace process. Weak mediators could still be able to influence the negotiations
through these softer forms of leverage. In her analysis of mediation in civil wars, Reid finds that capa-
bility leverage improves the likelihood of reaching an agreement but suffers from the time-inconsistency
problems identified by Beardsley (2008) in international conflicts. Credibility leverage is not associated
with a higher chance of producing an agreement, but it is associated with longer-lasting peace once an
agreement is signed.
This tension between mediator characteristics that produce agreements versus those that reduce the
risk of war recurrence indicates another important part of the mediation and conflict resolution litera-
ture: duration of post-agreement peace.4 Quinn et al. (2013), in their study of ethnic wars in Africa,
find that mediator strategy has no significant relationship with decreasing post-crisis tensions, support-
ing Beardsley’s time-inconsistency story and perhaps validating Kaufman’s concerns that focusing on
4I focus here on work looking at the impact of mediation on post-conflict peace. A large literature has explored other potential
influences on agreement duration. Readers interested in this broader literature should see Badran (2014); Mattes and Savun
(2009); Hartzell and Hoddie (2003); Gurses and Rost (2013); Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007).
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material causes and solutions has limited benefit to resolving the underlying causes of the crisis.
Once again, however, this literature has focused on the leverage of individual mediators. This dis-
sertation builds upon this part of the mediation literature by considering multiple sources of mediator
leverage and influence. I consider three broad sources of mediator leverage or influence: material re-
sources (reminiscent of power or strong mediators), contextual knowledge (similar to Reid’s credibility
leverage), and credible staying power. This third source of leverage accounts for the short life of most
peace agreements, highlighting the important role that mediators who can credibly commit to assist not
only during negotiations but also during implementation can play. In particular, I consider how these
sources of leverage fit together. While it is possible to have a single mediator with all three sources
of leverage, I expect this to be rather rare. Instead, I argue this is another situation in which consider-
ing the often multiparty nature of mediation can enrich our understanding of what generates successful
mediation outcomes.
Multiparty Mediation
These studies, while significantly advancing our understanding of mediation, consider mediators in
isolation. Either they assume that only one mediator is present in any given conflict, that multiparty ef-
forts operate as if the mediators are a cohesive unit, or that the influence of each mediator is independent
of all other present mediators. Some scholars control for multiparty mediation efforts with an indicator
variable for the presence of multiple mediators (see e.g. Beardsley, 2011). These studies, however, do
not consider the diversity of multiparty mediation efforts and how this diversity influences outcomes.
Clumping all multiparty mediation efforts together, the findings on multiparty mediation are rather pes-
simistic, often concluding that multiparty efforts are less effective than single-party efforts. I argue this
pessimism comes from the unacknowledged diversity within multiparty efforts. Relationships, connec-
tions, and characteristics of the individual mediators as well as how the mediators influence each other
are important pieces of the mediation story.
Studies considering the nature and effect of multiparty mediation more extensively have predomi-
nantly been the work of Bo¨hmelt (2011, 2012), and Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999b, 2001b, 2004).
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall take a practitioner’s view of mediation, focusing on qualitative accounts
of multiparty mediation efforts in a wide variety of conflicts and contexts. They propose that a col-
lective approach is preferable, as finding a single mediator with all the necessary qualities (leverage,
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staying power, political stamina, and resources) is rare (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2004, 15). These
same authors, however, refer to multiparty mediation as “herding cats,” highlighting the challenges of
intervention by multiple third parties in the same conflict (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999a).
Work systematically exploring the efficacy of multiparty mediation thus far has been rather limited.
Bo¨hmelt (2012) considers the onset of multiparty mediation in international conflicts. He finds that
coalitions of states are most likely to be used when the states have a lower average GDP per capita, a
higher level of accountability, and are closer together geographically. In his 2011 piece, Bo¨hmelt consid-
ers the characteristics of mediation teams that lead to greater success, hypothesizing that medium-sized
coalitions, more cooperative interactions among the mediators, and higher average levels of democracy
in the mediation team will increase the likelihood multiparty mediation succeeds (Bo¨hmelt, 2011).
These studies, however, are limited to coalitions of states mediating in interstate conflicts. The
pool of mediators, especially in civil wars, is much broader than states, including intergovernmental
organizations, individuals, and nongovernmental organizations. Moreover these non-state actors provide
important sources of leverage that states are often unable to exploit, making their role an important
consideration in a study of multiparty mediation. The theoretical framework I develop to explore what
combinations of mediator leverage should improve the chances for success allows for the inclusion of
non-state mediators, providing a more comprehensive understanding of multiparty mediation.
Another strand of mediation research has considered the presence of multiple diplomatic interveners
over time. In his article, “Failing to Succeed?” Bo¨hmelt (2013) explores the cumulative impact of me-
diation efforts in international conflicts. He pushes back against the conventional wisdom that repeated
interactions should reduce uncertainty and lead to a greater chance of success. Bo¨hmelt theorizes in-
stead that the cumulative effect diminishes after a point, producing a curvilinear relationship between the
number of mediation efforts and mediation effectiveness. Looking more broadly at peacemaking efforts
(which include mediation but are not limited to mediation), Heldt (2013) notes that between 1993 and
2004, it took an average of thirty-one peacemaking attempts to produce an agreement in emerging civil
conflicts. Interested in the impact of these consecutive attempts on producing stable agreements, Heldt
asserts that a lack of coordination across efforts is a substantial challenge to success. He argues that
uncoordinated peacemaking processes prevent the peacemakers from learning from previous efforts.
I believe that coordination among those intervening diplomatically should be important not only
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across time, but also in simultaneous multiparty mediation efforts. I consider the extent to which mul-
tiparty efforts coordinate, expecting a coordinated effort to be substantially more likely to succeed than
uncoordinated efforts.
This project explores multiparty mediation in civil conflicts, identifying and evaluating the char-
acteristics of a mediation team that encourage or hinder success. I consider how bias, leverage, and
coordination impact mediation outcomes. I explicitly acknowledge the often multiparty nature of medi-
ation, considering how mediators’ biases and sources of leverage can influence each other. By explicitly
considering multiparty mediation, I build upon previous knowledge of mediation’s role in conflict reso-
lution, while also allowing for a richer understanding of how and when multiple mediators can improve
the prospects for peace. In the next chapter, I develop the theoretical framework through which I assess
multiparty mediation and elaborate upon the characteristics of an ideal mediation team and how these
characteristics overcome obstacles to improve the chances for peace.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MEDIATION DREAM TEAM
Past studies controlling for multiparty mediation efforts find that multiparty mediation is equally as
or less effective than single-party efforts, depending on the particular metric of success used. These stud-
ies, however, ignore the diversity of multiparty efforts. By lumping multiparty efforts that coordinate
mediators with diverse strengths together with multiparty efforts involving many redundant mediators,
these past studies obscure the positive effect of some multiparty mediation efforts.1
This treatment also generates a false dichotomy separating single-party and multiparty efforts when,
in fact, the characteristics of the mediator(s) are often more relevant than the number. Successful me-
diation is more likely when the mediator(s) provides enough leverage to credibly build trust between
the disputants, helping the disputants overcome the obstacles to peace (by revealing information and
overcoming credible commitment problems). Perhaps this can be achieved by a single international
actor, such as a regional power, with knowledge of the conflict as well as the resources and will to as-
sist in the implementation of the agreement. Often, however, the ideal intervention will involve more
than one mediator. Multiparty efforts can take advantage of the comparative strengths of each mediator,
building a more powerful mediation team that is better prepared to steer the conflict toward peace than
any single actor. For example, a team with a major power and a neighboring state benefits from the
material resources of the major power while also benefiting from the neighbor’s deep knowledge of the
conflict, disputants, and grievances. Mediation by a major power alone can exert material, political, and
economic influence over the disputants, but it likely lacks important contextual knowledge that would
enable it to use those resources effectively. It is important to note that the composition of the mediation
dream team will not be the same for all conflicts. The right combination of mediators in one conflict
1It should be reiterated that by “mediation team” I am referring to multiple actors mediating in the same conflict at the same
time. These actors may be working together, coordinating their efforts, and presenting joint proposals. Alternatively, they may
be operating separately, interacting with the disputants independent of the other mediators.
15
will not necessarily be the best combination in another.
Mediation as a Club Good
Admittedly, the pessimism coming out of past works stems from valid concerns about the chal-
lenges of multiparty mediation. Multiple mediators mean more sources of leverage, a greater possibility
of deep ties to all sides of the conflict, and more resources available for use both during the negotiation
and implementation phases of the peace process. More, however, is not necessarily better. The ben-
efits of another mediator must be weighed against the disadvantages of adding an additional party to
the negotiations. The addition of a new mediator complicates the process by increasing the diversity of
interests and opinions at the table. This can slow down the negotiations and make finding an agreement
acceptable to all parties more difficult. Additional mediators, therefore, can generate negative exter-
nalities that hurt the chances of success. The value of an additional mediator is a function of the new
resources or modes of influence the mediator brings to the table as well as the complexity they add.
In this way, mediation can be conceived of as a club good: members participate voluntarily, non-
members are excluded, and mediation can result in congestion or overcrowding.2 Mediation is volun-
tary: international actors are willing to mediate because it produces a net benefit in terms of international
prestige or the ability to influence the outcome of the conflict to align more closely with their prefer-
ences). Non-members are excluded: international organizations and states not present at the negotiating
table might benefit from some of the outcomes of mediation (such as regional or international stability),
but they do not receive any of the benefits associated with helping to broker the peace. Furthermore,
actors interested in joining the efforts must gain the permission of at least the disputants and potentially
any mediators already present in order to gain a seat at the negotiations; not all interested mediators
are welcome to participate. Finally, mediation suffers from overcrowding. Having too many mediators
increases the risk of forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding, which in turn decreases the prob-
ability that mediation is successful. Multiparty mediation efforts are heterogeneous clubs. Some mem-
bers have desirable traits that increase the utility of the club (by increasing the probability of success)
while others have less desirable traits that decrease the utility of the club (by decreasing the probability
2For a thorough discussion of the characteristics of clubs and club goods, see Sandler and Tschirhart (1997).
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of success).
I identify these desirable traits and how they fit together to generate the mediation dream team. First,
I discuss the obstacles to peace that mediators face and how mediation can help the disputants move past
them. I then highlight the specific problems associated with overcrowding in mediation efforts. Finally,
I identify three characteristics of mediation teams that maximize mediation effectiveness and assert that
desirable mediators contribute to these characteristics while undesirable mediators do not.
Obstacles to Peace
Mediators play a key role at three important phases of the negotiation process: resolving immediate
concerns in order to bring and keep the relevant parties at the negotiating table, identifying a mutu-
ally acceptable agreement, and resolving commitment problems in order to implement the terms of an
agreement effectively. Each of these moments presents a new obstacle that requires a specific source of
leverage from the mediation team in order to move forward. To overcome these obstacles, mediators
need to possess contextual knowledge of the conflict, help the disputants navigate information asym-
metries, alleviate the commitment problems that inevitably arise, and be able and willing to exert the
military and economic resources necessary to help the disputants transition through the implementation
phase.
Preparing the Table: The Importance of Contextual Knowledge
Maintaining meaningful negotiations requires contextual knowledge on the part of the mediation
team. The team must understand the conflict in order to allay both the immediate fears of the disputants
and those that will arise during and after the negotiations. Enduring peace agreements share certain
dimensions, such as being inclusive, resolving the security dilemma, and establishing a working gov-
ernment (Licklider, 2001). Generating an inclusive peace process is non-trivial. It requires determining
which actors (both domestic and international) are necessary to include and which actors will only dis-
tract. Cunningham (2006) advises including all veto players (which can be rebel groups, government
actors, and external states if sufficiently invested in the conflict) and excluding all non-veto players in
negotiations. Veto players, as defined by Cunningham, are those with the ability to unilaterally prevent
settlement. Some actors might seem important to an outsider but actually do not wield enough power
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to be able to block an agreement. Others might be more important to reaching a stable agreement than
is readily apparent. Furthermore, some actors might not be crucial to reaching an agreement but have
the ability to interrupt the implementation of an agreement. A contextual understanding of the conflict
is therefore critical to being able to identify the relevant and irrelevant actors, as well as being able to
update that classification throughout the negotiations so that the necessary parties are always included.
After the parties to the negotiations are agreed upon, the mediators still face substantial challenges
in getting them to talk and compromise. While several sources of leverage and influence can help the
mediators encourage discussion and concessions, contextual knowledge plays a role here as well. As
Cohen (1996) has stressed, facilitating communication requires acknowledging the cultural dynamics
that influence and shape how the parties perceive the negotiations. Once again, neighbors or countries
with cultural ties to the disputants are more likely to understand the conflict and disputant-specific
obstacles to communication.
The relevant parties and the concerns that must be addressed during the negotiations vary substan-
tially from conflict to conflict. As generating an agreement requires knowledge of the relevant disputants
are in the negotiation process, the barriers preventing these disputants from negotiating bilaterally, the
vulnerabilities of each side, and how to mitigate these vulnerabilities, not all international actors in-
terested in mediating will have the same depth of knowledge. Mediators with strong historical and
cultural connections to the belligerents are more likely to possess the knowledge necessary to navigate
the unique complexities of the situation. Regional organizations, neighboring states, or colonial powers,
for example, are more likely to have (or easily obtain) this information than large international bodies
(like the United Nations) or distant major powers. Thus, mediators that share cultural and historical
linkages provide a specific and important source of influence at the negotiating table.
Reaching Agreement: Knowledge and Strength
Mediators must overcome two main obstacles to produce a signed agreement. First, mediators must
help the disputants find the mutually acceptable range of compromises. This can entail revealing in-
formation about the disputants’ resolve and capabilities or trying to increase the perceived gains from
cooperation by bringing the disputants’ attention to new issues or linking pre-existing issues together.
Alternatively, mediators can use their own resources or power to manipulate the bargaining range by
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threatening punishment if no agreement is reached or rewarding an agreement through economic, polit-
ical, or military assistance. Second, commitment problems arise throughout the negotiations. As these
problems plague the peace process not only during but also after negotiations, the role of mediators in
mitigating the commitment problems will be discussed in the next section.
Information and Legitimacy
The first hurdle to reaching an agreement is revealing private information. Finding a mutually ac-
ceptable agreement that all disputants would prefer to war requires being able to obtain and reveal
information about the available bargaining range to the combatants. As mentioned in the previous chap-
ter, some scholars point to mediation bias as a useful tool for revealing information. As the conditions
under which bias enables the revelation of private information is very narrow and the other side is likely
to be reluctant to believe information from a biased mediator is credible, I side with the skeptics of
bias when it comes to the role of mediators in revealing information. Since both impartial and biased
mediators have incentives to misrepresent, the disputants will be skeptical of information provided by
both types. Instead of focusing on mediators revealing information the disputants do not already have,
I consider the role mediators play in changing how the bargaining range is perceived by the disputants
through agenda-setting or issue-linkage.
Mediators with contextual understanding are more likely to know what issues can be linked or what
agenda needs to be set in order to tackle the obstacles to agreement. While not revealing information
directly, they are able to help the disputants communicate and are more able to use the information
the disputants share effectively. Mediators with a contextual understanding of the conflict are able to
influence how the disputants see the bargaining range and reveal compromises previously not viewed as
plausible.
This indicates that perhaps the role mediators play with regard to information is less about sharing
information and more about helping the disputants identify common ground, see previously-obscured
issue-linkages, and set an agenda for the talks. Organizing the talks to address the disputants’ grievances,
while also ordering the topics so that compromise, linkages, and concessions can be made without
derailing the process requires a mediator who understands the needs of the disputants and the conflict-
specific obstacles to resolution. Mediators who have close relationships with the disputants (through
historical ties or cultural ties) are most likely to have or easily gain this understanding. Mediators
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with little history with the conflict or combatants are unlikely to have this specialized knowledge and
are therefore less likely to navigate these obstacles effectively, potentially pushing issues before the
disputants are ready or not prioritizing issues that must be resolved before further progress can be made
in the negotiations.
Strength and Manipulation
Agenda-setting and issue-linkage rely on softer forms of influence to encourage negotiation. In ad-
dition to using relational leverage, mediators can also try to encourage resolution by directly influencing
the range of mutually acceptable agreements with carrots and sticks. The mediator must have sufficient
economic or military power over the disputants in order to to use threats and promises to influence
behavior effectively. Conventionally strong mediators will be in the best position to manipulate the
bargaining range to encourage agreement, but such manipulations suffer from the time-inconsistency
problems discussed in the last chapter. Thus, if agreement is reached by influencing the bargaining
range, commitment problems are likely to be exacerbated. In some cases, using relationships to in-
fluence the bargaining range might be sufficient to produce an agreement. For other cases, a strong
mediator might be more effective, at least in the short run.
Mediators who are best suited to find the opportunities to increase the disputants’ expected gains
from negotiation and those who have the muscle to influence the bargaining range will vary from con-
flict to conflict. Moreover, strong mediators and mediators with relational leverage are often not the
same. Multiparty efforts that include both conventionally strong mediators and mediators with strong
relationships with the disputants can wield both sources of influence in pursuit of a settlement.
The Problem of Credible Commitment
Throughout the peace process, both sides of the conflict will face moments of vulnerability. Nei-
ther side can credibly commit not to take advantage of the other side during moments of weakness. This
dynamic is what generates the commitment problems that make conflict resolution difficult. These com-
mitment problems can be very difficult for the disputants to resolve bilaterally. Disputants, therefore,
select into mediation when these commitment problems are sufficiently severe that the disputants can-
not generate enough bilateral trust to negotiate without third parties. Moreover, impartial mediators are
often unable to help mitigate these concerns. Impartial mediators cannot credibly promise to monitor
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the disputants and report violations, because they have incentives to let minor violations slide if they
fear revealing those violations would jeopardize the prospects for peace. Disputants anticipate the com-
peting incentives impartial mediators face, preventing impartial mediators from effectively alleviating
the disputants’ security concerns.
Biased mediation can help address security concerns, although this assistance comes at a price. Bi-
ased mediators have incentives to protect the side toward which they are biased. This not only means
providing support at the negotiating table, but more importantly, being able to provide assurances that
facilitate trust during the negotiation process. Government-biased mediators can help alleviate the gov-
ernment’s concerns about losing power to the rebels throughout the negotiations by credibly committing
to protect their interests and monitor rebel activity (Svensson, 2007a). This decreases the government’s
perceived vulnerability in negotiating with the disputants, increases the government’s willingness to
discuss compromised settlements, and thus increases their confidence in the conflict resolution process.
Mediators biased toward the government do little to alleviate rebel concerns, however, and in fact
might exacerbate rebels’ feelings of vulnerability. Without protection for the rebels, the rebel groups
are concerned that once they sign an agreement (which often requires demobilization), the government
will take advantage of their temporary weakness to launch a counteroffensive. These concerns cause
rebel groups to lose confidence in the peace process and become unwilling to sign agreements that
leave them vulnerable. With a mediator biased in favor of the rebels, however, the rebels can have
more confidence that the mediator will not abandon them as soon as an agreement is signed. Such a
mediator has an interest in ensuring that the government follows through on its agreements. Therefore,
the rebel group believes the mediator’s promises to monitor the actions of the government and to assist
during the implementation. Some evidence of this is seen in Svensson (2009); mediators biased in favor
of the rebels are more likely to include third-party guarantees in the negotiated agreements than other
mediators.
While mediator bias can alleviate one side’s security concerns, it also risks leaving the other side
feeling more insecure. Even beyond the negotiation table, those affected by the agreement more broadly
are unlikely to perceive an agreement brokered by a biased mediator as fair and legitimate. Those
negatively affected by the agreement (for example, any military personnel forced to demobilize, or
groups that lose power in the post-conflict government) will be unlikely to embrace the implementation
21
of the agreement, preventing a smooth transition to peace. By leaving one side feeling vulnerable, biased
mediators exacerbate the commitment problems and distrust that block implementation, resulting in an
unstable environment in which to establish peace.
Multiparty efforts that include mediators biased toward both sides of the conflict are able to reconcile
the challenges and benefits of bias in alleviating commitment problems. Moreover, multiparty efforts
composed of the mix of mediators best able to address both the information and commitment prob-
lems should be more effective at reaching an agreement than single-party efforts and other multiparty
compositions.
Implementation
Reaching an agreement is an important and necessary step to a lasting peace, but implementing even
a partial ceasefire requires overcoming a new set of challenges. The implementation process exposes
all parties in the conflict to new periods of vulnerability. Almost fifty percent of peace treaties signed
in civil wars between 1945 and 2004 failed within eight weeks of being signed (Gartner, 2012). This
high rate of failure highlights the importance of considering the impact of mediation on the agreement’s
chances of being implemented.
Enforcing or monitoring the implementation of an agreement has been acknowledged as a tool
available to third parties interested in fostering peace (see e.g. Fortna, 2004; Walter, 2002; Sisk, 2009).
Mediators can include formal or informal provisions in the agreement to assure the disputants that
they will stay throughout implementation to monitor the transition to peace. Not all mediators who
promise this, however, are likely to be believed. Some organizations, such as the United Nations (UN)
or African Union (AU), have a reputation for sending monitors or peacekeepers to conflicts. States that
can credibly signal an interest in the long-term outcome of the conflict or an interest in protecting one
side of the conflict are also better able to signal a commitment to staying after the formal negotiations
are over than neutral or impartial mediators.
The parties best able to overcome the initial barriers to negotiation and effectively navigate the
process of reaching an agreement are not always the parties best able to oversee implementation and
provide security guarantees in the aftermath of the conflict. For example, organizations that have been
working extensively in the warring country likely possess the relevant contextual knowledge to get the
disputants to the negotiating table and find a mutually agreeable solution, but they likely lack the military
22
and economic resources to monitor implementation and intervene appropriately if violations occur.
Again, multiparty efforts are in an advantaged position. Organizations such as the UN or AU have
experience coordinating and deploying peacekeeping forces to post-conflict areas. Countries such as the
United States have the power and resources to fund and supply such missions. Intervention by the UN
alone is not sufficient, however, as UN efforts without major power support are very difficult to execute
(see e.g. Crocker, 2001). The UN relies on its member states for resources and personnel; for a UN
promise to be credible, it must be accompanied by states’ promises to send money and troops. Major
powers often lack the political will to shoulder the burden of a monitoring or peacekeeping mission
alone. When these two types of mediators work together, states can avoid shouldering the entire burden
of such missions while the organization benefits from the states’ resources. Organizations and major
powers together can more credibly signal that peacekeeping be deployed, if necessary, and that troops
will stay throughout the transition.
Challenges of Overcrowding
The obstacles to successful resolution identified above are obstacles faced by all mediation efforts,
regardless of the number of mediators present. While multiparty efforts are often better suited than
single-party efforts to overcome these obstacles, multiparty efforts also introduce new complications,
potentially impeding the chances of success. Each mediator has its own interests in the outcome (or
they would not be willing to mediate), making common ground harder to find. Furthermore, third par-
ties potentially have interests external to the conflict that influence their behavior during negotiations
and their preferences over the negotiated outcome. Neighboring states with their own rebel populations
do not want to appear too soft on insurgents. Powerful states such as the United States have geopolitical
interests, such as supporting pro-Western governments or promoting democracy and economic liberal-
ization in the post-conflict state. These competing interests can result in longer, slower negotiations with
more roadblocks to agreement. With additional mediators, finding an agreement that the mediators are
willing to present to the combatants is harder, and even more so is finding an agreement that the medi-
ators and the disputants are all willing to accept. The longer negotiations drag on, the more vulnerable
the negotiation process becomes to spoiler violence, changes in the relative balance of power shifting
belligerents’ willingness to compromise, or even stagnation in the negotiations.
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In addition, Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999a) identify three important challenges unique to mul-
tiparty mediation: forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding. These problems are challenges
for all multiparty efforts but are magnified in overcrowded efforts. Forum-shopping occurs when dis-
putants search for a sympathetic mediator. This search by the disputants can delay mediation onset as
disputants drag their feet in order to identify a mediator with similar preferences. Forum-shopping also
delays on-going mediation as it encourages disputants to spend energy searching for a sympathetic ear
and playing mediators off each other instead of investing in the current negotiation process.
Forum-shopping not only changes the behavior of the disputants, but it also puts the mediators in
a difficult position. Mediators have good reason to be distrustful of the disputants’ sincerity, making
differentiating between legitimate concerns and stall tactics challenging. Forum-shopping can be miti-
gated by identifying a mediation team that makes both sides of the dispute feel that their concerns are
being addressed. In addition, the mediators can discourage new mediators from joining the negotiations
once talks have begun.
Mixed messages arise when the mediators have divergent preferences and send competing signals
to the disputants. Mediators who prioritize different aspects of the conflict will propose and support
competing peace plans. Different promises, ideas, or expectations from the mediators make resolving
the conflict and reaching a settlement more difficult. Conflicting information and agendas can bring the
progress of negotiations into doubt and decrease the willingness of the disputants to engage in continued
mediation. Mixed messages can be avoided by coordination among the mediators, so that proposals are
presented as a unified message.
Finally, the presence of other mediators can encourage free-riding within the mediation team (Crocker,
Hampson and Aall, 2001a). Mediators endure costs when they intervene in a conflict. These costs vary
across conflict environments, ranging from reputation costs (if the resolution process fails) to the op-
portunity costs of not extending diplomatic intervention elsewhere. The presence of multiple mediators
encourages individual actors to delay action in order to shift costs onto other mediators. This is espe-
cially true when there are multiple mediators with the same sources of leverage. If there are multiple
mediators that can exert the same influence over the disputants, then each mediator has an incentive to
diminish its individual costs. This classic collective action problem can be mitigated by minimizing the
number of mediators present, starting with the removal of redundant mediators that do not bring new
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tools, sources of leverage to the table.
The Mediation Dream Team
To most effectively overcome these obstacles to peace and minimize the negative externalities of
overcrowding, the ideal mediation team is complementary, balanced, and coordinated. Complementary
efforts maximize the sources of leverage at every phase of the negotiations, providing the knowledge,
resources, and credibility necessary to improve the prospects for peace while also avoiding redundant
mediators that crowd the mediation process. Balanced efforts help resolve the commitment problems
associated with negotiating and implementing an agreement. By including an ally of both the rebels
and the government, balanced efforts leave both sides feeling more protected, decreasing the severity
of the commitment problems faced by the disputants. Coordinated efforts help overcome the problems
unique to multiparty mediation efforts, diminishing the risk of forum-shopping, mixed messages, and
free-riding. Mediators that help balance or complement the team possess desirable traits that increase
the probability of mediation success. Mediators that can complement or balance each other will vary
across conflicts. While the ideal composition of the dream team will vary by context, I expect these
characteristics to be important for all intrastate conflicts.
Before elaborating upon how the mediation dream team improves mediation success, it is worth
considering what it means for a mediation effort to be successful. An important initial step in the
resolution process is getting the disputants to reach agreement. Getting a peace agreement signed is
difficult; by this metric, most mediation efforts result in failure. In fact, 65.6 percent of mediation efforts
in civil wars between 1989 and 2005 failed to produce a partial or comprehensive peace agreement.
Even if a peace agreement is signed, the chance of war recurrence post-mediation remains high in civil
wars. Forty-two percent of partial and full peace agreements signed in the same time period failed in the
first month. This implies that short- and long-term conceptualizations of the peace process might have
different obstacles and thus different roles for mediators to play.
Evaluating Success
My first conceptualization of resolution success is the production of a signed agreement. Signing
an agreement, regardless of whether the agreement is implemented, separates those efforts that were
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successful in getting the disputants to find a mutually acceptable compromise from those that could
not find common ground between the disputants. As most agreements fail within two months of being
signed and mediation has shown to have competing short- and long-term impacts, I also consider the
durability of the agreements. First, I measure the durability of the agreement by determining if the
agreement managed to last through the difficult initial two-month period. A second conceptualization
of the durability of the peace agreement measures the months of post-agreement peace. Taken together,
these conceptualizations of success allow for evaluating the short- and long-term impacts of mediation.
While some characteristics of the dream team might encourage an agreement to be signed, considering
the duration of post-agreement peace allows for evaluating if mediation is producing agreements that
have no chance of resulting in a durable resolution.
Complementary Mediation
Complementary mediation teams bring together mediators with different sources of leverage. By
having mediators with sufficient contextual knowledge of the conflict, enough will to credibly commit
to stay involved as long as necessary, as well as the resources necessary to generate and enforce an
agreement, the team is in a stronger position to overcome all three obstacles to resolution. Mediators
can generate complementary teams in several ways. Perhaps the team includes a local organization with
contextual knowledge and the will to help implementation, as well as a regional or global power with
the necessary resources. Perhaps each role is provided by a different actor. The important characteristic
of the dream team is that each role is filled, without unnecessary mediators crowding the negotiations.
Mediators with contextual knowledge are crucial to identifying the relevant parties to the negotia-
tions, as discussed previously. Contextual knowledge of the crisis and the disputants gives the mediator
a better understanding of the bargaining range and ways to expand the range through issue-linkage or
outside assurances. Mediators with contextual knowledge are in a better position to make sure all nec-
essary parties are involved in the talks and to use their knowledge to help the disputants find a mutually
acceptable agreement.
While agenda-setting and issue-linkage can help disputants find a mutually acceptable agreement
in some cases, in other cases such agreements might not be readily available. In these more difficult
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cases, mediators with economic or military power will have the leverage necessary to compel or co-
erce the disputants into an agreement. Promises of aid or preferential trade relationships could expand
the bargaining range, opening up mutually acceptable compromises. Likewise, threatening military ac-
tion, economic sanctions, or the removal of current aid packages could increase the costs of continued
conflict, expanding the bargaining range.
While strong mediators will have the leverage to use these carrots and sticks to encourage resolution,
the reality is that the influence of such efforts would be short-lived. This makes the third component
of a complementary effort, staying power, very important. Mediators that are willing to stay after the
agreement has been reached are able to respond to new tensions as they arise. Having actors that are
still in dialogue with the disputants provides earlier detection of problems and potentially more readily
available solutions. Identifying moments where additional influence from the mediators could be useful
(perhaps to reopen talks and deal with an unforeseen source of conflict, to assert more pressure, or
to provide additional protections and assurances) could help stabilize the implementation process and
reduce the chances the agreement fails.
Moreover, I argue that disputants interested in a lasting peace are aware of the time-inconsistency
problems often associated with mediation agreements. Disputants who expect an agreement to fail
immediately will be reluctant to sign on to the agreement in first place. Actors with staying power are
important from the very beginning of the negotiations in order to improve the disputants’ expectations
about the effectiveness of the talks, encouraging them to invest fully in the negotiations.
Complementary efforts will positively effect the chances of reaching an agreement that will endure.
By having all three sources of leverage present at the negotiating table, the mediation team is equipped
to address a variety of challenges and potential obstacles. The consequences of overcrowding imply
that while the presence of these three types of leverage is important, avoiding redundancy within the
mediation effort is also important. Additional mediators are not always desirable. The value of another
mediator is a function of how that mediator contributes to the strengths of the mediation team. Mediators
that add new sources of leverage to the mediation effort will increase the chances of mediation success,
while those that are redundant hurt the chances of success.3
3It is conceivable that the effect of redundant mediators might be different depending upon the composition of the mediation
team. In particular, perhaps redundant mediators might be more damaging when the mediation team is incomplete than when
the team is complete. I do not expect the risks of free-riding and mixed messages, however, to be a function of whether all
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This discussion identifies two important dimensions to a complementary effort: having all three
sources of leverage (being complete) and having no redundant mediators (i.e. mediators who do not
bring a unique source of leverage to the table). I expect complete efforts to be more successful than
incomplete efforts (regardless of the number of redundant mediators). Likewise, mediation efforts with
fewer redundant mediators should be more successful, all else equal.
The mediation effort by the Community of Sant’Egidio, the United States, Italy, and the United
Nations in Mozambique illustrates the effectiveness of complementary mediation. The Community of
Sant’Egidio provided contextual knowledge and cultural leverage, the UN provided peacekeeping forces
and legitimacy, and Italy and the United States provided resources and credibility to the process. Italy
also served as a liaison between the United States and the rest of the mediation team, allowing the team
to draw on the United States’ resources, while also minimizing the complications that would result from
a more direct American presence (Bartoli, 1999).
The case of Mozambique highlights the benefits of having a complete mediation effort in which all
three sources of leverage are present. The Community of Sant’Egidio, the United States, Italy, and the
UN provided different tools to the mediation effort, collectively ensuring that the mediation team had
contextual knowledge, resources, and credible staying power. Efforts like this are able to exert influence
at each stage of negotiations, helping the disputants navigate the hurdles they face. Incomplete efforts
(i.e. those lacking in one or more of these sources of leverage) might still have some influence over
the disputants, but this influence will be limited, reducing their effectiveness at helping negotiate a
settlement.
Hypothesis 1 Complete mediation teams increase the probability of successfully reaching a mediated
agreement, as well as the duration of post-agreement peace, relative to incomplete mediation teams.
Consider alternatively a multiparty mediation team consisting of representatives from four neigh-
boring states. Each of these mediators likely provide contextual knowledge, an interest in generating re-
gional stability, and some resources. All four neighbors, however, provide the same sources of leverage,
making three out of the four of these states redundant and encouraging free-riding among the mediators.
three types of leverage are at the table. Therefore I do not test this interactive possibility in the main analyses. Models with
this interactive term can be found in Tables A.13, A.14, and A.15 of the appendix.
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If more than one mediator possesses the same resources and leverage, those mediators have incentives
to minimize their costs by delaying action in the hopes another actor bears the costs. This generates
inefficiency, potentially slowing down the mediation team’s efforts, stalling progress, complicating the
process, and ultimately reducing the chances of success.
Hypothesis 2 Mediation teams with fewer redundant mediators increase the probability of successfully
reaching a mediated agreement, as well as the duration of post-agreement peace, relative to mediation
teams with more redundant mediators.
The composition of the mediation team are important influences in the outcome of mediation. The
ideal mediation team provides enough leverage to help the combatants reach agreement, yet avoids
complicating the mediation effort with actors that generate inefficiency. Furthermore, each mediator
fills a specific role, requiring each member to play their part in order to reach the desired outcome,
while also ensuring that each function is provided. It is worth noting that single-party mediation can be
complementary, if that single mediator possesses all three sources of leverage. The relevant variance is
in the types of leverage present at the negotiating table, not the number of mediators.
Balanced Mediation
Balanced mediation is unique to multiparty efforts because achieving balance requires at least two
mediators. A balanced effort is a mediation process in which each side of the dispute has a mediator
looking out for its interests. In other words, a balanced effort has at least one mediator who favors the
rebels and at least one mediator who favors the government. While many forms of mediator bias exist,
in this project a mediator is considered biased if she has provided support to one side during the conflict
or if she has ties to one side of the conflict such that she prefers an outcome that advantages that side.
Bias then is captured both in terms of the mediator’s actions and the mediator’s preferences. Mediation
efforts that are not balanced are either impartial or unbalanced. Impartial efforts are those in which no
mediator is biased toward either side. Unbalanced, or biased, efforts are those in which at least one
mediator is biased toward one side and no mediator is biased toward the other side.
To explain the advantages of balanced mediation, consider the positive process effects mediation
can have and how these effects are influenced by multiple third parties. Biased mediators have two main
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functions: to provide information so that the disputants can find a mutually acceptable agreement and
to help the disputants overcome the commitment problems that accompany conflict resolution attempts.
While mediators can in certain circumstances reveal information, their ability to do so is often quite
limited. A balanced mediation effort could improve information revelation as each side would have a
mediator to recommend caution when appropriate. Proposals approved by a balanced mediation effort
would also have a higher level of legitimacy. This improvement, however, would be constrained by the
ability of these mediators to learn information their preferred side does not already know. Therefore, the
primary mechanism by which balanced mediation efforts improve the chances of success is in mitigating
the credible commitment problems.
Impartial mediators would not exacerbate the security concerns of the disputants, but they also
cannot extend credible promises of protection or monitoring to either side. Biased mediators are in
a unique position to address the concerns of their allies. A biased mediator is more likely to alert
its ally of any opponents’ action that indicates defection from the negotiations or agreements. This
early warning provides additional protection to disputants, alleviating the urge to defect first in order to
protect against an ambush by their opponent. In addition to serving as an early warning system, biased
mediators can also credibly promise to protect their allies should the opposition try to take advantage
of a period of relative weakness. For example, demobilization leaves the side putting down weapons
vulnerable; reacquiring arms can be both costly and time consuming. The time it takes to rearm could
be sufficient to allow the other side to change the balance of power between the disputants and ruin any
progress toward peace. A biased mediator can credibly promise to send support should such a situation
arise, protecting their ally from this risk and encouraging their ally to agree to temporary ceasefires,
demobilization, or other necessary steps that might leave them at a temporary military disadvantage. In
this way, biased mediators can reduce the costs of exploitation, decreasing the need for preventive action
and encouraging disputant cooperation in a way that impartial mediators cannot.
In alleviating the concerns of one side, however, mediator bias can intensify the feelings of vulner-
ability felt by the other side. By making one side feel safer, a biased mediator can decrease the security
of the other side, potentially encouraging the insecure side to back out of the peace process. In Northern
Uganda, for example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) refused mediation by South Sudan, claiming
that Uganda’s support of South Sudan during South Sudan’s fight for independence biased South Sudan
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in favor of the Ugandan government. The LRA thus claimed that their concerns would not be taken as
seriously. An effort in which both the rebels and the government have an ally provides all the advantages
of bias in overcoming commitment problems on both sides of the conflict. By alleviating the disputants’
commitment problems during the negotiation and implementation of a peace accord, balanced media-
tion improves the chances of mediation success. By including mediators biased in favor of each side,
the mediation effort as a whole benefits from both sets of protections that biased mediators provide.
Mediation teams that include the right mix of mediator bias improve the chances of reaching an agree-
ment by helping mitigate the commitment problems that lead to negotiation breakdown. This enables
the mediation effort to benefit from mediator bias without leaving one side feeling more insecure.
Reaching an agreement does not remove the commitment problems between the disputants. Instead,
new vulnerabilities often arise as the process of implementing the agreement unfolds. Even after reach-
ing agreement, neither side wants to expose itself to defection by the other side without being prepared.
This prevents the sides from taking the first steps toward demobilization and encourages preemptive
attacks. Moreover, the process of demobilization is often asymmetric. These asymmetries create new
commitment problems that can heighten tensions, erode trust, and destabilize the peace process. Fur-
thermore, the political benefits are often not received immediately as power-sharing arrangements take
time to set up. Biased mediators are more likely to stay after an agreement has been signed because
they are more invested in the outcome of the conflict and in the security of their ally. With incentives to
leave political advisors and monitors to help ensure the safety of their ally, biased mediators continue
to mitigate the vulnerabilities of initial implementation and encourage the disputants to put their trust in
the mediator instead of their opponent. The benefits of balanced mediation therefore carry over into the
post-agreement phase; balanced mediation protects both sides with credible assurances that their inter-
ests are being looked after, providing the disputants with a safety net while they initiate implementation.
The risk of war recurrence lingers as the combatants move from violent conflict to political en-
gagement. The asymmetries created by demobilization and new political systems are rarely resolved
quickly. Eventually, even biased mediators will lose interest in monitoring the disputants’ progress to-
ward a long-term peace. While having an involved mediator who prefers the other side might encourage
biased mediators who are part of a balanced effort to stay actively involved longer, eventually other
interests will become more salient priorities. Therefore while I expect balanced mediation to improve
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the durability of the peace, I do not expect this impact to be as strong as balanced efforts’ more initial
effects.4
Hypothesis 3 Balanced mediation teams increase the probability of successfully reaching a mediated
agreement, as well as the duration of post-agreement peace, relative to unbalanced and impartial me-
diation teams.
When it comes to bias in a mediation effort, the ideal mix of mediators is one of balance. Impartial
teams (in which none of the mediators are biased) do not exacerbate commitment problems, but they
also cannot alleviate them. On the other extreme, unbalanced mediation teams, in which mediators
are biased only toward one side of the dispute, are likely to result in distrust and heightened insecurity
from the underrepresented side. By leaving one side feeling vulnerable, the commitment problems that
prevent implementation, encourage belligerents to be suspicious of their opponent’s actions, and thus
generate an unstable environment in which to establish peace, continue to plague the generation and
implementation of agreements negotiated by unbalanced mediation teams. While many obstacles stand
between negotiation and the establishment of a lasting peace, both sides of the conflict having an ally
provides the resolution process tools to encourage the combatants to pursue peace.
Coordination
By protecting against the challenges that arise from adding additional mediators to the negotiations,
coordinated mediation teams are more likely to succeed than multiparty efforts in which the mediators
intervene in the conflict independently of each other. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts suffer increased
risk of forum-shopping, free-riding, and mixed messages. Mediators can make different promises or
signal different priorities, depending upon their interests in the conflict and their relationships with the
disputants. These discontinuities decrease the possibility of reaching an agreement. Establishing order
and hierarchy within the mediation team can help guard against these risks. With coordinated mediators,
communication between the disputants and the mediators is less likely to generate mixed messages.
4It would be interesting to evaluate if balanced efforts that also included a member with staying power strengthened the
durability of the peace as perhaps this would be the idea combination theoretically. Unfortunately, interacting balance and
complementary efforts in the empirical analysis is not plausible as the observed data does not have enough variation.
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Ignoring this variation in mediation efforts leads to inaccurate conclusions about the effect of multi-
party mediation. If coordinated efforts are more likely to produce successful outcomes than single-party
efforts but uncoordinated efforts are less likely to produce successful outcomes than single-party efforts,
then our understanding of how multiparty mediation influences the prospects for peace will conflate the
positive effects of coordinated efforts with the negative effects of uncoordinated efforts. Variation within
multiparty efforts, therefore, is an important consideration when evaluating the effect of multiparty me-
diation on conflict resolution.
The level of coordination in multiparty mediation teams varies from effort to effort. Some mediation
teams go so far as to organize summits and select a leader. Often, the mediators will have meetings at
various stages of the negotiation process in order to set the agenda or agree to a plan of action. These
meetings indicate that the mediators are coordinating their work. This institutionalized coordination
sits in stark contrast to efforts on the other end of the spectrum where mediators make contradictory
statements or promise the disputants’ incompatible outcomes. Sometimes the mediators might meet
to coordinate the mediation process but leave the meeting without having reached an agreement (e.g.
the prominent countries in ECOWAS during their efforts to mediate the conflict in the Coˆte d’Ivoire).
Coordinated efforts, therefore, are not just a matter of will but also of the mediators’ ability to overcome
their differences.
Once again, the mediation effort in Mozambique, by the Community of Sant’Egidio, the United
Nations, the United States, and Italy provides an illustration of a characteristic of the dream team. The
mediators in Mozambique actively coordinated with one another. Despite their diverse interests and
roles, the mediators worked together to diminish the risk of sending mixed messages to the disputants
and increased the effectiveness of the mediation process. Coordinated multiparty mediation efforts
benefit from all of the advantages of multiparty mediation while diminishing the risk of negative conse-
quences. As a result, I expect coordinated multiparty efforts to be more effective at reaching agreement
than uncoordinated multiparty and single-party efforts.
Uncoordinated efforts are unable to utilize the benefits of multiparty mediation effectively, and they
suffer from overcrowding. The civil war in Burundi attracted many mediators and is a prime exam-
ple of what happens when mediators fail to coordinate, and send different signals to the disputants
(Hara, 1999). The political and reputational incentives for mediators outweighed the complications of
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multiparty mediation, encouraging many mediators with little sense of coordination. Fabienne Hara as-
serts that the number of mediators interested in Burundi were “out of proportion with Burundi’s strategic
value” and that many of them saw Burundi as “a laboratory to test new conflict resolution and prevention
approaches” (Hara, 1999, 142). Burundi saw mediation attempts by international organizations (includ-
ing the UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the European Union (EU)), states (including the
United States, Canada, South Africa, and Kenya), as well as non-governmental organizations (including
the Community of Sant’Egidio). These mediators all had fundamentally different approaches to me-
diation, identifying different challenges and focusing on different grievances (Hara, 1999, 142). This
generated a wide variety of responses by the international community.
For many of the mediators, coordination with the rest of the international community was seen
as desirable, but the sheer number of actors with different frameworks for mediation left the goal of
coordination unachieved (Hara, 1999, 143). The Community of Sant’Egidio, for example, tried to build
connections between the international actors and the disputants in order to make the talks more cohesive
but had limited success (149). The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Act of August 2000 was signed
at the end of these negotiations, predominantly as a result of the efforts of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania
and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. This agreement, however, failed to stop the conflict. Key rebel
groups refused to sign the agreement and even those parties who did sign the Arusha Act had serious
concerns about the agreement and the prospects for peace (Southall, 2006, 201). The response by the
international community reflected an interest in resolving the crisis in Burundi. The number of actors
who intervened, however, resulted in poor coordination and ultimately forum-shopping and free-riding.
Mediation in Burundi reflects the consequences of an overcrowded mediation effort.
Similarly, mediation in Guinea-Bissau involved many ad hoc initiatives with many actors coming
and going. In the words of Massey (2006), “Multiplication of mediators is less a matter of choice
than a fact of life in today’s world” (83). The challenges of multiparty mediation in Guinea-Bissau,
however, stemmed from different sources than the challenges faced in Burundi. The main obstacle for
Guinea-Bissau was the competition between France and Portugal for influence in the region (Massey,
2006, 89-90). After a series of very ad hoc efforts by a number of third parties, including Portugal,
Angola, Sweden, Libya, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bissau, and Gambia, the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) established itself as the primary mediator (86). France influenced
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the mediation process through proxies in ECOWAS. During a lull in ECOWAS’s negotiations, Portugal
entered the process through Communidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP). Portugal sought
to use this opportunity to increase its influence in its former colony, turning the mediation efforts into
a competition between France and Portugal. As the two mediation factions sought to maximize their
importance and secure their interests, they diminished the opportunity to generate a lasting peace.
Throughout the process, the mediators acted with “little unity of purpose”, pursuing divergent agen-
das with little information sharing (85). The Abuja agreement signed in November 1998 was not im-
plemented, the promised elections were postponed, and the violence continued (Ostheimer, 2000). The
agreement was described as “unconvincing”, and despite the agreement, the conflict ended with the
rebels taking control of the government and exiling the former ruler (Massey, 2006, 83). In this case,
coordination was not a priority of the mediators. Portugal and France (and their proxies) were more
interested in securing their position in the peace process and post-conflict environment than working
together to generate a stable transition to peace for Guinea-Bissau. Portugal knew that sending CPLP
into the conflict would complicate the negotiations, generate tension with France, and would provide
little in the way of new sources of leverage or resources that would encourage resolution. Their political
interests in the region, however, outweighed the potential risks, leading CPLP to join the negotiations
anyway. This dynamic illustrates how multiple, uncoordinated mediators can disrupt the conflict reso-
lution process.
When mediators can coordinate as they did in Mozambique, I expect very different results from
cases in which they cannot. Efforts like Burundi are the ones that leave multiparty mediation looking like
“herding cats”. In these efforts, I expect the positive impact of the mediation effort to be overpowered by
the negative consequences of overcrowding and poor coordination, resulting in uncoordinated multiparty
efforts being less likely to succeed than single-party efforts.
Hypothesis 4 Coordinated multiparty mediation teams increase the probability of successfully reach-
ing a mediated settlement relative to single-party and uncoordinated multiparty mediation. Single-party
mediation increases the probability of successfully reaching a mediated agreement relative to uncoordi-
nated multiparty mediation teams.
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The impact of coordination, however, is only expected to effect the reaching of an agreement. Co-
ordination is not hypothesized to impact whether the agreement endures Coordination alone does not
signal staying power, the ability to mitigate commitment problems, or long-term interest in the conflict.
The mediation dream team is complementary, balanced, and coordinated. Mediators with contextual
knowledge or bias will vary from conflict to conflict, and therefore the dream team will be different in
different contexts. As mediation is only used in the most difficult to resolve conflicts, the task undertaken
by any mediator or group of mediators is not an easy one. While the dream team is expected to improve
the chances of peace, the presence of the dream team is not expected to be sufficient to guarantee an
enduring peace in all conflicts. While the dream team might not ensure mediation will succeed, this is
an important step forward in understanding how the international community can improve the chances
of peaceful conflict resolution. In the next chapter, I operationalize these characteristics of the dream
team and present the research design I use to test these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN & DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
To evaluate the hypotheses from the previous chapter, I develop new measures to operationalize the
characteristics of the mediation dream team. These measures draw on both existing data sources as well
as original data collection. I collected data on the list of mediation attempts in civil wars taken from the
Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011), restricting the years
of interest to 1989–2005. This restriction provides a more temporally homogeneous sample, avoiding
complications that could arise from including mediation efforts that occurred during and after the Cold
War era.1 For civil wars ongoing during this time period, CWM identifies the mediators present in each
mediation attempt as well as the outcome of the attempt.
Measuring Mediation Success
Using this sample of mediation attempts, I estimated a series of statistical models to explore the
effect of the dream team characteristics on mediation success. Importantly, I operationalize success
in three ways in order to assess the effect of complementary, balanced, and coordinated efforts on both
short- and long-term outcomes. I measure success in terms of reaching a negotiated settlement at the end
of the mediation attempt as well as if the settlement halts the violence and ultimately if the settlement
leads to a durable peace.
Reaching an Agreement
The first analyses evaluate the effectiveness of complementary, balanced, and coordinated media-
tion efforts in overcoming the obstacles to reaching an agreement. To evaluate this, I operationalize
1While the temporal heterogeneity with respect to the effect of mediation is an interesting question, it is left for another
project.
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mediation success in terms of what type of agreement, if any, was reached at the end of negotiations.
Negotiations can result in failure (no agreement reached between the belligerents), a process agreement
promising future negotiations, a ceasefire that agrees to halt hostilities but does not resolve the underly-
ing source of the hostilities, a partial peace agreement, or a comprehensive peace agreement that seeks
to end the violence and address the grievances of the belligerents. I consider mediation efforts to be
more successful if they produce more formalized, comprehensive agreements. Therefore, these media-
tion outcomes fall into a natural progression from failure to comprehensive peace agreement. Because
process agreements and ceasefires often accompany one another, establishing a clear coding rule to
distinguish between the two is difficult. Furthermore, both process agreements and ceasefires are tem-
porary agreements that leave the door open for future negotiations but do not address the causes of the
conflict. For these reasons, I include these two possible outcomes in one category: limited commitment
agreements.
Using this hierarchy, I implement ordered logistic models in which the dependent variable, me-
diation success, is defined as the outcome of the negotiations: no agreement, a limited commitment
agreement, a partial peace agreement, or a comprehensive peace agreement.2 Table 3.1 presents the
frequency distribution of this measure of success.3
Table 3.1: Distribution of Mediated Settlements
Failure Limited Comm Part Peace Comp Peace Total
51 147 61 43 302
16.9 48.7 20.2 14.2 100
Counts and percentages of mediation attempts in each category.
Halting the Violence
Next, I consider only those mediation efforts that resulted in an agreement and operationalize medi-
ation success as the termination of violence after the signing of an agreement. For this set of analyses,
ceasefires, partial peace agreements, and comprehensive peace agreements are included. In each of
2These codings are taken predominantly from DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011). Some changes have been made
by the author as a result of further investigation, including cross-checking with the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset and fur-
ther reading on the mediation process and outcome from news sources accessed through Lexis Nexus and ProQuest Historical
Newspapers. A list of these changes is available upon request.
3Models with partial and comprehensive peace agreements coded as one category are reported in the appendix.
38
these agreements, the combatants make promises to put down their weapons. All three of these types
of agreements should have short-term impacts on reducing violence. Violence termination is coded
from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Ho¨gbladb and Wallensteen, 2006) and the UCDP
Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010). Violence is considered to have terminated if it halted for
at least two months after the signing of an agreement.4 With this dichotomy, I evaluate the effect of
complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation efforts on short-term post-conflict success using
logistic regression.5 Of the 302 mediation attempts, 183 of them ended in a ceasefire, partial or compre-
hensive peace agreement. Just over fifty percent of these agreements failed to stop the violence for two
months (93 cases, or 50.8 percent). The remaining ninety cases (49.2 percent) reached this two-month
threshold.
Generating a Durable Peace
Finally, I operationalize mediation success in terms of the durability of the post-agreement peace.
For this analysis, only peace agreements (partial and comprehensive) are included, as limited commit-
ment agreements often come with a termination date and are thus not expected to endure indefinitely. A
mediation effort’s success is determined by the duration of peace after the agreement was signed. The
duration of peace is coded as the number of months that passed before the peace agreement failed, ei-
ther implicitly through the return of hostilities, or explicitly by either side as coded by the UCDP Peace
Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Ho¨gbladb and Wallensteen, 2006). As not all mediation efforts identified
in CWM match up with agreements in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the duration of the remain-
ing agreements is coded from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010). In this sample,
fifty-eight of the post-agreement peace episodes are censored, not failing during the UCDP’s window
of observation (leaving forty-five uncensored observations). Figure 3.1 illustrates the duration of post-
agreement peace in the uncensored and censored observations (in months). As these graphs show, many
4While two months is somewhat arbitrary, this threshold was motivated by analyses conducted in past studies. The conclu-
sions drawn from the model are unchanged using any threshold up to six months. Longer thresholds than six months were not
tested as this variable is supposed to capture a short-term post-agreement outcome.
5Censored probit models (also referred to as Heckman probit models) were also estimated in order to control for the selection
into an agreement. These models are notoriously unidentified (Brandt and Schneider, 2004). The censored probit models esti-
mated here also suffer from identifiability issues and are therefore not chosen as the primary analyses for this operationalization
of success. Output from the censored probit models are included Table A.9 in the appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Duration of Post-Agreement Peace (in Months)
agreements fail quickly, with eighty percent of the uncensored agreements (forty-seven percent of all
peace agreements) failing within the first year. Yet, many agreements manage to make a lasting impact,
as can be seen in the censored cases which range from four years to twenty years and counting.
The effect of the mediation dream team on the hazard of peace failure (i.e. the risk of war recur-
rence) is estimated using a Weibull event-history model. As peace agreements are not signed at random,
I estimate and report a Weibull model with selection (Boehmke, Morey and Shannon, 2006) in the ap-
pendix to see how the inclusion of a selection equation influences the results. While many agreements
fail shortly after signing, this risk of failure decreases as the agreement endures, making the Weibull
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an appropriate choice of event-history model. The Weibull distribution assumes a baseline hazard rate
that is either flat, monotonically increasing, or monotonically decreasing and estimates this rate with the
parameter p (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). The baseline hazard is expected to be monotonically
decreasing as the risk of failure should decrease over time. Therefore, the Weibull distribution accom-
modates and tests the assumed relationship between peace duration and risk of failure.6 Also included
in the appendix are Cox proportional hazard models. As semi-parametric models, the Cox model makes
no assumption about the baseline hazard rate. While this has some advantages, the main disadvantage
is that it prevents the estimation of substantive quantities of interest, including median expected dura-
tion. As this project is interested in not only statistical relationships, but also the substantive impact of
differences in mediation efforts, the Weibull results and predicted mediation durations are reported as
the main analyses.
Measuring the Dream Team
With the measures of mediation success specified, the characteristics of the mediation dream team
must now be operationalized. Measures of complementary and balanced efforts are developed from
existing data sources, with the procedure used to code these variables summarized in Tables 3.2 and 3.6.
To capture the coordination of multiparty efforts, original data collection was conducted.
Complementary Mediation
A complementary team is one in which each of the key sources of leverage is accounted for (contex-
tual knowledge, military/economic resources, and credible staying power), and each mediator provides
at least one unique source of leverage. Mediation efforts can fail to be complementary in two ways.
First, they can fail to include all three sources of leverage. These attempts are referred to as incomplete.
Second, they can include mediators who fail to provide a unique source of leverage. These mediators
are referred to as redundant. The complementary nature of mediation teams was determined by coding
the sources of leverage each mediator brings to the table. These individual sources of leverage are then
aggregated to determine the number of redundant mediators as well as whether the meidation effort as
6In the analyses presented below, ln(p) is statistically significant and negative (p < 1), providing support for the assumption
that the baseline hazard for civil war recurrence is monotonically decreasing.
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a whole is complete. This process is described below and summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Complementary Mediation Coding
For Each Mediator For Mediation Team
Value Description Value Description
Contextual Knowledge 1
previous successful mediation
or ethnic/religious ties 
0 otherwise Complete 1 all present0 at least one missing
Mediator Strength 1 major or regional power0 otherwise Redundancy ≥ 0 # redundant mediators
Staying Power 1 reputation for peacekeeping0 otherwise
Contextual Knowledge
Mediators develop contextual knowledge through historical and cultural connections with the dis-
putants. Sources of contextual leverage include a shared religion or ethnicity, previous intervention in
the conflict, or other experience in the country at war. For mediators like the Community of Sant’Egidio,
strong contextual knowledge was signaled by its association with religious communities within the state
but also by a history of humanitarian and civil society activity in Mozambique. The key to contex-
tual knowledge is picking a threshold for these relationships that separates those actors with relevant
knowledge from those that have interests in the country but not the depth of knowledge necessary to
exert relational influence as a mediator. Shared cultural identity is a fairly high standard with only 9.5
percent of the mediators in the data having a shared identity with either of the disputants. Previous
intervention in the conflict alone, however, does not signal contextual knowledge as mediators could
intervene repeatedly without gaining insight into the disputants’ needs. Additionally, while repeated in-
tervention could indicate investment by the mediator, it does not signal that the mediator understands the
cultural differences preventing communication or the opportunities for issue-linkage or agenda-setting
that would enable the mediator to shape the negotiations productively.
Other potential means of separating mediators with contextual knowledge from those without could
try to identify characteristics of mediators that are more likely to be correlated with possessing contex-
tual knowledge. For example, neighbors are more likely to possess this knowledge than distant powers.
Not all neighbors, however, will inherently possess such knowledge. Moreover, neighbors are also more
likely to be directly impacted by the war (through refugee populations or spill-over effects). Coding all
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neighbors as having this kind of influence risks conflating those with contextual knowledge with other
characteristics of neighbors, such as their concern for regional stability.7
For this study, mediators have contextual knowledge in a given mediation instance if: a) they have
successfully mediated in the conflict previously, b) they have a cultural tie to either side of the conflict
through common religion or ethnicity. If either of these conditions are met, then the individual mediator
is determined to have contextual leverage. Narrowing the field to only mediators with previous suc-
cessful interventions helps eliminate mediators who might have a history with the conflict but not the
relational ties necessary to understand the unique challenges the disputants face. Mediators who have
successfully negotiated an agreement, on the other hand, have demonstrated an ability to navigate the
conflict’s challenges and have built productive relationships with the disputants. Such mediators have
signaled that either they possess contextual knowledge or are able to gain such knowledge from the
disputants.
Condition a is determined by previous entries in the CWM dataset; a mediator is coded as having
contextual knowledge if the mediator was successful in negotiating an agreement within a year of the
current negotiations. Past success is only coded for this narrow time window because the knowledge and
relationships from a successful mediation are likely to decay over time. New problems, new insecurities,
new challenges, and new opportunities for compromise will have arisen.8 A mediator who has not kept
in close communication over time will not have the newest information and therefore will no longer
have the necessary contextual knowledge.
Determining if the mediator has a cultural tie with any of the disputants requires identifying the
religious and ethnic identity of the mediator and the combatants, if relevant. IGOs offering mediation
are coded as having no religious/ethnic identity.9 Therefore, IGOs cannot satisfy condition b. Individ-
uals who mediate could theoretically be culturally connected to the conflict if they cite their ethnic or
religious similarities as reasons for their willingness to or interest in mediating. In this sample, however,
7Robustness checks including neighbors being coded as having contextual knowledge are included in Tables A.20, A.21, and
A.22.
8Alternative codings at two- and five-year thresholds were also included. The results of these alternative operationalizations
can be found in Tables A.20, A.21, and A.22.
9While IGOs might send individual mediators who have religious or ethnic connections to the conflict, these individuals will
be operating on behalf of and through the constraints of the organizations that sent them. As these IGOs represent many states
and thus cultures, they are coded as not having a strong religious or ethnic identity.
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none of the individuals who intervene satisfy this criteria. This means that only states and NGOs have
cultural connections to the disputes in this sample of mediation attempts.
To determine if a state mediator satisfies condition b requires coding the religious/ethnic identity of
the state as well as the religious/ethnic identity of the disputants. The religious/ethnic identity of the
mediator and the government in conflict was identified using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset
(Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). EPR identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups (including
ethnoreligious groups) in a given state.10 For each group, EPR codes the extent to which that group
controls the current government. The level of control ranges from groups that have “absolute power”
to those that are “exclu[ded] from central power”. The ethnic/religious identity of a state mediator or
government disputant is ethnic group that has absolute control (monop=1 or dominant=1) or is the senior
partner in a power-sharing agreement (senior=1).
The rebel group’s religious/ethnic identity is coded by combining information from the Minorities
at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset (Asal, Pate and Wilkenfeld, 2008), the Minorities
at Risk (MAR) quantitative dataset (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009), the EPR dataset (Wimmer, Ced-
erman and Min, 2009), and the Ethnic Armed Conflicts (EAC) dataset (Cederman, Min and Wimmer,
2008). The EAC dataset identifies whether the conflict had ethnic/religious ties through recruitment or
goals. This signals whether the rebels have an ethnoreligious identity. The identity of these groups is
indicated in the EPR dataset by matching the conflict codes from EAC. The MAR and MAROB datasets
provide additional support for these coding decisions as needed.
As few NGOs mediated in civil wars during the time period under consideration, the ethnic and
religious identities of mediating NGOs was coded by reading the NGOs’ mission statements and objec-
tives. If these indicate a strong religious or ethnic motivation, that identity is coded for the NGO. For
example, the Community of Sant’Egidio is coded as a Catholic organization because its mission and
peacemaking activities are clearly rooted in its Catholic identity. Taken together, a mediator satisfies
condition b if the mediator’s ethnic/religious identities intersect the identities of the government or rebel
groups.
Table 3.3 indicates the frequency with which these characteristics were present in the mediation
10EPR defines a group as politically relevant if “at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that
group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated
against in the domain of public politics” (325).
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attempts under study as well as the percentage of efforts with each combination present.
Table 3.3: Components of Contextual Knowledge by Mediation Effort
Cultural Ties No Cultural Ties Total
Previous Successful Mediation
11 69 80
3.64 22.8 26.5
No Previous Successful Mediation
37 185 222
12.3 61.3 73.5
Total
48 254 302
15.9 84.1 100
Counts and percentages for the presence of previous successful mediation/cultural ties in
mediation attempts.
Mediator Strength
Resource leverage is determined by the material wealth and power of the intervener. All mediators
have some resource leverage, but to fulfill this role the mediator must have sufficient resources to alter
the negotiating environment and fund the negotiation and post-negotiation process. Therefore, mediators
are divided into those with high levels and those with low levels of resource leverage. Major (global)
powers (as determined by the Correlates of War (COW) State System Membership List, 2011) are high
resource leverage mediators. Regional powers, when mediating a conflict in their region, also have
sufficient economic and military strength to coerce and compel the disputants. For each region and each
year, the regional power is the state with the highest Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)
score using the National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). Regions are
coded following the COW designations.11 Table 3.4 lists both the regional and major powers, years they
held this status (within the time period under observation), as well as frequency of mediation.12
Credible Staying Power
Mediators are coded as having credible staying power if they currently have peacekeepers or moni-
tors in the country they are mediating, a history of sending monitors to the conflict, or are regional/international
organizations known for peacekeeping efforts. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations (MPO) Database identifies all peace operations conducted by the
11This generates nine regions: North and Central America, South America, Europe, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Middle
East, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.
12For regional powers, the frequency of mediation only includes mediation attempts in the power’s region.
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Table 3.4: Global & Regional Powers
Global Powers
Power Years Frequency
United States 1989–2005 54
United Kingdom 1989–2005 5
France 1989–2005 25
Germany 1991–2005 2
Russia 1989–2005 41
China 1989–2005 0
Japan 1991–2005 6
Regional Powers
Power Years Frequency
Brazil 1989–2005 0
Nigeria 1989–2005 1
South Africa 1989–2005 6
Turkey 1989–2005 0
Indonesia 1989–2005 13
Australia 1989–2005 3
UN, regional organizations, or “ad hoc coalitions of states” (Soder, 2012). This dataset lists each state
that contributed personnel as well as the years of participation. A state mediator has credible staying
power if it sent peacekeepers to that conflict in the past or currently has peacekeepers on the ground.
Additionally, organizations have credible staying power if they are known for engaging in peacekeeping
operations and the country in conflict is a member of that organization. MPO identifies organizations
that deployed peacekeeping missions during and shortly before the time period of interest.13 These
organizations, therefore, have credible staying power when mediating a dispute in a member country.
Determining Complementary Mediation
Finally, these sources of influence were combined to determine the overall complementary nature
of the mediation team. A source of mediation is considered present in the mediation team if at least one
mediator is coded as having that type of leverage. Complete is a dummy variable that captures if the
mediation team possesses all three sources of leverage. If each source of leverage is present, then the
team is complete. If a source of leverage is lacking, then the mediation team is labeled incomplete.
13These organizations are: United Nations, African Union, Economic Community of Central African States, Commonwealth
of Independent States, Economic Community of West African States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union,
Organization of American States, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
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If all of a mediator’s sources of leverage are accounted for by the other mediators, then that mediator
is redundant. The number of redundant mediators determines the level of redundancy in the mediation
effort. Redundancy is a count variable equal to the number of redundant mediators. Table 3.5 summa-
rizes the frequency with which each source of leverage is present as well as the frequency of complete
mediation teams. Figure 3.2 describes the distribution of the number of redundant mediators in the
mediation attempts in this sample.
Table 3.5: Sources of Influence & Complete Mediation
Cont. Knowledge Resource Lev. Staying Power Complete
Attempts Present
117 107 131 20
38.7 35.4 43.4 6.6
Attempts Absent
185 195 171 282
61.3 64.6 56.6 93.4
Counts and percentages for the presence of the three sources of leverage.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Redundancy
Mediation Balance
To determine the balance of the mediation team, first the biases of each mediator were identified.
Each mediator’s bias was coded from the perspective of the mediator’s relationship with the government.
A mediator can either be biased in favor of the government (and thus against the rebels), biased against
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Table 3.6: Mediation Balance Coding
For Each Mediator For Mediation Team
Value Description Category Description
Mil/Pol Bias (MB)
1 supported G only
0 supported neither/both 
Balanced B < 0 for at least one mediator-1 supported R only & B > 0 for at least one mediator
Cultural Bias (CB)
1 ethnoreligious ties to G Impartial B = 0 for all mediators
0 ties to neither/both
-1 ethnoreligious ties to R
Biased
B > 0 for at least one mediator
& B = 0 for all other mediators
Mediator Bias (B)
MB + CB > 0 Biased toward G or B < 0 for at least one mediator
MB + CB = 0 Impartial & B = 0 for all other mediators
MB + CB < 0 Biased toward R
Note: R indicates rebels; G indicates government.
the government (in favor of the rebels), or impartial to both sides. The connections between each
mediator and the disputants was determined along two dimensions: military/political bias and cultural
bias. Table 3.6 provides a summary of the procedure that produces the variable Balance.
Military and Political Bias
The first dimension is the military/political bias of the mediators. Drawing on Svensson (2007a),
a mediator is biased in favor of the government if it provided direct military or political support to the
government during the conflict. Likewise, a mediator is biased against the government (i.e. in favor
of the rebels) if it provided direct military or political support to the rebels, as coded from the UCDP
External Support Project Primary Warring Party Dataset (Ho¨gbladh, Pettersson and Themne´r, 2011).
The External Support dataset identifies all secondary warring and non-warring providers of support in
civil conflicts from 1975 to 2009. Warring support involves sending troops to assist in the ongoing
conflict. Non-warring support can involve “provision of sanctuary, financial assistance, logistics and
military support short of troops” that is provided by a state or an organization.14 As one might expect
the impact of military support to erode over time, mediators are only coded as biased if they provided
military/political support within ten years of the start of the mediation effort.
While a history of support might generate perceptions of bias that persist for longer than ten years,
mediators who provided support in the past and have stopped doing so are unlikely to be able to credibly
commit to assisting their former allies now. On the other hand, a more narrow window would exclude
mediators who have not provided support more recently because of a stalemate in the conflict, a lack of
14It should be noted that UCDP throws out “allegations of support that have limited spread or that are clearly outrageous”.
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continued need by their ally, or because they have found ways to provide support through more subtle
channels not being detected by observers. MB is coded as 1 (indicating that the mediator is biased
toward the government) if that mediator provided political or military support to the government in the
conflict in the last ten years, -1 if the mediator provided support to the rebels in the last ten years, and 0
if the mediator provided support to neither side or both sides during the ten-year period.15
Cultural Bias
The second dimension is the cultural bias of the mediators. While some have dismissed this dimen-
sion of mediator bias in the past (see e.g. Savun (2008)), given the cultural and ethnic sources of tension
in many civil conflicts, this dimension plays an important role in shaping the relationship between the
combatants and mediator(s). Mediators with strong cultural ties to one side will be perceived as biased
by the disputants, influencing how much the disputants trust the mediators. Moreover, mediators with
strong cultural ties will be able to develop more confidence with and leverage over the combatants with
which they share cultural connections. In this analysis, a mediator is considered culturally biased in
favor of a disputant if the mediator shares politically relevant religious or ethnic ties with that disputant
as coded previously.
The mediator received a value of 1 for cultural bias (CB) if the mediator shared ethnic/religious ties
with the government, -1 if it shared ethnic/religious ties to the rebels, and 0 if it shared ties with neither
or both sides. Notably, a mediator can share ethnic/religious ties to both sides in the conflict. In such
cases the mediator has contextual knowledge but does not have a cultural bias.16
Relative Bias
Each mediator’s biases are captured by these two variables: military/political bias (MB) and cultural
bias (CB). These variables capture what Savun (2008) refers to as the absolute bias of the mediator.
The relative bias of a mediator is B = (MB) + (CB).17 The calculation for B allows the mediator’s
cultural and political biases to potentially cancel each other out should a mediator be politically biased
toward one side and culturally biased toward the other. The magnitude of B is not of interest in this
15Interestingly there are eight cases of a mediator having provided support to both sides during the ten years leading up to the
mediation attempt. This is an interesting, albeit rare, phenomenon that perhaps deserves more attention in future work.
16This is empirically a very rare event. There is only one case of this occurring in this project’s dataset.
17This follows the method of Savun but changes the components of the calculation in order to accommodate the relevant
sources of bias in the civil war mediator-disputant relationship.
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Table 3.7: Mediator Balance by Dimension & Overall Mediation Balance
Military Dimension Cultural Dimension Overall
Balanced
10 0 17
3.3 0.0 5.6
Impartial
221 255 192
73.2 84.4 65.6
Unbalanced
71 47 93
23.5 15.6 30.8
Counts and percentages of mediation attempts in each category.
study, only whether B is positive or negative. If B is positive, then the mediator is biased in favor of
the government. If B is negative, then the mediator is biased against the government (i.e. biased toward
the rebels). When B equals 0, the mediator is impartial, having no relative bias toward either side in the
conflict.
Mediation Balance
After identifying each mediator’s relative bias, these biases were aggregated to capture the overall
balance of the mediation effort. The variable, Balance, is a three-category variable by which the baseline
category of balanced mediation can be compared to impartial and unbalanced mediation. Mediation
efforts were coded as impartial if all members of the team are impartial (i.e. all mediators had a relative
bias of 0). The remaining mediation efforts have at least one biased mediator and therefore fall into either
the unbalanced or balanced mediation categories. A team is balanced if both sides have a mediator
biased in their favor (i.e. for at least one mediator B is negative and for at least one mediator B is
positive). A team is unbalanced if only one side has mediators biased in its favor. Balanced mediation
requires at least two mediators, making it inherently multiparty. Unbalanced and impartial efforts need
not be multiparty. Table 3.7 provides summary information regarding how the mediation efforts are
categorized for each dimension (military/political and cultural) as well as overall. In order to directly
evaluate Hypothesis 3, the baseline category in all analyses is balanced mediation. Table 3.8 displays
descriptive information about the mediation balance categories.
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Table 3.8: Mediation Balance by Multiparty Mediation
Single-Party Multiparty Total
Balanced
0 17 17
0.0 5.6 5.6
Impartial
123 69 192
40.7 22.8 63.6
Unbalanced
31 62 93
10.3 20.5 30.8
Total
154 148 302
51.0 49.0 100.0
Counts and percentages of mediation attempts by mediation balance.
Identifying Coordination
Existing datasets of mediation in intrastate conflicts do not include sufficient information on media-
tor composition and coordination. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 4, I gathered new data on coordination
in multiparty mediation efforts for each of the cases in the CWM dataset. This relied on three primary
sources: the Conflict Barometer annual reports (available in English after 2002)18 and news articles
identified using ProQuest Historical Newspapers and LexisNexus Academic databases. The Conflict
Barometer reports provide an overview of both inter- and intrastate conflicts currently ongoing in the
international system as well as key developments in the conflict in that year. More specific information
about the conflicts and resolution efforts came from news articles reported before, during, and soon
after the mediation attempts occurred. These articles were systematically identified using both Pro-
Quest Historical Newspapers and LexisNexus Academic databases. Only articles contemporary to the
resolution efforts were analyzed in order to avoid temporal biases in the data collection process. Other
sources were also consulted as appropriate. For example, reports and press releases available through
the Crisis Management Initiative and Center for Humanitarian Dialogue websites were consulted for
cases mediated by these organizations.
To test the hypothesis that coordinated multiparty efforts should be more successful than uncoor-
dinated multiparty efforts, I used these sources to determine if the mediators worked collectively or
18These reports are available at www.hiik.de/eh/konflktbarometer/.
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independently. Often, the mediators would have meetings to set the agenda or agree to a plan of ac-
tion. These meetings indicated that the mediation team sought to work collectively and were coordinat-
ing their work. Other times, mediators made separate statements that contradicted each other or were
promising different outcomes. These statements signaled uncoordinated efforts. The coordination of
these efforts was coded as a trichotomous variable identifying if the mediation effort was single-party
and for multiparty efforts distinguishing between multiparty efforts that were coordinated and those that
were not. Of the multiparty mediation cases, about twenty-two percent were uncoordinated. The other
seventy-eight percent were coordinated. Table 3.9 summarizes this classification of mediation attempts.
Table 3.9: Mediation Coordination
Single-Party Uncoordinated Multiparty Coordinated Multiparty
154 32 116
51.0 10.6 38.4
Counts and percentages of mediation attempts by coordination type.
Control Variables
In addition to complementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation, other characteristics of the me-
diation process influence mediation success. I also control for alternative explanations of conflict resolu-
tion, including the following control variables in all subsequent models. The command structure of the
rebel group influences the mediation process and thus the likelihood of reaching an agreement. A rebel
groups with a strong central commands has a clear bargaining partner for the government negotiators
(Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). Therefore, rebel groups with strong central commands
are more likely to negotiate an agreement successfully. Moreover, the presence of a strong central com-
mand can help alleviate tensions as the agreement is implemented, protect against spoiling, and provide
a focal point for the government to assess compliance. Thus, strong central command should also be
associated with more durable agreements. The strength of the rebel group’s central command structure
is taken from the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars (NSA) Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan,
2013).
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Past works on mediation have also identified issue salience as influencing the likelihood of negoti-
ation success (e.g. Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Bercovitch and Houston, 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie and
Rothchild, 2001). Fearon (2004) asserts that territorial wars are more difficult to resolve because they
are more intractable. As the incompatibility influences not only the likelihood of reaching a peace agree-
ment, but also the likelihood of peace following an agreement, all three models of mediation success
include a variable indicating whether the conflict was over territory.19
The duration of the war should improve the chances of reaching an agreement as well as lengthen the
duration of the post-agreement peace (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001). As the conflict persists,
both sides learn more about the conflict and their opponent, making a settlement more appealing. Thus,
the longer the war, the more likely a signed agreement will produce a stable, lasting peace. The duration
of the conflict is coded as the number of years between the conflict’s first inclusion in the UCDP Armed
Conflict Dataset20 and the last year of its inclusion before the signing of the peace agreement. Addi-
tionally, the intensity of the conflict may encourage disputants to consider a compromised settlement
over continued fighting. In a discussion of international conflicts, Ghosn (2010) asserts that in higher
intensity wars the disputants are more likely to embrace negotiation, but less likely to reach a successful
outcome. The intensity of the conflict is coded from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al.,
2002).
Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) also argue that the opposition’s past experience with the
government should influence their trust and mutual willingness to abide by the settlement. Therefore,
higher levels of democracy during the negotiations and at the time of the agreement’s signing should
positively influence opposition expectations about future interactions, thus increasing the probability
of peace. Therefore, the state’s polity score, from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2002), in the
year in which the agreement was signed is included in all three models. Finally, I control for the region
in which the conflict being mediated occurs. This control seeks to accommodate the known impact of
regional influences from spill-over effects to regional pressure to resolve the conflict.
Moreover, some factors influence the likelihood a signed agreement endures. To account for these
factors I control for whether the agreement was a ceasefire in the logistic models. Additionally, the
19This variable is coded from the Conflict Barometer Annual Reports available at http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/.
20The UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v. 4-2010, 1946-2009 can be accessed from http://www.ucdp.uu.se.
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strength of the rebels relative to the government is included in the logistic and duration models to
control for the conflict environment in which the agreement is being implemented. This variable comes
from the NSA dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2013).
In the duration models, an additional control variables is included. Third-party guarantees by way
of a commission to oversee or monitor the implementation of the agreement (Mutwol, 2009) or the
provision of a peacekeeping force (Fortna, 2004) in the final stages of the negotiations can increase the
belligerents’ faith in the peace process. Interestingly, Tiernay (2015) finds that peacekeepers present
during the negotiations are not correlated with signing an agreement; this control is only included in the
duration models. The presence of a peacekeeping or monitoring force soon after the cessation of negoti-
ations was coded from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace
Operations Database (Soder, 2012) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.21
After operationalizing the characteristics of the dream team and considering alternative explanations
for mediation success, Hypotheses 1–4 can now be evaluated on the sample of mediation attempts in
civil wars from 1989–2005. The next chapter reports and discusses the findings from these analyses.
21Information on past United Nations peacekeeping missions can be accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml with a complete list of operations available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS & RESULTS
This chapter presents the previously-described analyses in order to evaluate the effects of mediation
dream team characteristics on mediation outcomes. Overall, I find support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 in
terms of short-term outcomes. Balanced and coordinated efforts increase the probability of mediation
ending in a comprehensive peace agreement. The support for my hypotheses is not as strong when
considering the post-agreement impact of the mediation effort. Balanced mediation has a meaning-
ful impact on halting the violence post-agreement, but no significant impact on decreasing the overall
hazard of war recurrence. The characteristics of the dream team encourage the disputants to reach an
agreement but are not sufficient to produce a durable post-agreement peace.
Bivariate Relationships
To give a better understanding of how complementary, balanced, and coordinated efforts relate to
the different measures of mediation success, this section presents bivariate comparisons in the absence
of controls.
Reaching Agreement
Beginning with the immediate mediation outcome (the type of agreement, if any, agreed to by the
disputants) Tables 4.1–4.3 and Figure 4.1 present bivariate comparisons between mediation characteris-
tics and the type of agreement reached. Complete mediation efforts show a relatively even distribution
across outcome categories. More complete efforts end with the signing of a peace agreement (con-
sidering together partial and comprehensive) than fail or produce a limited commitment agreement.
Incomplete efforts, on the other hand, more often produce limited commitment agreements than a peace
agreement. The Fisher’s exact test, however, does not indicate that this bivariate pattern is significant.
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Table 4.1: Completeness & Agreement Outcome
Failure Limited Comm Part Peace Comp Peace Total
Incomplete
46 141 56 39 282
16.3 50.0 19.9 13.8 100
Complete
5 6 5 4 20
25.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 100
Total
51 147 61 43 302
16.9 48.7 20.2 14.2 100
Counts and percentages of mediation outcomes by completeness.
Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.290.
Figure 4.1: Redundancy & Agreement Outcome
The number of redundant mediators also shows the expected pattern, albeit weakly. Figure 4.1
illustrates the percent of total mediation attempts that ended in each of the four outcome categories
for the different number of redundant mediators present. A Spearman rank correlation test produces
a negative coefficient: -0.018. While this is in the direction expected (more redundant mediators is
associated with a less comprehensive agreement), the substantive size of the relationship is quite small,
and the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 0.05 threshold.
Impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts are both most likely to result in limited commitment
agreements. Limited commitment agreements are more likely for these categories than the combination
of a partial or comprehensive peace agreement. Balanced mediation shows an interesting pattern; it is
equally likely to result in failure as a partial peace agreement. When considering the two types of peace
agreement together, however, a peace agreement is the most likely outcome for balanced mediation.
Finally, coordinated multiparty efforts are more likely to result in a peace agreement (and less likely
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Table 4.2: Balance & Agreement Outcome
Failure Limited Comm Part Peace Comp Peace Total
Balanced
5 4 5 3 17
29.4 23.5 29.4 17.7 100
Impartial
29 100 34 29 192
15.1 52.1 17.7 15.1 100
Unbalanced
17 43 22 11 93
18.3 46.2 23.7 11.8 100
Total
51 147 61 43 302
16.9 48.7 20.2 14.2 100
Counts and percentages of mediation outcome by mediation balance.
Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.226.
to result in failure) than uncoordinated or single-party efforts. Single-party efforts also outperform
uncoordinated multiparty efforts.
Table 4.3: Coordination & Agreement Outcome
Mediation Outcome
Total
Failure Limited Comm Part Peace Comp Peace
Single-Party
23 87 25 19 154
14.9 56.5 16.2 12.3 100
Uncoordinated
12 17 2 1 32
37.5 53.1 6.3 3.1 100
Coordinated
16 43 34 23 116
13.8 37.1 29.3 19.8 100
Total
51 147 61 43 302
16.9 48.7 20.2 14.2 100
Counts and percentages of mediation outcome by coordination.
Fisher’s exact test: p < 0.000.
Violence Halted
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 as well as Figure 4.2 provide the bivariate relationships between the charac-
teristics of the dream team and whether peace lasted for at least two months after the signing of an
agreement.1
The number of complete cases in this set of analyses is quite small with only ten total. Of these ten,
six of them successfully navigate the initial post-agreement period, generating peace for at least two
1As coordination was not hypothesized to have a post-agreement effect, the relationship between coordinated efforts and
reaching this two month threshold (as well as the average duration of peace considered below) are not discussed here.
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Table 4.4: Completeness & Halted Violence
Failed Succeeded Total
Incomplete
89 84 173
51.4 48.6 100
Complete
4 6 10
40.0 60.0 100
Total
93 90 183
50.8 49.2 100
Counts and percentages of successfully halting violence
by completeness. Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.532.
Figure 4.2: Redundancy & Halted Violence
months. The other four fail to achieve this measure of success. While only a little more than half of
complete efforts succeeded, a little less than half of the incomplete efforts succeeded. This bears out the
general pattern expected in Hypothesis 1, although this pattern does not reach statistical significance.
Redundancy tells a more complex and less intuitive story. About half of the efforts that have no
redundant mediators succeeded and the other half failed. A little more than half of the efforts with one
redundant mediator failed. For larger numbers of redundant mediators, the majority of these efforts
succeeded. Statistical tests of this relationship indicate a slight (and statistically insignificant) positive
relationship between the number of mediators and successfully reaching the two-month threshold.2
2Difference of means tests looking at the average number of redundant mediators, comparing successful efforts to unsuccess-
ful efforts, finds a difference of 0.09 with a corresponding p-value of 0.497.
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Notably, the majority of attempts in which no redundant mediators are present are in fact single-party
efforts.3
Table 4.5: Balance & Halted Violence
Failed Succeeded Total
Balanced
1 8 9
11.1 88.9 100
Impartial
69 48 117
59.0 41.0 100
Unbalanced
23 34 57
40.4 59.6 100
Total
93 90 183
50.8 49.2 100
Counts and percentages of successfully halting violence
by mediation balance. Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.003.
Balanced mediation is associated with greater levels of success than both unbalanced and impartial
mediation. Eight of the nine balanced efforts succeeded, while impartial efforts only had a success
rate of 41.0 percent and unbalanced efforts had a success rate of 56.7 percent. With both unbalanced
and balanced efforts having a greater success rate than impartial efforts, strong support is found for the
hypothesis that bias in mediation attempts can play an important role in helping disputants both find a
mutually agreeable compromise and overcoming post-agreement obstacles.
Durable Peace
Simple illustrations of bivariate relationships when one of the variables represents a duration can be
tricky when some of the observations are censored, meaning they were still at peace when the UCDP
dataset stopped monitoring conflict onset and termination. Of the 103 peace agreements signed, a little
over forty percent are censored. The vast majority of uncensored cases failed within three years of the
agreement being signed. The censored agreements, on the other hand, all endured for at least four years.
The censored agreements, therefore, represent the longer-lasting agreements. These agreements are at
varying risk of failure after observation stopped; therefore average or expected duration calculations
that do not account for censoring should be considered cautiously. Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 below
provide comparisons across mediation characteristics but do not account for the censoring. In all of
these comparisons, duration of peace is measured in months.
3This is true for all mediation attempts as well as only those mediation attempts that resulted in some kind of agreement.
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Figure 4.3: Completeness & Peace Duration
Figure 4.3 shows that complete mediation efforts tend to last about six years while incomplete ef-
forts last about five and a half years. This difference is not substantively or statistically significant.
Perhaps this is a function of the censoring. Given the results of more sophisticated analyses presented
later, however, it seems more likely that the characteristics of the dream team that encourage short-term
success do not have strong long-term impacts. While some characteristics of the dream team are capa-
ble of helping the disputants overcome their immediate differences, they are not able to overcome the
additional post-agreement complexities and systematically mitigate the unpredictable post-agreement
environment enough to prevent the disputants from falling back into war. While the identified pattern
between the average duration of post-agreement peace across different numbers of redundant mediators
is in the expected direction (an additional redundant mediator decreases the expected duration of peace),
the correlation between these two variables is very weak.4
The relationship between mediation balance and peace duration is more obvious than the other
dream team characteristics. Impartial mediation efforts endure, on average, about four years with bal-
anced efforts lasting about seven and a half years and unbalanced efforts lasting just a little longer at
about eight years. The impact of mediator bias does seem to continue to have an impact after the peace
4Correlation coefficient between duration of post-agreement peace and number of redundant mediators is -0.057 with an
associated p-value of 0.570.
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Figure 4.4: Redundancy & Peace Duration
Figure 4.5: Balance & Peace Duration
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agreement has been signed.5
While the previous tables and graphs in this section provide some intuition for the bivariate rela-
tionships between the characteristics of the dream team and mediation success, these analyses do not
provide robust tests of the hypotheses asserted earlier. They do not control for potential confounders,
nor do they take into consideration complexities such as the censoring of post-agreement peace duration.
Therefore, I conduct more sophisticated multivariate analyses in the following sections.
Reaching Agreement
To evaluate Hypotheses 1–4 with regard to the first measure of success (the type of agreement, if any,
reached at the end of negotiations), I estimated an ordered logistic model with standard errors clustered
by conflict. As ordered logistic models assume that the coefficients are constant across categories (see
e.g. McCullagh, 1980), this assumption was tested for the model reported in Table 4.6. The Brant
test calls into question the appropriateness of the proportional odds assumption for one of the control
variables, central control.6 Tables A.2 and A.3 report partial proportional odds models to verify and
illustrate robustness to relaxations of the proportional odds assumption. The results are indeed robust
to these relaxations. The ordered logistic model is chosen as the main model despite the Brant test
results not only because it is a more intuitive and parsimonious model, but also because the Brant test
is known for false positives (i.e. leading researchers to conclude the proportional odds assumption
has been violated when it has not (see e.g. O’Connell, 2006)). In particular, tests of proportionality
produce questionable results when there is a “general sparseness of cell sizes” (Peterson and Harrell Jr,
1990, 215). As cell sparseness is a concern here and the results are not qualitatively different between
the ordered logistic and the partial proportional odds models,7 I report as the main results the ordered
logistic model.8 The dependent variable captures how the negotiations ended: in failure, with a limited
5An anova test shows that the relationship is significant at the 0.10 level with an f-statistic of 1.52 and a p-value of 0.069.
6See Table A.1 for the full results of the Brant test.
7The only exception is that redundancy becomes significant in the expected duration when relaxing the proportionality con-
straint only for central command.
8For an extended discussion of the difference between the ordered logistic model and the partial proportional odds model as
well as how the results change across models, see the discussion surrounding Tables A.2 and A.3.
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commitment agreement, with a partial peace agreement, or with a comprehensive peace agreement.9
From this regression, I find support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Table 4.6: Ordered Logistic Regression: Reaching Agreement
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.118 (0.522)
Redundancy −0.429 (0.220)
Impartial Mediation −0.738 (0.477)
Unbalanced Mediation −1.348 (0.436)
Single-Party Mediation −1.190 (0.286)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.592 (0.436)
Territorial Conflict −0.436 (0.188)
Conflict Duration −0.009 (0.011)
Conflict Intensity −0.280 (0.303)
Polity 0.088 (0.026)
Central Command −0.360 (0.214)
Europe 1.459 (0.690)
Asia 1.858 (0.584)
Africa 2.293 (0.636)
Latin America 1.358 (0.666)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) −2.943 (0.728)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace) −0.312 (0.734)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace) 0.991 (0.744)
N 302
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
Complete efforts have a positive effect on reaching a more comprehensive peace agreement. While
this coefficient is in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant at the 0.05 threshold. No-
tably, complete mediation efforts are an empirically rare event with only 20 of the 302 cases in this
sample being complete.10 As expected from the theory, an additional redundant mediator diminishes
9To ensure robustness of these results to the coding of the dependent variable, in particular the number of categories chosen,
alternative models were estimated in which the dependent variable only included three categories: failure, limited commitment
agreements, and peace agreements (both partial and comprehensive). The results of this model can be seen in Tables A.4–A.6.
10Alternative codings of complete including neighbors as mediators with credibility leverage as well as relaxing the threshold
for previous successful mediation can be found in the appendix. Summary statistics can be found in Tables A.18 and A.19 and
the regression results for the models included in this chapter using these alternatives can be found in Tables A.20–A.22.
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the probability of reaching a more comprehensive settlement. This supports my argument that addi-
tional mediators complicate the negotiations, increasing the risk of forum-shopping or mixed messages
and harming the mediation effort when mediators do not bring a unique source of leverage to the ne-
gotiating table. Furthermore, none of the mediation attempts in this sample are truly complementary.
While some efforts are complete and others have no redundant mediators, none of the attempts in this
study are both complete and have no redundant mediators.
Balanced mediation efforts are more likely to result in a more comprehensive agreement than both
unbalanced and impartial efforts, although this relationship is only statistically significant when com-
paring balanced efforts to unbalanced efforts. Balancing the mediators’ biases and including in the
mediation team an ally for both sides improves the prospects for a more comprehensive agreement. Im-
partial mediation is more likely to produce a comprehensive agreement than unbalanced mediation,11
indicating that the benefits of bias are being washed out by the negative externalities, such as greater
distrust, that biased mediation produces, at least for overcoming the initial hurdle of finding and signing
a mutually acceptable compromise.
Finally, coordinated multiparty efforts are more effective at producing more comprehensive peace
agreements than both single-party and uncoordinated multiparty efforts. Single-party efforts are more
likely to result in a comprehensive peace agreement than uncoordinated multiparty efforts, although this
effect is not statistically significant.12 Whether the effort is coordinated, therefore, identifies important
variation in multiparty efforts with a substantial impact on conflict resolution outcomes. This supports
Hypothesis 4; coordinating multiparty efforts diminishes the risk of overcrowding and enables the medi-
ation effort to take advantage of the additional sources of leverage and influence that multiple mediators
provide. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts, on the other hand, are less likely to produce comprehen-
sive agreements than single-party efforts, indicating that the effect of multiparty mediation relative to
single-party mediation is dependent upon the characteristics of the multiparty effort.
Overall, the control variables tell an intuitive story. Territorial conflicts are less likely to end in a
11This effect is statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.611 and a standard error of 0.231 on unbalanced mediation when
impartial mediation is the baseline.
12The coefficient on single-party mediation when uncoordinated multiparty efforts are the baseline is 0.401 with a standard
error of 0.578.
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comprehensive agreement. Longer and more intense wars also result in lower probabilities of a compre-
hensive settlement, reaffirming that these conflicts are often difficult to resolve. Democracies are more
likely to see comprehensive peace agreements, and mediation attempts in the Middle East are less likely
to result in peace agreements than mediation attempts in other regions of the world.13 Central com-
mand has the opposite effect on reaching a comprehensive agreement than expected from the literature.
Having a stronger central command decreases the probability of reaching a comprehensive agreement,
although this relationship is not statistically significant.
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Figure 4.6: Predicted Prob. of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (with 95% CIs)
To better assess the substantive impact of variation in the complementary, balanced, and coordinated
nature of these mediation attempts, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the predicted probability of a compre-
hensive peace agreement for different combinations of these mediation characteristics.14 Figure 4.6
13Europe is also statistically less likely to produce a comprehensive agreement than Africa. The other comparisons between
regions are not statistically significant.
14These probabilities and their corresponding confidence intervals were simulated using the Clarify package (King, Tomz and
Wittenberg, 2000).
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focuses on the effect of different types of mediation balance as well as different types of coordination
on conflict resolution. Figure 4.7 focuses on the effect of complete versus incomplete efforts and the
number of redundant mediators. For both sets of predicted probabilities, the other variables in the model
are held at central values. Conflict duration is held at its mean. Conflict intensity, territorial conflicts,
and central command are held at their median (and modal) values of low intensity, conflicts not over
territory, and moderately strong control respectively. Polity is set at its median value of 0, and region is
set to its modal category: Africa. In Figure 4.6 the values for the remaining characteristics of the dream
team are incomplete (modal category) with one redundant mediator (median and mode). In Figure 4.7
the other characteristics of the mediation effort are held at impartial (modal category) and coordinated
multiparty.15
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Figure 4.7: Predicted Prob. of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (with 95% CIs)
Balanced coordinated efforts outperform the other types of mediation with a predicted probability of
15Single-party is the modal category but since two redundant mediators can only occur in multiparty efforts the value of
coordination is held at coordinated multiparty (the modal category within multiparty efforts).
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reaching a comprehensive peace agreement of almost sixty percent. Impartial coordinated efforts have
a forty-two percent chance and unbalanced coordinated efforts have only a twenty-eight percent chance
of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. Balanced efforts are substantially more likely to reach
a comprehensive agreement than impartial and unbalanced efforts. This pattern is born out for unco-
ordinated and single-party efforts as well. Coordinated multiparty efforts are also substantially more
likely to end in a comprehensive peace agreement than uncoordinated efforts. These large differences
in the expected outcome as the level of coordination and type of mediation balance change highlight
the importance of mediator coordinaton to reduce the risks of forum-shopping, mixed-messages, and
free-riding.
Figure 4.7 illustrates that an additional redundant mediator reduces the probability of reaching a
comprehensive peace agreement by about ten percent. The difference between complete and incom-
plete efforts is small, implying minimal substantive difference in expected mediation outcomes between
complete and incomplete efforts. The large error bars on the predicted probabilities for complete efforts
reflects the small number of complete cases observed in this sample.
Halting the Violence
To evaluate Hypotheses 1–3 with respect to the longer-term impact of the negotiations, I estimated a
logistic regression with the dependent variable indicating whether the violence stopped for two months
after the signing of an agreement.16 Ceasefires, partial, and comprehensive peace agreements are all
included in this analysis. To account for the potentially different nature of ceasefires, a dummy variable
indicating if the agreement was a ceasefire is included in the model.17 Additionally, the strength of the
rebel group is controlled for as power asymmetries could exacerbate existing tensions, encouraging the
combatants to renege on their agreements and return to violence. Table 4.7 shows strong support for the
importance of balanced mediation but not support for the complementary mediation hypotheses.
Complete mediation, in fact, has the opposite effect on halting the violence than anticipated, with
a negative effect on reaching the two-month threshold for peace. In the sample with only ceasefires
16Logistic regressions using thresholds from one month to six months are included in the appendix. The results of these
regressions can be found in Table A.8.
17A model excluding ceasefires from the analysis is reported in Table A.7.
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Table 4.7: Logistic Regression: Halting the Violence
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation −1.022 (0.819)
Redundancy 0.515 (0.306)
Impartial Mediation −4.183 (1.204)
Unbalanced Mediation −3.926 (1.148)
Single-Party Mediation 0.283 (0.680)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −0.498 (0.861)
Territorial Conflict 1.231 (0.624)
Conflict Duration −0.094 (0.040)
Conflict Intensity −3.264 (0.849)
Polity 0.150 (0.063)
Central Command −0.494 (0.458)
Rebel Strength −1.099 (0.385)
Ceasefire −1.108 (0.532)
Europe −1.949 (0.575)
Asia −3.672 (0.967)
Africa −3.381 (0.972)
Latin America −4.921 (1.005)
(Intercept) 11.178 (2.668)
N 183
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
and peace agreements, however, the number of complete efforts falls from twenty to ten, limiting the
extent to which strong conclusions can be drawn from the patterns identified with these ten cases. An
additional redundant mediator has an insignificant effect on reaching the two-month threshold. Impartial
and unbalanced efforts, as expected, are both less likely to reach this two-month threshold than balanced
efforts.18 Balanced efforts are therefore not only important in producing a peace agreement in the first
place, but also in helping the disputants begin the process of implementing that agreement.
While coordinated efforts were not hypothesized to have an effect on the peace process post-
agreement, coordination is included in the post-agreement models to control for this characteristic of
18Impartial and unbalanced efforts are not statistically different from each other. The coefficient on unbalanced efforts when
impartial efforts are the baseline is 0.257 with a standard error of 0.508.
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the mediation effort. No statistically significant relationships between the effort’s coordination and the
probability of reaching the two-month threshold were found.19
Once again, the control variables behave as expected. Peace agreements negotiated in longer and
more intense conflicts are less likely to survive for two months as are agreements in conflicts in which the
rebels are stronger relative to the government. Ceasefires are more likely to end within two months than
peace agreements. Democracies are more likely to reach this goal. Interestingly, territorial conflicts
are more likely to see two-months of peace than non-territorial conflicts. Agreements negotiated in
conflicts in the Middle East are more likely to reach this threshold as well.20 This may indicate that
while negotiating agreements in territorial conflicts or conflicts in the Middle East is challenging, once
these agreements are signed, they are more likely to produce a temporary peace than efforts in non-
territorial conflicts and other regions.
Figures 4.8 illustrates the predicted probability of reaching the two-month peace threshold for dif-
ferent types of mediation efforts.21 Once again, balanced mediation efforts substantially outperform
impartial and unbalanced efforts. Within coordinated multiparty efforts, the predicted probability of
halting the violence is ninety-eight percent compared to sixty-one percent for impartial mediation. For
uncoordinated multiparty efforts, agreements produced by balanced mediation are about forty-four per-
centage points more likely to halt the violence than impartial efforts and about thirty-eight percentage
points more likely to halt the violence than unbalanced efforts. Interestingly, single-party impartial and
unbalanced efforts are more likely to result in halted violence than multiparty impartial and unbalanced
efforts (regardless of coordination).
19Interestingly, if coordination is dropped from the regression and instead mediation balance is interacted with a dummy
variable for multiparty efforts, balanced mediation outperforms impartial single-party, unbalanced single-party, impartial mul-
tiparty, and unbalanced multiparty mediation. See Table A.17 and Figure A.4 in the appendix for the results of this regression
and the corresponding predicted probabilities.
20Agreements negotiated in conflicts in Europe are also statistically more likely to endure than those for conflicts in Asia and
Latin America. All other comparisons across regions are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
21The control variables are held at the same central values as before. For the two new controls, rebel strength is held at its
median value, and ceasefire is held at its modal category of peace agreements. The values for the remaining characteristics of
the dream team are incomplete (modal category) with one redundant mediator (median).
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Figure 4.8: Predicted Prob. of Halting the Violence (with 95% CIs)
Durable Peace
Finally, to evaluate the impact of the characteristics of the mediation dream team on the duration
of post-agreement peace, I estimated Weibull survival models. These models include only peace agree-
ments (partial and comprehensive) as many ceasefires are not expected to endure indefinitely. In par-
ticular, ceasefires are often negotiated with a stated termination date that may or may not be extended.
Weibull models with selection are included in the appendix for interested readers (see Table A.12). As
this exclusion of limited commitment agreements substantially decreases the sample size, Table 4.8
includes the results of two regressions.22 Columns 2 and 3 report results with only the variables that
capture the mediation dream team. The full model with the characteristics of the dream team and con-
trols are in columns 4 and 5. It is worth noting that while the dependent variable is coded as the number
of months of no violence (or the duration of post-agreement peace) the model is estimated in terms of
22Tables with the results reported in terms of hazard ratios instead of coefficients are included in the appendix. See Table A.10.
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the risk of failure. The coefficients are therefore the average effect of the independent variable on the
risk of peace failing (i.e. the risk of conflict recurrence). Positive coefficients indicate a greater risk
of failure (i.e. a less durable post-agreement peace) and negative coefficients indicate a lower risk of
failure (i.e. a more durable post-agreement peace).
Table 4.8: Weibull Regression: Duration of Post-Agreement Peace
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.237 (0.593) 1.000 (0.662)
Redundancy 0.269 (0.147) −0.468 (0.325)
Impartial Mediation 1.167 (1.088) 0.675 (0.671)
Unbalanced Mediation 0.443 (1.142) −0.327 (0.756)
Single-Party Mediation 0.471 (0.496) −0.615 (0.684)
Uncoordinated Multiparty 0.372 (0.922) −0.058 (0.549)
Territorial Conflict −0.606 (0.543)
Conflict Duration 0.021 (0.032)
Conflict Intensity 1.609 (0.643)
Polity −0.219 (0.075)
Central Command 0.722 (0.335)
Rebel Strength 0.540 (0.288)
Peacekeeping −2.001 (0.580)
Europe 0.454 (0.573)
Asia 2.834 (0.719)
Africa 1.732 (0.571)
Latin America 3.825 (1.070)
(Intercept) −3.029 (1.100) −5.303 (1.315)
ln(p) −1.118 (0.072) −0.520 (0.142)
N 103 103
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level.
Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty mediation,
and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
In the model without controls, the components of complementary mediation are not statistically
significant. Complete mediation and an additional redundant mediator are both associated with a greater
risk of peace failure. In the full model with controls, redundancy is associated with a decreased risk of
peace failure.
Peace agreements produced by impartial mediation and unbalanced mediation efforts are more likely
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to fail than agreements produced by balanced efforts in the first model. In the full model, the coefficient
on unbalanced mediation changes signs, indicating that agreements produced by unbalanced efforts are
less likely to fail than those produced by balanced efforts. Impartial efforts are less likely to produce a
stable peace than unbalanced efforts in both models, reaching statistical significance in the full model
with controls.23
Coordinated multiparty efforts produce agreements that are less likely to fail than single-party and
uncoordinated efforts in the basic model and are more likely to fail than single-party and uncoordinated
efforts in the full model, although these coefficients are not statistically significant. The relationship
between agreements produced by single-party compared to uncoordinated multiparty efforts changes
sign between the two models and is insignificant in both.24
Of the controls, only polity, central command, conflict intensity, and the presence of peacekeepers
reach statistical significance. Democracy has a negative effect on failure, meaning a positive effect on the
duration of peace. Peace agreements signed in more intense conflicts and conflicts with stronger central
command structures are more likely to fail, once again highlighting the difficulty of these conflicts
and the challenge of producing a lasting peace in these areas. Peacekeeping decreases the risk of war
recurrence as expected by the literature. Agreements signed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are
more likely to fail than agreements produced in the Middle East.25
As mentioned previously, one of the benefits of fitting a Weibull model is that the Weibull model
estimates a parameter p that represents the shape of the baseline hazard.26 In Table 4.8 the ln(p) is neg-
ative and statistically significant in both models. This indicates a decreasing baseline hazard, meaning
that the risk of failure decreases over time; the longer the peace agreements endure the less likely they
are to fail.
23The coefficient on unbalanced efforts when impartial efforts are the baseline is -1.002 with a standard error of 0.418 in the
full model and -0.724 with a standard error of 0.402 in the model without controls.
24Agreements mediated by single-party efforts are more likely to fail than those mediated by uncoordinated multiparty efforts
with a coefficient of -0.471 on uncoordinated multiparty efforts when single-party efforts are the baseline (standard error
0.496) in the basic model. With controls the coefficient is 0.615 with a standard error of 0.684.
25Agreements signed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are more likely to fail than agreements signed in Europe and those
generated in Latin America is also more likely to fail than agreements signed in Africa. No other comparisons were statistically
significant.
26Cox proportional hazard models, which make no assumptions about the baseline hazard, are reported in the appendix.
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Figure 4.9: Median Expected Duration in Months (with 95% CIs)
Another benefit of the Weibull model is the ability to calculate substantive values of interest that
provide a more intuitive interpretation. Taking advantage of this, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the
median expected duration (in months) of the post-agreement peace for different combinations of com-
plementary, balanced, and coordinated mediation, holding the control variables at central values.27 The
error bars represent conservative ninety-five percent confidence intervals.28
From these figures, unbalanced mediation produces agreements that outlast those produced by im-
partial and balanced mediation. This substantive effect is quite strong for single-party mediation. For
both uncoordinated and coordinated multiparty mediation, agreements negotiated by unbalanced medi-
ation teams are also the most durable. Impartial single-party efforts result in agreements that are more
27The control variables are held at the same central values as before. In Figure 4.9 the values for the remaining characteristics
of the dream team are incomplete (modal category) with one redundant mediator (median). As before, in Figure 4.10 the other
characteristics of the mediation effort are held at impartial (modal category) and coordinated multiparty.
28These median durations and confidence intervals are computed from 1,000 simulations of the full Weibull model with
controls holding the characteristics of the mediation attempt at the appropriate values. The conservative method used to
calculate these confidence intervals forces the upper and lower bounds to fall on observed values.
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durable than those signed as a result of impartial coordinated or uncoordinated multiparty efforts. The
importance of biased mediators is reflected in this figure, although balancing those biases does not seem
to have the same effect as balanced mediation does on producing a signed agreement in the first place.
The expected durations plotted in Figure 4.10 are for different levels of redundancy within impartial
coordinated multiparty efforts. Here a very unexpected pattern is seen with the presence of more re-
dundant mediators resulting in longer periods of peace than fewer redundant mediators and incomplete
efforts producing agreements that outlast those generated by complete efforts. While this is a quite sur-
prising result, these differences are not statistically significant, perhaps in part as a consequence of the
limited number of cases in these some of these categories.29
29When limiting the sample to mediation attempts that resulted in a peace agreement, only nine of the 103 agreements were
mediated by a complete mediation team.
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Discussion
Accounting for the number of redundant mediators, the level of coordination within multiparty ef-
forts, and the balance of the effort produces valuable insights into the impact of mediation on producing
peace agreements in civil wars. The variation within these characteristics has a meaningful impact on
the likelihood of reaching a more comprehensive agreement and durable conflict resolution. More re-
search needs to consider the unique challenges that occur post-agreement in order to better evaluate how
and when mediation can help overcome those new obstacles to implementation.
Overall, the analyses presented in this chapter illustrate just how difficult a task mediators face.
With many of the agreements that mediators broker failing very quickly, the mediation team needs to
consider not only the immediate concerns of disputants, but also how the agreement will generate or
shape the obstacles faced during implementation. Mediators, of course, cannot control every aspect of
the conflict environment. Additionally, they cannot force the disputants to genuinely prefer peace to all
other alternatives. This means that sometimes an agreement that is appealing in the short-term might
not be appealing to one side of the dispute (or both) in the long-term.
The analyses in this chapter highlight the importance of the composition of mediation efforts. Co-
ordination has a strong positive effect on reaching an agreement, with coordinated multiparty efforts
being more likely to reach an agreement than single-party and uncoordinated multiparty efforts. Co-
ordinated efforts enable the mediators to take advantage of each actor’s strengths while mitigating the
costs of overcrowding. Balanced mediation has a strong, positive impact on not only producing an
agreement but also on halting the violence after an agreement has been signed. This supports my argu-
ment that balance provides the benefits of bias while also avoiding the negative effects of one-sided bias.
Balanced mediation can improve both sides’ confidence in the conflict resolution process and provide
the disputants an ally invested in protecting their interests both at the table and during implementa-
tion. Moreover, balanced mediation can exert pressure on both sides as needed, helping keep both the
government and rebels invested in the peace process.
The next chapter considers two cases of multiparty mediation in more depth. These cases allow for
greater illustration of how the mediation effort assisted the disputants in navigating the peace process as
well as when and how these efforts failed.
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CHAPTER 5
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
The multiparty mediation efforts in Angola and Mozambique illustrate the characteristics of the
dream team at work. In Angola, coordinated, balanced mediation brokered the Bicesse Accords. This
agreement, signed on May 31, 1991, produced a temporary peace. In Mozambique, coordinated, com-
plementary mediation brokered the General Peace Agreement in Rome on October 4, 1992. The General
Peace Agreement led to free and fair elections, demobilization, and a lasting peace.
I selected these cases because the characteristics of the dream team played a key role in producing
(and in the case of Mozambique implementing) a peace agreement as well as because of the cases many
similarities. Most civil wars, while primarily a conflict between two parties vying for power within a
state, involve international actors. Angola and Mozambique are not exceptions; both involved exter-
nal supporters of the government and the rebels, with neighbors and great powers funding whichever
side they believed would provide them greater geopolitical benefits (Zartman, 1995, 4-8). Angola and
Mozambique were both colonies of Portugal, and both attracted Portugal’s attention during the conflict
resolution process (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 61). Moreover, both conflicts emerged out of anti-colonial
wars that left factions competing for power, and the post-colonial governments in both adopted socialist
political platforms.
Regional dynamics also shaped the conflict environments in both countries. South Africa had
adopted an anti-decolonization stance, exerting power in the region to protect its interests (Hume, 1994,
6). The peace agreement establishing Namibian independence also influenced both conflicts (Msabaha,
1995, 204-205). These regional dynamics provided a common background for the peace processes in
Angola and Mozambique, and influenced their conflict dynamics, continued access to external support,
and the attractiveness of political solutions.
Internally, both central governments were weak at local levels, providing rebel groups opportunities
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for recruitment and growth (Vanneman, 1990, 68). These international, regional, and internal similari-
ties provide a foundation from which the role of the mediation team can be evaluated.
Angola
The civil war in Angola grew out of Angola’s war for independence. The three liberation move-
ments that fought for Angolan independence had little in common once Portugal acquiesced. In January
1975, when Portugal agreed to hold elections in Angola, granting Angola independence, fighting broke
out among the three groups. Each liberation group represented a different region of the country and
received external support from different backers. The National Liberation Front of Angola, known by
its Portuguese abbreviation FNLA, was based in the north and received external support from Zaire,
western countries, and China. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was based
in urban areas with support from Communist bloc countries and Cuba. The National Union for Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) was based in the south with support from South Africa and some
western countries (Hume, 1994, 6). The MPLA declared victory the day before independence, took
control of Luanda, eliminated the FNLA, and left UNITA challenging MPLA’s authority.
After independence, the MPLA received extensive support from the Soviet Union in the form of
financial, materiel, and training assistance. The Soviets supported the MPLA because of the MPLA’s
Marxist ideology. In addition, the Soviet Union wanted to signal to the United States and China that
it was still a major player in southern Africa (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995). Economic interests (par-
ticularly oil) also made Angola an attractive ally (MacFarlane, 1992). At the height of the conflict, the
Soviet Union poured one billion dollars worth of military equipment into Angola each year (Vanneman,
1990, ix). Cuba supported the MPLA with troops, training, and military equipment. Cuba’s interest in
the conflict was motivated in part by its shared ideology. Castro also wanted to extend his global influ-
ence (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 180). In 1987, the Soviet Union had 2,500 troops in Angola, and
Cuba had at least 37,000 (Vanneman, 1990, 46). Eventually, the expense of supporting the MPLA en-
couraged the Soviets to consider a negotiated settlement (MacFarlane, 1992). The Soviets also wanted
to secure a solution that would not result in the MPLA losing or being humiliated (Cohen, 2000, 4).
While they were interested in negotiations, they continued to support and protect their ally.
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UNITA received support from South Africa and the United States throughout the conflict. American
support included economic and military assistance intended to maintain the status quo in southern Africa
(Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995). The United States had stayed out of the conflict for the first several
years, becoming involved in 1981. Following Namibian independence, the United States became the
main source of military support for UNITA (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 67). American support was
aimed at preventing an MPLA victory, not enabling a decisive UNITA win. Even with this limited aim,
American assistance was worth about twenty-five million dollars per year (Cohen, 2000, 4).
The Start of Negotiations
The conditions became favorable for negotiations as both the MPLA and UNITA began to see a
military victory as unlikely. The combatants had reached a military stalemate, and the environment
around them was changing rapidly. In December 1988, a tripartite agreement (to which the United
States and the Soviet Union were parties) granted Namibia independence, removed Cuban and South
African troops from Angola, and signaled that the two primary backers of the Angolan civil war were
ready to consider a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995).
Despite concerns from both the MPLA and UNITA that the Namibian peace accord would mean
a reduction in support from their allies, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was ready to
leave their Angolan ally (Papp, 1993, 186). In fact, the United States sent letters and made public
announcements of support for UNITA in order to signal that they were still invested (Cohen, 2000,
88). The United States also maintained its policy of not developing formal relations with the Angolan
government until national reconciliation. While this made communication between the United States
and the MPLA more difficult, it also signaled continued American support of UNITA (Cohen, 2000,
89). Finally, the United States agreed not to accept any settlement that did not include free and fair
elections, a shift from its stance of no pre-conditions (Cohen, 2000, 96). This shift further encouraged
UNITA that the United States would pursue a peace in line with UNITA’s interests. These signals were
important to UNITA, helped maintain the balance of power between the warring factions, and alleviated
UNITA’s security concerns in entering negotiations.
The Soviet-MPLA relationship developed similarly, with the Soviet Union promising to continue
funding the MPLA while also encouraging negotiations (MacFarlane, 1992). With both sides secure
in their relationships with their allies, the powers began to apply pressure to find a political solution.
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The MPLA proposed a ceasefire in January 1989, in large part because of pressure from their Soviet
supporters (Papp, 1993, 188). On March 13, 1989, Savimbi, UNITA’s leader, broadcast a proposal for
direct talks with the government and announced a one-month unilateral cessation of major military ac-
tions (Cohen, 2000, 89-90). The government of Angola did not agree to talks right away. Pressure from
neighbors as well as the Soviet Union eventually led the MPLA to agree to negotiations in Gbadolite,
Zaire. Savimbi agreed to participate in these negotiations in large part because of American pressure
(Cohen, 2000, 94). Balanced mediation, therefore, helped get the disputants to the table with the external
supporters using their relational leverage to encourage negotiation.
Mobutu, president of Zaire, led the Gbadolite summit in June 1989 in the presence of eighteen other
African heads of state. Mobutu seemed a natural leader for the negotiations as Zaire recognized the
MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola but also allowed the United States to supply UNITA
through Zaire’s borders (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 194). The Gbadolite summit, however, con-
fronted many of the common challenges of multiparty mediation. In particular, many of the heads of
state came from countries with one-party rule. They were reluctant to see a neighboring government
removed because of a violent rebellion. UNITA, concerned that the majority of those present were bi-
ased in favor of the MPLA, did not trust the summit negotiations (Cohen, 2000, 92). Additionally, no
one officially recorded the process or the agreements reached. As a result, different participants told
different accounts, generating confusion and preventing continued negotiation. Despite this chaos, three
points of agreement were collectively expressed: a mutual desire to end the war, a ceasefire effective
June 24, 1989, and the establishment of a joint UNITA-MPLA commission under Mobutu’s mediation
(93).
After the Gbadolite summit, Mobutu was unable to keep the parties talking. He held a mini-summit
in Harare, Zimbabwe with six other African presidents, which angered Savimbi and led him to back
out of the ceasefire (Williams, 1993, 200). The United States pushed Savimbi to rejoin the negotiating
table, but Savimbi refused. The mini-summit had accepted the MPLA’s interpretation of the events at
Gbadolite, confirming to Savimbi that the mediators preferred a settlement that protected the current
government. Out of frustration with Savimbi’s refusal to participate, Mobutu cut UNITA’s supply lines
through Zaire, further convincing Savimbi that Mobutu was not neutral (Williams, 1993, 201). Even
pressure from the United States could not encourage Savimbi to negotiate in such a biased environment.
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Still interested in finding a political solution to the conflict, UNITA held its own meeting and drafted
its own peace plan. The plan requested a cease-fire, direct talks with the MPLA, release of politi-
cal prisoners, establishment of a transitional government, a new constitution, and multiparty elections
(Williams, 1993, 201). To this point, “the superpowers were yet to demonstrate that they were prepared
to use the economic or military leverage they possessed, not merely to get their respective clients to
the negotiating table, but to persuade them to make the necessary concessions” (Williams, 1993, 202).
The United States and the Soviet Union had encouraged and supported the negotiations, but they had
done so mainly from outside the formal negotiations. This changed as the powers became more directly
involved.
Mediation after Gbadolite
Taking advantage of the lapse in Mobutu’s mediation attempts, a Portuguese delegation visited An-
gola’s neighbors to establish Portugal’s role in the Angolan peace process, extended formal relations
to UNITA, and encouraged international recognition of the group (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 68, 70).
This initiative resulted in Portugal’s take over as the primary mediator, with active participation by the
United States and Soviet Union. Portugal controlled the negotiations while the United States and Soviet
Union were official observers. UNITA saw an ally in the leftist Portuguese Socialist party while the
Angolan government trusted the centrist Social Democratic government in Lisbon (Cohen, 2000, 102).
This provided each side with a reason to trust Portugal as a fair, if not impartial, mediator (Venancio and
Chan, 1996).
In the first four months, Portuguese mediation made little progress toward finding a solution (Williams,
1993, 204). Once the United States and Soviet Union became more active, however, negotiations pro-
gressed quickly (Schneidman, 1993, 219). In February 1990, foreign ministers from the United States
and Soviet Union met in Moscow to discuss the Angolan peace process (Cohen, 2000, 99-100). The
United States and Soviet Union agreed to meet with opposing leadership; representatives from the
United States met with the Angolan foreign minister and the Soviet foreign minister held meetings
with Savimbi. This signaled their support for a negotiated settlement, conferred some legitimacy to
Savimbi (something the MPLA was still reluctant to do) and set the stage for a meeting with the dis-
putants cosponsored by the United States and Soviet Union in Washington, DC. During these meetings,
Portugal continued to lead the mediation efforts (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 195).
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Out of the meetings in Washington came an agreement with seven central provisions: the legal-
ization of UNITA, holding of free elections, creation of a unified national army before elections, con-
stitutional legalization of multiparty democracy, cessation of military supplies from all sources1, UN
involvement in cease-fire monitoring, and the presence of international election monitors (Cohen, 2000,
107). Debates over when the ceasefire would start prevented signing the agreement in Washington, but
on May 31, 1991 the accord was signed by the MPLA and UNITA in Bicesse, Portugal (Williams, 1993,
207).
Soviet pressure was a significant factor in getting concessions from Angolan President dos San-
tos (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995, 193). The American delegation also promised dos Santos that the
United States would cooperate with international monitors during the implementation of the agreement
in order to improve trust with dos Santos, who was skeptical of the United States’ presence in the ne-
gotiations. Additionally, while the United States and Soviet Union cut lethal military aid to their allies,
they continued to provide political aid throughout implementation (Cohen, 2000, 110).
Many factors set the stage for the signing of the Bicesse Accord. The hurting military stalemate
made the disputants more interested in negotiations. The changing regional and international envi-
ronments provided increased international interest in resolving the conflict in Angola. Changes in the
MPLA’s ideology provided more room for compromise. In July 1990, the MPLA held a party Congress,
officially distancing itself from its previous Marxist principles (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 135). The
rocky start to negotiations and failure of the Gbadolite summit, however, show that these environmental
factors were not enough to get the disputants to sign an agreement. Soviet and American involvement
provided the necessary leverage to get the disputants talking by tying funding to continued negotiations
(Smock and Gregorian, 1993, 10). This leverage got the disputants to Gbadolite, but it was not until the
United States and Soviet Union became more directly involved that real headway was made. Savimbi’s
distrust of Angola’s neighbors eliminated potential mediators. Meanwhile, the government’s distrust of
the United States prevented the United States from mediating alone. The combatants’ concerns about
biased mediators illustrates the negative consequences of biased mediation. Fortunately in Angola, the
1This clause meant that UNITA agreed to stop receiving lethal support from the United States and the MPLA agreed to no
longer receive lethal support from the Soviet Union. This became known as the “triple zero” option.
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Soviet Union and United States were willing to both participate in the negotiations, balancing the medi-
ation team. Additionally, Portuguese mediation provided an intermediary with which both sides had a
positive relationship. Including the United States and Soviet Union at the table positioned these powers
to encourage participation as well as observe the negotiations and promise protection and assurances
when necessary.
The mediators worked together closely, quickly becoming known as the Troika. This collective
name represents the collective spirit of the negotiations. The United States and Soviet Union respected
Portugal’s leadership, holding meetings as the Troika to discuss the conflict and its obstacles to peace.
By coordinating their efforts, the Troika avoided the risks of over-crowding. All three actors were
engaged in the mediation process, with minimal free-riding or mixed messages. Moreover, once the
Troika was established under Portuguese leadership, the disputants did not engage in forum-shopping,
even though the MPLA was not pleased with the inclusion of the United States. The United States’
representatives acknowledged that “As UNITA supporters, we could not pretend to be neutral” (Cohen,
2000, 122). The lack of neutrality was balanced by Soviet involvement, providing the MPLA a protector
as well. Portugal also welcomed the increased influence from the United States and Soviet Union,
acknowledging the unique leverage these states had over their allies.
The coordination among the Troika provided a foundation for the United States and Soviet Union
to pressure their allies to accept mediation, negotiate earnestly, and ultimately sign an agreement. The
powers both exerted pressure on the disputants and offered assistance and protection. The balanced
biases within the Troika helped alleviate disputants’ concerns during and after the negotiations. The
disputes and constant delays over the timing of elections and demobilization illustrate the disputants’
concerns that an agreement would expose them to vulnerabilities that the other side would exploit.
Moreover, neither side trusted the other to monitor the agreement. The United States and Soviet Union
agreed to form the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC) comprised of the warring factions,
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Portugal in order to provide monitors interested in protecting
each side. Balanced mediation alleviated the security concerns felt by the disputants both during the
negotiations and as implementation began. Unfortunately, the Troika’s mediation was not sufficient to
turn the Bicesse Accords into a stable peace.
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Implementation of the Bicesse Accords
The implementation of the Bicesse Accord was to be monitored by the JPMC and UN Angola Ver-
ification Mission (UNAVEM II). The design of the JPMC, while effective at alleviating the disputants’
concerns and inducing an agreement, was flawed. With only the disputants as full members and the
United States, Soviet Union, and Portugal serving as observers, no member served as official tie breaker
in times of disagreement (Cohen, 2000; Venancio and Chan, 1996). This stalled progress, made moving
forward with the implementation difficult, and did not provide a mechanism for reopening mediation.
Additionally, the MPLA insisted on limiting the UNAVEM II mission, not authorizing enough troops
to monitor the country adequately. Moreover, the Angolan government maintained sole control over
the police, which it used as paramilitary forces, increasing UNITA’s distrust and vulnerability. UNITA’s
right to provide security for its leaders during the build-up to elections also gave the group access to
areas of the country it had previously been unable to penetrate, increasing the government’s distrust and
vulnerability. Ultimately, neither side fully implemented the demobilization agreement (Knudsen and
Zartman, 1995, 137).
Potentially more important than the limitations of the JPMC was the failure of the Bicesse Accords
to ensure that both parties would be included in the post-election government (Knudsen and Zartman,
1995, 137). UNITA struggled to transition from a military rebel group to a political party ready to
compete in an election (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 83). When it came time for the elections, ninety-one
percent of eligible voters registered to vote, and over four million Angolans (more than ninety percent of
registered voters) voted (Williams, 1993, 209). The elections were considered successful (Knudsen and
Zartman, 1995, 137) and “generally free and fair” by observers (Cohen, 2000, 116). Savimbi clearly
opposed an outcome that resulted in the MPLA taking over a majority of parliament and the presidency.
Very early counts (only ten percent of the votes) had dos Santos winning. Before even waiting for the
final count, Savimbi claimed fraud and threatened to abandon the peace process if UNITA did not win
(Cohen, 2000, 117). The United States urged Savimbi to accept the results of the election2 and hold
the run-off quickly (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 100). Ignoring the United States, Savimbi backed out
of the peace plan and UNITA withdrew their troops from the joint UNITA-MPLA army, relaunching
2By the final count, the MPLA had won 129 seats in the parliament compared to UNITA’s 70 of the 220 total seats. While
dos Santos had received more votes than Savimbi, a run-off would be necessary before the elected President could be officially
announced (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995, 137).
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attacks against the government (Cohen, 2000, 119). After UNITA withdrew from the agreement, the
United States withdrew its support. With new access to diamond mines, UNITA funded their military
campaigns without American support (Hare, 1999, 661).
Multiple factors led to the failure of the Bicesse Accords. The United Nations had not been a party to
the negotiations and only became involved during implementation. Earlier UN involvement could have
helped improve the design of the monitoring and peacekeeping mission. An earlier UN presence could
also have warned about, and potentially prevented, dos Santos’ efforts to limit the peacekeeping forces
(Schneidman, 1993, 222). The inclusion of the UN would have complemented the Troika, providing an
important source of leverage to the Angolan peace process. Finally, UNITA’s wealth diminished, if not
erased, the United States’ leverage over UNITA and redefined the balance of power between the MPLA
and UNITA. The former United States representative to the Angolan peace process concluded that “In
the end, Savimbi chose the option of war over peace. That is the reason why the Lusaka peace process
failed” (Hare, 1999, 661).3
The fact that the Troika had no formal responsibility in the implementation of peace accord is per-
haps more central to understanding the role of mediation balance. Venancio and Chan (1996) assert that
this allowed the United States and Soviet Union to distance themselves from the peace process when
obstacles arose (84). The Troika managed to avoid free-riding during the negotiations, but succumbed
to this obstacle of multiparty meditation during implementation.
By coordinating their efforts during the negotiations, the Troika managed to minimize the negative
consequences of multiparty mediation. Balanced mediation exerted pressure on both sides of the con-
flict, encouraging direct talks between the disputants and concessions by both sides. Promises of con-
tinued assistance and support during and after negotiations alleviated the disputants’ security concerns,
helping the disputants reach an agreement and begin the implementation process of demobilization and
preparation for elections. Ultimately however, the disputants continued to distrust each other, culminat-
ing in Savimbi’s rejection of the election and return to war. The efforts of the United States and Soviet
Union in Angola illustrate the benefits of balanced mediation while also demonstrating that even when
the mediation is balanced, some factors are beyond the mediators’ control.
3This sentiment is echoed by other diplomats as well. Cohen (2000) writes “the main reason Angola went back to war was
UNITA’s refusal to live up to its commitments” (123).
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Mozambique
Mozambique became independent in June 1975. Following a military coup in Lisbon, Portugal
hastily relinquished power to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) (Bartoli, 2005,
80). Frelimo, with support from China and the Soviet Union, had fought against the Portuguese for
independence for over a decade, adopting a socialist political platform as it took power (Bartoli, 1999,
253). Frelimo’s relationship with the Soviet Union was much more limited than the MPLA’s. The Soviet
Union provided some aid to Frelimo, mainly through military advisors and favorable loans (Vanneman,
1990, 60). When Mozambique was rejected by the Council for Mutual Economic Assitance (CMEA),
Mozambique looked to the West for donations (66).4
Frelimo, formed in 1962, had grown out of three anti-colonial groups that each represented a differ-
ent region of the country and had different experiences with colonialism (Manning, 2002, 44). Divisions
within Frelimo were common even before independence. By 1967, several of the original leaders of the
anti-colonial groups had left or were expelled from the organization (45). Serious economic problems
also plagued Frelimo. Although Frelimo had inherited many of these problems from Portugal, food
shortages and other humanitarian crises, along with political repression, increased dissatisfaction with
the government (Hume, 1994, 10-11).
Renamo emerged in 1976 “as a product of power struggles between competing external groups”
(Manning, 2002, 77). Rhodesian intelligence exploited Frelimo’s internal tensions and popular discon-
tent to generate an opposition group. Frelimo allowed Rhodesian rebels to operate within Mozambique’s
borders (Bartoli, 1999, 253), and Maputo imposed the UN sanctions against Rhodesia when Frelimo
took power, cutting off access to port Beira (Hume, 1994, 7). In retaliation, the Rhodesian government
funded the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) to provide intelligence on Rhodesian rebels
operating in Mozambique and to put pressure on the Frelimo government (Hume, 1994, 10). After in-
dependence in 1980, Rhodesia’s support of Renamo transferred to South Africa’s military intelligence
agency (Schneidman, 1993, 220). South Africa, threatened by the diffusion of liberation and national-
ist movements, supported insurgencies in order to protect its buffer (Moran and Pitcher, 2004). South
4In 1984 the Soviet Union was Mozambique’s eighth largest donor after Italy, Sweden, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, the United States, the European Economic Community, and the Netherlands (Hume, 1994, 20).
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Africa was the only significant source of external support for Renamo (Hume, 1994, 20).
Renamo’s strategy focused on disrupting the government and preventing it from consolidating power
(Bartoli, 1999, 254). Its tactics in pursuit of this goal (namely targeting civilians) gave Renamo the
reputation as the “Khmer Rouge of Africa”. This reputation alienated potential supporters who opposed
Frelimo’s socialist ideology but did not want to be associated with civilian atrocities. Despite Renamo’s
reputation, South Africa continued its support. Even after the Nkomati Accord of 1984, in which South
Africa promised to stop supplying Renamo as part of a deal with Frelimo, South Africa continued to
provide covert aid (Bartoli, 1999, 246).
The conflict in Mozambique resulted in at least three million displaced persons, 1.4 million refugees,
and many dead (Ajello, 1999, 622). The humanitarian crises created by the conflict attracted interna-
tional attention. In 1989, a mediation team consisting of the Community of Sant’Egidio and Italy,
supported by France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the UN, initiated dialogue
with the combatants (Whitfield, 2007, 29). Two years later, the disputants signed the General Peace
Agreement in Rome.
Mozambique’s Mediators
The Community of Sant’Egidio, founded in Rome in 1968 with a mission statement of “friendship
with the poor”,5 took interest in the conflict when Bishop Gonc¸alves (the Bishop of Beira who had
previously worked with the Community in Rome) spoke to the Community about the marginalization
of Catholics in Mozambique under Frelimo. Religion had long been a source of tension in Mozam-
bique. While the Catholic Church had historically received preferential treatment, the constitution of
1975 embraced secularism (Morier-Genoud, 2000). Frelimo also confiscated church property and im-
posed restrictions on religious leaders. Bishop Gonc¸alves spent six months in jail for violating these
restrictions (Hume, 1994, 17).
The Community, interested in improving conditions for Mozambican Catholics, responded by de-
veloping relationships with Frelimo. On an official visit in August 1984, the Community initiated its
formal relationship with Frelimo, bringing planeloads of humanitarian aid to Mozambique (Bartoli,
2005, 90). The Community continued to work to alleviate the humanitarian crises that accompanied
the conflict, providing food and medicine whenever possible (Hume, 1994, 18). These humanitarian
5More about the Community’s origins and mission can be found at http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/15/langID/en/Friendship with the poor.html.
86
missions provided opportunities for the Community to develop its relationship with the government.
The Community waited to develop a relationship with Renamo until negotiations seemed plausible
(Bartoli, 1999, 256-257). In 1982, the Community negotiated the release of priests and nuns being
held by Renamo, building contacts and relationships with members of Renamo (Hume, 1994, 18). In
the mid-1980s, Renamo pursued a deeper relationship with the Church, and the Community responded
positively (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 52).
Bartoli (1999) refers to the role of the Community as one of “referee”. The community did not
have coercive leverage and therefore the Community’s intervention was “relational” (Bartoli, 2005, 89).
The relationships built enabled it to help the disputants communicate, first through the Community and
eventually directly. The Community’s involvement in Mozambique and extensive relationship with the
Mozambican people helped guarantee its impartiality and loyalty to the process (Bartoli, 1999, 270).
Cohen refers to the role of the Community as “surprisingly logical” as it had contacts on both sides,
knew the conflict well, and also understood the broader effects of the conflict on the Mozambican
people (Cohen, 2000, 247).
Throughout the negotiations, the Community looked for mediation partners that could provide po-
litical or economic authority the Community lacked. The most prominent partner was Italy with assis-
tance from the UN, the United States, and other interested states. Italy, interested in accessing southern
Africa’s economic markets, developed a relationship with Mozambique after its independence (Venan-
cio and Chan, 1996, 57). By 1988, Mozambique’s largest donor was Italy (Hume, 1994, 20). As a
democracy composed of many different ideological perspectives, Italy also provided a role model for
generating a democracy out of a country full of differences (Bartoli, 1999, 261).
Mediation by the United States had been proposed, but Chissano, Frelimo’s leader, rejected this
option, saying a “constructive role” by the United States was welcome (Hume, 1994, 27). The United
States had been slow to pick sides in this conflict and thus never provided direct support to either group
(Cohen, 2000, 181-184).6 Despite this, Chissano did not expect the United States to be favorable to a
socialist party. The United States supported the mediation efforts, providing expertise on military, legal,
and economic challenges that the Community did not have the expertise to address (Bartoli, 1999, 270).
6The United States did provide humanitarian aid to the Mozambican people during the conflict, totaling one hundred million
dollars per year (Cohen, 2000, 8).
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The United States also shared lessons learned from other southern Africa peace processes, including
Angola (Cohen, 2000, 188). The United States followed the negotiations through its embassies in
neighboring countries as well as through contacts with the Community of Sant’Egidio (Cohen, 2000,
187). Hume, the deputy chief of the United States’ mission to the Vatican, described his responsibilities
as “support the mediators”, saying his “position was at times on the outside of the negotiations, at other
times on the fringe, never in the center” (Hume, 1994, xii).
Despite the United States’ peripheral role, Chissano exploited America’s international clout to signal
to his allies that negotiations with Renamo were the only choice (Schneidman, 1993, 219). Chissano
wanted negotiations, but hardliners within his party opposed dialogue with Renamo (Cohen, 2000, 9).
By meeting first with Reagan and then Bush, Chissano was able to influence his own party and begin
repairing Frelimo’s relationship with the United States. In addition to supporting the Community’s
efforts with complementary expertise and political cover for Chissano, the United States helped shape
the role of the UN in the peace process. While the UN’s role was critical, the United States’ cooperation
provided more power for the UN and greater credibility to the UN’s promises to fund a sizable mission
during implementation (Schneidman, 1993, 220).
The Mediation Process
Kenya’s Moi and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe had initiated a round of negotiations in 1989, but the dis-
putants did not seem interested in pursuing this option further. Frelimo accused Moi of bias toward
Renamo, and Renamo accused Mugabe of bias toward Frelimo. Venancio and Chan (1996, 57) assert
that these claims were at least partially excuses to stall negotiations. In particular, Renamo wanted to
improve its political strength before ending the conflict. Moving the negotiations to Rome under the
direction of the Community of Sant’Egidio revived the mediation efforts (Msabaha, 1995, 221). Ne-
gotiations with the Community began in 1990, progressed over several rounds between July 1990 and
October 1992, and culminated in the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome on October 4,
1992 (Bartoli, 1999, 24).
A European forum was selected for the negotiations in part because of the relationship between
Mozambique and Italy. In addition, Renamo saw negotiations in Europe as a way of establishing its
legitimacy (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 57).7 The core of the mediation team included two members of
7Renamo had proposed Portugal as a location for the talks, but Frelimo rejected this proposal as pro-Renamo lobbies in
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the Community of Sant’Egidio, a representative of the Italian government (who also served as chair-
man), and Bishop Gonc¸alves as a representative of Mozambique’s civil society. The team started off
as observers to the talks, present to encourage the disputants to negotiate but given no formal authority.
A few months into the negotiations, however, the team was acknowledged by the disputants as “full-
fledged mediators” (Bartoli, 1999, 258). The talks began slowly, with Frelimo presenting a twelve-point
plan to the Community to share with Renamo, and Renamo responding with a sixteen-point proposal for
the Community to share with the government (Hume, 1994, 28). The disputants were initially reluctant
to hold direct talks, but the mediators were able to encourage dialogue despite the extensive distrust
between the two parties.
Throughout the negotiations, the Community helped the disputants compromise and identify pos-
sible solutions (Hume, 1994, 73). The Community’s goal was to help the disputants’ express their
demands in ways that were consistent with the overall goal of reconciliation. When they were ready to
discuss military arrangements and terms of implementation, the United States and UN played a more
direct role (Hume, 1994, 95). At the request of the mediation team, the United States’ State Department
sent representatives to the third round of talks (Hume, 1994, 41). American legal and military experts
went to Rome during the March 15–June 9, 1992 round to lend their expertise as well (Hume, 1994,
97). UN representatives were directly involved from June to October 1992, but not previously (Bartoli,
1999, 259). UN military representatives and Italian defense experts prepared ceasefire documents that
built upon the plans proposed by American military experts (Hume, 1994, 118). In September, the UN
sent survey teams to Mozambique to begin gauging what type of mission would be needed to monitor
elections and aid demobilization in preparation for the signing of the agreement (Hume, 1994, 130-131).
Throughout the mediation process, Frelimo tried to diminish Renamo’s legitimacy by making uni-
lateral changes such as authorizing multiparty elections and redrafting the constitution (Schneidman,
1993, 223). At its fifth party Congress, Frelimo embraced economic and political liberalization (Alden,
2001, 12). These unilateral reforms responded to the grievances expressed during the conflict, but also
made it more difficult for Renamo to establish legitimacy (Msabaha, 1995, 212). With the disputants
coming closer on political issues, Frelimo was primarily concerned about demobilization and Renamo
Portugal led Frelimo to distrust Portuguese mediation (Venancio and Chan, 1996, 56).
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was focused on gaining political legitimacy (Alden, 2001, 25). After twelve rounds of talks, the dis-
putants signed an agreement that included provisions for implementation and international monitoring
of election preparations.
The case of Mozambique illustrates how multiple mediators with complementary sources of lever-
age can work together and pool their resources to overcome obstacles to resolution. The Community of
Sant’Egidio provided contextual knowledge and cultural leverage. Its history with the country, partic-
ularly its efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crises during the conflict, established the Community as
interested in helping the disputants and the Mozambican people find peace. The UN provided staying
power and Italy and the United States provided resources and political and military expertise (Bartoli,
1999).
Importantly, Italy served as a liaison between the United States and the rest of the mediation team,
allowing the team to draw on the United States’ resources, while also minimizing the complications
that would result from a more forceful US presence. This coordination of the mediators under Italy’s
leadership gained the disputants’ trust and discouraged mixed messages and free-riding. Each of the
mediators played an important role in the process, becoming more active in the negotiations when their
expertise or leverage was needed and supporting the other mediators when it was not. The reluctance of
the disputants to engage in direct negotiations indicates the importance of the Community’s contextual
knowledge in helping navigate the early stages of the negotiations. The mediators from the Community
knew that they did not have traditional sources of power or authority (a strong military or economic
incentives), so they focused on developing relationships and improving dialogue between the parties
(Bartoli, 1999).
Chissano’s distrust of the United States and Dhlakama’s distrust of Kenya illustrates how sensitive
the disputants were to the possibility of biased mediation. As in Angola, concerns over bias shaped
the mediator pool. Where Angola balanced the mediation effort, bringing the main supporters into a
more prominent role, supporters in the Mozambique conflict played a more peripheral role in the peace
process. For example, Kenya and Zimbabwe, who had been rejected as mediators, played an observer
role in later stages of the negotiations (Smock and Gregorian, 1993, 18).
These concerns of bias also meant that the United States could not play a central role. Instead,
the United States exerted its resource leverage through commitments to the other mediators. American
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commitment to the UN was especially important as it signaled international support and funding of the
peacekeeping mission. Italy’s role as host ensured a state with resources and the military and political
expertise the Community lacked were always at the table. As Mozambique’s primary donor and a
country interested in developing deeper economic ties with Mozambique, Italy also provided economic
leverage. Moreover, these mediators invested in the peace process after the agreement was signed,
forming new partnerships in order to overcome new challenges as they arose.
Implementing the General Peace Agreement
ONUMOZ, the supervising and monitoring commission lead by the UN, helped the combatants
implement the peace process. The Reintegration Support Scheme paid demobilized solders eighteen
months of salary to encourage demobilization and incentivize cooperation with the peace accord (Ajello,
1999, 617). The UN’s role during the negotiations enabled it to identify and respond to obstacles to im-
plementation. In contrast to Angola, where the UN was brought in after the negotiations were finished,
the UN had already established itself as an integral part of the peace process before the peacekeepers
arrived. This positioned the UN to understand and respond to new challenges more effectively.
For example, Renamo faced several challenges to transforming itself into a competitive political
party. Renamo held its first party Congress in 1989 to work out its identity as a political party, but it
needed resources to campaign and expand their political ranks to fill the positions created by the peace
commissions (Manning, 2002, 103-104). Renamo was reluctant to demobilize until it was confident that
it would be able to finance a political campaign. The UN responded by putting pressure on Renamo to
begin demobilization, reminding Dhlakama that the UN was present in part to protect Renamo through
the transition and would not be around forever.8 It was in Renamo’s best interests to take advantage of
the UN’s presence to demobilize and hold elections. The UN also helped alleviate Renamo’s concerns
by finding donors to contribute campaign funds for Renamo (Ajello, 1999, 633).
All of this lead to the demobilization of 80,000 soldiers, a new army, and free and fair elections ac-
cepted by all parties (Ajello, 1999, 615). With eighty-seven percent turnout for the elections, Chissano
took the office of President on December 9, 1994 (Bartoli, 1999, 246, 248). Despite some minor claims
of fraud during the elections, Renamo never seized those opportunities to defect (Ajello, 1999, 634-636).
8ONUMOZ cost the international community 503 million dollars over two years (Alden, 2001, 64).
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Discussion
In Angola and Mozambique, multiparty mediation efforts helped the disputants overcome the ob-
stacles to negotiations, reach agreement and initiate the implementation process. Balanced mediation
in Angola exerted leverage on the disputants to get them to the table. During negotiations, the United
States and Soviet Union pressured their allies to negotiate sincerely and promised continued political
aid and protection to alleviate the disputants’ security fears. In Mozambique, complementary mediation
brought contextual knowledge, economic and military resources, and staying power to the negotiating
table, with different sources of leverage used during different rounds of negotiations. In both mediation
efforts the mediators coordinated their efforts, maximizing their ability to use their collective leverage
while minimizing the risk of overcrowding. While Angola began the implementation of the Bicesse
Accords, the elections brought the return of violence. Mozambique’s elections produced a relatively
smooth transition to the post-election government and cessation of hostilities.
The difference in outcomes between these two cases can partially be attributed to Angola’s medi-
ation team ignoring the importance of staying power during the negotiation and failing to include the
UN until after the agreement had been signed. Additionally, some factors are outside of the mediators’
control. In Mozambique, the disputants shifted from preferring victory to preferring peace (Bartoli,
1999). In Angola, it seems that Savimbi always preferred victory to peace, never expecting that elec-
tions would not result in victory. Changing this mindset is not something that mediators alone can do,
but it has strong implications for the success of any peace accord.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation explores the characteristics of multiparty mediation that influence when and how
multiple mediators can help (or hurt) the prospects for peace. This project provides important insights
into how the composition of the mediation team affects resolution, by looking deeper into multiparty
efforts to understand the dynamics between the mediators as well as the dynamics between the medi-
ators and the disputants. To pursue this question, I introduced a theoretical framework of multiparty
mediation as a heterogeneous club good, providing a basis from which to consider when additional me-
diators are desirable and when they are not. While additional mediators can provide positive sources
of leverage, they also increase the risk of overcrowding and thus increase the risk that forum-shopping,
mixed messages, or free-riding will hinder the negotiations.
From this framework, I identified three characteristics of mediation efforts expected to improve
mediation’s chances of success. First, complementary efforts improve the mediation team’s ability to
respond to challenges at all phases of the resolution process. Complementary efforts are complete, pro-
viding three important sources of leverage to the negotiations: contextual knowledge, economic/military
resources, and staying power. Furthermore, complementary efforts reduce the risk of overcrowding by
excluding mediators who do not bring a unique source of leverage to the table. Thus, mediation efforts
that are complete as well as those with fewer redundant mediators should be more successful.
Second, balanced mediation efforts include mediators biased toward both sides of the conflict. This
provides each side with a mediator they trust to protect their interests at the negotiating table. Moreover,
balanced mediation provides each side a mediator who is more likely to protect them if the other side
reneges on the agreement. In this way, balanced mediation can help alleviate disputants’ security con-
cerns, improving the chances that negotiations are successful. Therefore, I expected balanced mediation
to be more likely to produce an agreement that is implemented than unbalanced mediation (where only
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one side has mediators biased in its favor) and impartial mediation (where none of the mediators are
biased).
Finally, I expected that coordination among the mediators should improve the chances of mediation
success. While multiparty efforts are at risk of overcrowding, a coordinated mediation effort can mini-
mize the negative consequences of additional mediators. By working together, the mediators can reduce
the disputants’ incentives to forum-shop. Additionally, coordination reduces the risk that the mediators
send mixed messages or succumb to the temptation to free-ride. Coordination improves the mediation
team’s chances of success by maximizing the ability to take advantage of the additional resources and
tools of another mediator while also minimizing the negative effects of adding a new party to the nego-
tiations. Thus, I expected coordinated multiparty mediation to be more successful at reaching a peace
agreement than single-party mediation and uncoordinated multiparty mediation. When multiple medi-
ators do not coordinate, the mediation effort cannot take full advantage of the mediators resources as
forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding are more likely to undermine the peace process. I
expected, therefore, that uncoordinated mediation would be less effective than single-party mediation at
producing an agreement.
To evaluate these expectations, I employed statistical tests on a set of mediation attempts in civil
wars between 1989 and 2005. In these analyses I considered three measures of mediation success:
reaching an agreement, overcoming the difficult two-month period post-agreement, and producing a
durable peace. In addition to these statistical analyses, I discussed two cases of multiparty mediation:
Angola and Mozambique. These cases allowed for a clearer look at the dynamics of complementary,
balanced, and coordinated mediation during the conflict resolution process.
The case of Mozambique highlights the value of complementary sources of leverage. The mediators
in Mozambique all brought something unique to the table, playing a more prominent role when their
tools were needed and a more supportive role when they were not. The Community of Sant’Egidio
provided contextual knowledge, building upon its connections with the disputants as well as the people
of Mozambique. Italy provided resources as well as a neutral location for the negotiations. The United
States provided resource leverage as well, although it did so in a more indirect role, primarily supporting
the efforts of the Community and Italy. The UN also participated in the mediation effort, providing
staying power and crafting the monitoring and peacekeeping missions that accompanied the General
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Peace Agreement. These complementary sources of leverage ensured that all of the necessary sources
of influence were available, guiding the disputants through the different stages of conflict resolution.
This positive effect of complementary efforts, however, did not find systematic support in the sta-
tistical analyses. Importantly, the case of Mozambique shows how mediators can play different roles,
some central to the peace process and others in more supportive roles. Currently, the literature tends
to consider a mediator present or not. Considering peripheral mediators as well as other international
actors that are influencing the negotiations indirectly could strengthen the ability to identify complete
and mediation efforts as well as better identify redundant mediators. Mozambique highlights the value
of this peripheral role. While the United States is considered a mediator in the Mozambique peace pro-
cess, its role was not as direct or forceful as Italy’s. By playing a more peripheral role, the United States
helped avoid overcrowding the mediation effort. Expanding the club goods framework of mediation to
account for central and peripheral mediators would better capture the dynamics at play in Mozambique.
This expanded framework could also provide more nuanced ways of operationalizing completeness and
redundancy.
The quantitative and qualitative analyses in this dissertation show that balanced mediation has a
strong and significant impact on reaching an agreement as well as helping that agreement last through
the difficult first months of implementation. As balanced mediation is unique to multiparty efforts,
this highlights the potential advantages of having multiple mediators at the table. Angola’s mediation
process illustrates that balanced mediation can provide leverage over the disputants and encourage them
to continue negotiations until an agreement was reached. Balanced mediation also provided allies for
both sides of the conflict, alleviating some of the disputants’ security concerns during the negotiation
and implementation of the peace agreement. Balanced mediation, therefore, can help move the peace
forward, even if it is not sufficient to produce a long-term stable peace.
The analysis also provided support for the assertion that coordinated multiparty efforts are more
likely to produce an agreement than single-party or uncoordinated multiparty efforts. Once again, this
indicates that multiparty efforts vary in their composition and that this variance has important impli-
cations for mediation outcomes. The statistical analyses found a strong positive effect for coordinated
efforts relative to single-party and uncoordinated multiparty efforts. In both Angola and Mozambique,
coordination among the mediators was important to the mediation team’s success. The coordinated
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efforts of Angola and Mozambique were able to take advantage of the balanced biases and comple-
mentary sources of leverage to pressure the disputants most effectively. When multiple mediators are
present, but do not coordinate their efforts (for example, in the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Burundi),
the mediation effort becomes overcrowded, leading to forum-shopping, mixed messages and free-riding.
Coordination, therefore, is an important characteristic of an effective multiparty mediation team.
Interestingly, none of the statistical analyses evaluating the effect of mediation composition on the
duration of peace indicated any significant relationships. While balance and coordination improve the
short-term effects of mediation, these characteristics are not enough to overcome the additional chal-
lenges that arise as the country transitions from conflict to peace. Some multiparty mediation teams,
therefore, can help the disputants navigate the initial obstacles to peace, reaching an agreement as well
as surviving the difficult window after the agreement is signed. Mediator composition can help build a
foundation for creating a lasting peace, but balanced and coordinated efforts are not sufficient to ensure
a durable peace.
Perhaps the lack of strong long-term effects is not surprising, as mediation is used in the hardest
cases. Moreover, many new obstacles arise as the disputants implement an agreement and transition
from conflict to peace. These obstacles are not necessarily predictable, leaving many factors outside of
the control (and influence) of the mediators. Some of these obstacles, however, can be anticipated. For
common roadblocks to implementation, provisions can be included in the peace agreement to improve
the disputants’ ability to overcome that challenge and continue on the road to peace. Power-sharing
arrangements, for example, have a meaningful impact on creating a stable peace. In Angola, Savimbi
was not satisfied with a solution that did not include UNITA in a substantial role in the post-conflict
government. A power-sharing arrangement in which UNITA had been guaranteed a position in the
government could have helped prevent UNITA from backing out of the agreement following the election.
This raises some interesting questions. How does the composition of the mediation team influence
the nature and contents of the peace agreement? Are balanced mediation efforts more or less likely
to include power-sharing? Are complementary efforts more or less likely to call for elections? With
diversity in how the peace process unfolds after an agreement is signed, useful insights could be gained
from considering how mediation composition influence the terms of the peace agreement. This could
in turn produce insights into when (and how) multiparty mediation improves the chances of reaching a
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durable peace.
From these analyses and discussion, I identify a few implications for both scholars and practitioners
of mediation. First, instead of shying away from biased mediators when disputants express concerns
about bias, look for opportunities to balance the mediation effort. Concerns of bias are often valid and
interested intermediaries should be sympathetic to these concerns. Often, however, these concerns lead
the disputants to select an impartial mediator. Balanced efforts can provide the security disputants seek
while also providing the leverage necessary to exert pressure on the disputants.
Second, include important parties early in the resolution process. A key difference in the mediation
effort in Angola and Mozambique was the inclusion of the UN during the negotiations in Mozambique.
Even though the UN’s main role in the peace process is during implementation, the inclusion of the UN
during the negotiations can give credibility to the mediation’s promises that international support will be
present during implementation. Moreover, it provides the actor responsible for monitoring implementa-
tion the opportunity to acquire more knowledge of the conflict and the type of mission needed to assist
implementation. This knowledge can also help the UN anticipate challenges and respond more quickly
and forcefully when obstacles arise. In addition, including the monitoring group during the negotiations
improves cohesion. The mediators do not hand off responsibility to a new actor, but instead are part of
team responsible for the negotiation, monitoring, and implementation of the agreement.
Finally, coordinate multiparty efforts. The consequences of overcrowding can be very severe. Coor-
dination among the mediators provides a first line of defense against forum-shopping, mixed messages,
and free-riding. Coordination in Angola and Mozambique allowed a diverse set of actors to help the dis-
putants reach agreement. In both cases, the mediators coordinated their efforts, ensuring that the peace
process progressed smoothly, without competing plans being brought forward by different mediators.
Mediators face a challenging task. They must navigate the barriers that prevent the disputants from
talking and open space for compromise. Multiple mediators means multiple sources of leverage and
multiple paths available to navigate these barriers. Multiple mediators can also mean more actors with
divergent interests and competing goals. Multiparty mediation encompasses a wide variety of mediation
efforts composed of different types of mediators. As multiparty mediation has become more common,
and will likely remain a popular conflict resolution technique, understanding the dynamics of multiparty
mediation can help the international community better design mediation efforts. Moreover, it can help
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potential mediators evaluate their relative impact in different conflicts and better allocate their energy,
investing in conflicts where they can best improve the chances of mediation success.
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APPENDIX
This appendix includes robustness checks, tests of model assumptions, and discussion of how alter-
native specifications alter the inferences drawn. It is broadly organized in the same way as the analyses
in Chapter 4: first models of reaching agreement, then of halting the violence, and then of peace dura-
tion. Interaction terms are considered in the next section; alternative codings of contextual knowledge
conclude the appendix.
Proportional Odds Assumption
As mentioned previously, ordered logistic models (also known as proportional odds models) assume
that the independent variables have a constant effect across the cut points, meaning that the effect of,
for example, democracy on moving from one category to higher categories is constant regardless of the
initial category. So the effect of democracy on moving from failed negotiations to a more successful
outcome (limited commitment or peace agreement) is the same as moving from a limited commitment
agreement to a more successful outcome (partial or comprehensive peace agreement).
The Brant test evaluates whether this assumption is violated for individual variables in the model
as well as for the entire model. Table A.1 provides the results of this test for the model reported in
Table 4.6. The statistically significant p-value for central command indicates that the proportional odds
assumption might not be appropriate in this model.
Generalized ordered logistic models (also known as partial proportional odds models) allow the
proportional odds assumption to be relaxed for variables that do not satisfy the assumption. By only re-
laxing the proportional odds assumption on variables for which it does not hold, the generalized ordered
logistic model is more efficient and parsimonious than alternative models for which the assumption is
removed for all variables (e.g. a multinomial logistic model) (Williams, 2006). For the variables with
the proportional odds restriction removed, the generalized ordered logistic model estimates a series of
binary logistic models. That is, it estimates the effect of the variable on going from the first category
(failure) to all higher categories (limited commitment or peace agreement); then it estimates the effect
on going from the first or second category (failure or limited commitment agreements) to a higher cat-
egory (partial or comprehensive peace agreements), continuing through all the categories. For all other
variables, the generalized ordered logistic model continues to estimate coefficients with the proportional
odds constraint imposed.
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Table A.1: Brant Test of Proportional Odds Assumption
Variable χ2 p-value
All 73.93 0.000
Complete Mediation 0.60 0.741
Redundancy 0.49 0.781
Impartial Mediation 0.93 0.629
Unbalanced Mediation 1.16 0.560
Single-Party Mediation 1.30 0.523
Uncoordinated Multiparty 1.39 0.498
Territorial Conflict 3.35 0.187
Conflict Duration 2.72 0.256
Conflict Intensity 2.05 0.359
Polity 0.24 0.887
Central Command 6.05 0.049
Europe 2.32 0.313
Asia 4.56 0.102
Africa 2.86 0.240
Latin America 4.45 0.108
Note: A significant test statistic indicates that the
proportional odds assumption has been violated.
Table A.2 presents the results of a generalized ordered logistic model in which the proportional odds
constraint was removed for central command. The first block of this table reports the coefficients and
standard errors for the variables that still have the proportional odds restriction imposed. The groups at
the bottom indicate the coefficients for central command as well as the cut point (or intercept) for each
transition. The main difference between the results from this generalized ordered logistic model and
those presented in Table 4.6 is that redundancy is statistically significant in this model. An additional
redundant mediator has a negative effect on reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. The results for
the rest of the characteristics of the dream team are similar, producing the same inferences as before.
Conflicts in Europe and Latin America are still more likely to reach comprehensive peace agreements
than conflicts in the Middle East, although this effect is no longer statistically significant. With the
proportional odds restriction removed, central command has a negative effect across all categories.
The unintuitive result from the analyses reported in Chapter 4 remains; stronger central control makes
reaching a more comprehensive peace agreement less likely, although this effect remains insignificant.
A global Wald test on this generalized ordered logistic model, however, indicates that the propor-
tional odds assumption is potentially still violated. Iterative Wald tests, which impose the proportional
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Table A.2: Generalized Ordered Logistic Results: Unconstrained Central Command
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.123 (0.515)
Redundancy −0.439 (0.221)
Impartial Mediation −0.716 (0.466)
Unbalanced Mediation −1.336 (0.428)
Single-Party Mediation −1.186 (0.285)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.623 (0.447)
Territorial Conflict −0.409 (0.193)
Conflict Duration −0.012 (0.012)
Conflict Intensity −0.276 (0.303)
Polity 0.093 (0.027)
Europe 1.406 (0.726)
Asia 1.815 (0.612)
Africa 2.245 (0.671)
Latin America 1.279 (0.715)
Central Command −0.568 (0.324)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) 3.289 (0.902)
Central Command −0.425 (0.247)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace) 0.457 (0.793)
Central Command −0.020 (0.333)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace) −1.350 (0.704)
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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odds constraint on one variable at a time (the variable which most clearly does not violate the assump-
tion) and then re-evaluate the model until all the remaining variables fail the proportional odds test,
indicate that territorial conflict, conflict duration, and region might also violate the proportional odds
assumption. Table A.3 reports the estimates from the generalized ordered logistic model when the pro-
portional odds constraint is removed for each of these variables.
The results presented in this model reflect those in Table 4.6 for the characteristics of the dream
team. Redundancy has a negative and insignificant effect. Territorial conflict is now only statistically
significant when comparing failure, limited commitment, and partial peace agreements to comprehen-
sive peace agreements. Conflict duration and central command both have a negative and statistically
significant effect on moving from a failed agreement to some kind of agreement. Conflicts in Europe,
Asia, Africa, and Latin America are almost always more likely to reach more comprehensive agreements
than conflicts in the Middle East. This relationship only reaches statistical significance when comparing
failures to signing at least a limited commitment agreement.
Coding Mediation Outcome
To ensure that the results in Table 4.6 are not sensitive to the decision to divide partial and compre-
hensive peace agreements into distinct categories, the tables below use a three-category dependent vari-
able. This variable divides mediation outcomes into failures, limited commitment agreements, and peace
agreements. Table A.4 presents the results of an ordered logistic regression with this three-category vari-
able. Table A.5 shows the Brant test for the model in Table A.4, and Table A.6 reports the results of the
generalized ordered logistic regression selected in response to potential violations of the proportional
odds assumption.
Overall, the results in Table A.4 are very similar to those in Table 4.6. The few differences between
the models include redundancy being statistically significant with a negative effect on reaching a peace
agreement. Territorial conflict loses its significance, although it still has a negative effect. Additionally,
central command continues to have a negative effect, which is statistically significant in the model with
a three-category dependent variable. Finally, the coefficient on Latin America (in comparison to the
Middle East) loses significance, although conflicts in Latin America are still more likely to produce a
signed peace agreement as a result of mediation than those in the Middle East.
I evaluated this model for violations of the proportional odds assumptions. Table A.5 indicates that
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Table A.3: Unconstrained Cent. Command, Terr. Conflict, Conf. Duration & Region
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.230 (0.504)
Redundancy −0.389 (0.222)
Impartial Mediation −0.225 (0.466)
Unbalanced Mediation −0.839 (0.406)
Single-Party Mediation −1.123 (0.297)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.747 (0.508)
Conflict Intensity −0.219 (0.320)
Polity 0.103 (0.028)
Territorial Conflict 0.152 (0.388)
Conflict Duration −0.044 (0.017)
Central Command −0.833 (0.384)
Europe 1.332 (0.545)
Asia 2.153 (0.629)
Africa 2.063 (0.636)
Latin America 2.337 (0.925)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) 3.266 (1.041)
Territorial Conflict −0.519 (0.275)
Conflict Duration −0.005 (0.014)
Central Command −0.435 (0.246)
Europe 0.175 (0.651)
Asia 0.578 (0.515)
Africa 0.998 (0.558)
Latin America −0.441 (0.684)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace) 1.036 (0.729)
Territorial Conflict −1.512 (0.642)
Conflict Duration 0.028 (0.035)
Central Command 0.012 (0.304)
Europe 1.983 (2.787)
Asia 1.882 (2.329)
Africa 3.329 (2.682)
Latin America 2.035 (2.526)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace) −2.851 (2.707)
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.4: Ordered Logistic Regression: 3 Category Outcome Variable
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.020 (0.596)
Redundancy −0.445 (0.222)
Impartial Mediation −0.755 (0.519)
Unbalanced Mediation −1.302 (0.495)
Single-Party Mediation −1.262 (0.284)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.754 (0.449)
Territorial Conflict −0.266 (0.211)
Conflict Duration −0.015 (0.011)
Conflict Intensity −0.188 (0.306)
Polity 0.086 (0.027)
Central Command −0.505 (0.207)
Europe 1.166 (0.585)
Asia 1.689 (0.515)
Africa 1.878 (0.568)
Latin America 1.052 (0.602)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) −3.469 (0.757)
(Limited Commitment/Peace Agreement) −0.838 (0.776)
N 302
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.5: Brant Test of Proportional Odds Assumption: 3 Category Outcome
Variable χ2 p-value
All 51.97 0.000
Complete Mediation 0.57 0.448
Redundancy 0.21 0.648
Impartial Mediation 0.92 0.337
Unbalanced Mediation 1.01 0.315
Single-Party Mediation 1.06 0.304
Uncoordinated Multiparty 1.18 0.278
Territorial Conflict 0.53 0.468
Conflict Duration 2.64 0.104
Conflict Intensity 0.04 0.836
Polity 0.00 0.971
Central Command 0.85 0.358
Europe 1.96 0.162
Asia 4.47 0.035
Africa 1.68 0.195
Latin America 3.20 0.073
Note: A significant test statistic indicates that the
proportional odds assumption has been violated.
some of the coefficients on the regional dummies violate the assumption. Iterative Wald tests also raise
concerns for each of the regional dummies as well as complete mediation. Table A.6, therefore, reports
the results of a generalized ordered logistic regression in which the coefficients on complete mediation
and the regional dummies are not constrained by the proportional odds assumption.
Overall, the results of the generalized ordered logistic model reflect the same patterns as the ordered
logistic regression. The coefficient on redundancy loses its statistical significance, while the coefficient
on Latin America is now significant when comparing failure to ending in some kind of agreement.
Complete mediation has a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effect when comparing failure or
limited commitment agreements to peace agreements. The regional effects become insignificant and the
effect of the conflict being in Europe or Latin America becomes negative.
The results reported in Table 4.6 for the characteristics of the dream team are robust to relaxations
of the proportional odds assumption as well as to coding the dependent variable to include only three
categories. Balanced mediation outperforms impartial and unbalanced mediation in all of the models
presented. Coordinated multiparty efforts are substantially and significantly more likely to result in
a comprehensive peace agreement than single-party and uncoordinated multiparty mediation attempts.
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Table A.6: Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression: Complete Mediation & Region
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation −0.784 (0.765)
Redundancy −0.416 (0.232)
Impartial Mediation −0.415 (0.489)
Unbalanced Mediation −0.966 (0.431)
Single-Party Mediation −1.204 (0.285)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.722 (0.485)
Territorial Conflict −0.296 (0.229)
Conflict Duration −0.018 (0.012)
Conflict Intensity −0.168 (0.318)
Polity 0.091 (0.027)
Central Command −0.509 (0.222)
Europe 1.946 (0.602)
Asia 2.632 (0.666)
Africa 2.554 (0.608)
Latin America 2.684 (0.845)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) 2.514 (0.795)
Complete Mediation 0.599 (0.484)
Europe −0.378 (0.537)
Asia 0.114 (0.437)
Africa 0.452 (0.473)
Latin America −0.716 (0.614)
(Limited Commitment/Peace Agreement) 1.883 (0.741)
N 302
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.7: Logistic Regression: Halting the Violence (Peace Agreements Only)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation −1.382 (0.906)
Redundancy 0.811 (0.394)
Impartial Mediation −3.879 (1.372)
Unbalanced Mediation −4.350 (1.191)
Single-Party Mediation 0.187 (1.024)
Uncoordinated Multiparty 0.102 (0.804)
Territorial Conflict 1.667 (0.972)
Conflict Duration −0.097 (0.046)
Conflict Intensity −3.516 (1.172)
Polity 0.144 (0.085)
Central Command −0.174 (0.528)
Rebel Strength −1.497 (0.513)
Europe −1.847 (1.060)
Asia −0.441 (1.089)
Africa −1.341 (1.006)
(Intercept) 8.108 (2.586)
N 103
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and Latin America are the baseline categories.
Support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 with respect to the type of agreement, if any, reached is robust to
alternative model specifications.
Excluding Ceasefires
As ceasefires are not always intended to halt the violence for extended periods of time, the model
of violence termination post-agreement was also estimated without ceasefires included in the sample.
Interestingly, when only looking at partial and comprehensive peace agreements, whether the conflict
was in the Middle East is strongly correlated with whether peace lasted for two months. Ten of the
eleven peace agreements signed in the Middle East reached the two-month threshold. As this strong
correlation causes collinearity and identification challenges for the model, the reference category for
region was changed to Latin America, and the Middle East was excluded.
The coefficient on redundancy is the only one of the mediation characteristics of interest that differs
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between the two models, gaining significance. Having an additional redundant mediator at the nego-
tiating table increases the likelihood that the agreement produces two months of peace post-signing.
This effect is still surprising, but once again perhaps indicates that having more mediators also means a
greater presence by the international community and more actors to monitor, observe, and continue to
pressure the disputants immediately after an agreement is signed. The effect of territorial conflicts and
level of democracy lose significance. The rest of the results are qualitatively similar to those from Table
4.7.
Violence Halted Thresholds
Next, the sensitivity of the results in Table 4.7 to the selection of a two-month threshold for the
dependent variable is evaluated. Table A.8 presents the results when the dependent variable captures
whether the violence halted post-agreement for one, three, four, five, and six months. Importantly,
across the models presented below there is no attrition in the sample. None of the observations were
censored within six months of signing an agreement.
When comparing the results in Table A.8 to those in Table 4.7, the general patterns in the original
model seem to bear out across thresholds for the dependent variable. The effect of complete mediation
is always negative and statistically insignificant; redundancy is positive and insignificant. Agreements
produced by balanced mediation are more likely to reach any of these thresholds than impartial and
unbalanced mediation, maintaining statistical significance and strong substantive effects across models.
Single-party mediation outperforms coordinated multiparty efforts, which in turn outperform uncoordi-
nated multiparty efforts, in all models.
When comparing the effects of the control variables, the effect of territorial conflicts gains signifi-
cance at the three-month threshold, maintaining a positive but insignificant effect across the rest of the
models. Ceasefires consistently have a negative effect across models, although this effect is statistically
insignificant in the model with the one-month threshold and the model with the four-month threshold.
The regional effects also indicate that conflicts in the Middle East are more likely to reach these thresh-
olds than conflicts in other regions, although at the four, five, and six-month thresholds this effect loses
significance for all regions except Latin America.
The threshold chosen for the dependent variable does not influence the inferences drawn regarding
the effect of mediation characteristics on halting the violence after an agreement. These thresholds
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also do not change the expected direction of the relationships between the control variables and the
probability of halting the violence.
Selection Effects: Halting the Violence
As the models of halting the violence only include those mediation attempts that produced an agree-
ment, the effect of variables of interest on reaching this two-month threshold could potentially be influ-
enced by selection processes that encourage these agreements to be signed in the first place, confounding
the effect of, for example, balanced mediation on helping halt the violence with the effect of balanced
mediation on producing an agreement in the first place. To address this possibility, Table A.9 presents
the results of a censored probit regression in which the selection equation estimates the probability of
producing a signed agreement (ceasefire, partial peace agreement, or comprehensive peace agreement).
Then the effect of the mediation characteristics of interest on helping those conflicts that signed an
agreement reach the two-month threshold of peace is estimated.
Agreements produced by a balanced mediation team are still more likely to halt the violence than
agreements produced by impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts. The other characteristics of the
dream team remain insignificant, and the coefficients on complete and uncoordinated mediation efforts
change sign. Complete mediation efforts are less likely to produce an agreement in the first place, but
more likely to halt the violence should an agreement be reached. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts are
less likely than coordinated efforts to produce an agreement, but more likely than coordinated efforts to
halt the violence. Additionally, the negative effect of ceasefires relative to peace agreements becomes
insignificant.
The strong support found for Hypothesis 3 is robust to excluding ceasefires, alternative peace thresh-
olds for the dependent variable, and specifying a selection model.
Hazard Ratios, Survival, & Cumulative Hazard Curves
Table A.10 presents the results from the same model as Table 4.8, reporting hazard ratios instead
of coefficients. Hazard ratios greater than 1 indicate a higher risk of peace failure (and thus a shorter
expected duration of post-agreement peace) while hazard ratios less than 1 indicate a lower risk of peace
failure (and thus a longer expected duration of post-agreement peace). Additionally, Figures A.1 and
A.2 illustrate the survival and cumulative hazard curves for the full model reported in Table 4.8.
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Table A.9: Censored Probit Estimation
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Violence Halted
Complete Mediation 0.009 (0.389)
Redundancy 0.044 (0.123)
Impartial Mediation −1.024 (0.361)
Unbalanced Mediation −0.785 (0.385)
Single-Party Mediation 0.136 (0.210)
Uncoordinated Multiparty 0.411 (0.391)
Rebel Strength −0.538 (0.125)
Ceasefire −0.268 (0.140)
(Intercept) 2.586 (0.539)
Selection Equation
Complete Mediation −0.434 (0.418)
Redundancy −0.150 (0.092)
Impartial Mediation −0.041 (0.294)
Unbalanced Mediation −0.479 (0.284)
Single-Party Mediation −0.664 (0.203)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.006 (0.357)
Territorial Conflict −0.157 (0.171)
Conflict Duration −0.031 (0.007)
Conflict Intensity −0.518 (0.215)
Polity 0.067 (0.017)
Central Command −0.144 (0.117)
Europe −0.090 (0.278)
Asia −0.213 (0.226)
Africa 0.177 (0.189)
Latin America −0.696 (0.536)
(Intercept) 1.824 (0.445)
ρ −1.000 (0.000)
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.10: Weibull Regression: Hazard Ratios of Peace Failure
Variable Haz. Ratio (Std. Err.) Haz. Ratio (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 1.267 (0.751) 2.720 (1.800)
Redundancy 1.309 (0.192) 0.626 (0.203)
Impartial Mediation 3.213 (3.496) 1.964 (1.318)
Unbalanced Mediation 1.557 (1.778) 0.721 (0.545)
Single-Party Mediation 1.602 (0.795) 0.541 (0.370)
Uncoordinated Multiparty 1.451 (1.338) 0.944 (0.518)
Territorial Conflict 0.545 (0.296)
Conflict Duration 1.021 (0.032)
Conflict Intensity 4.997 (3.211)
Polity 0.803 (0.060)
Central Command 2.058 (0.689)
Rebel Strength 1.717 (0.495)
Peacekeeping 0.135 (0.078)
Europe 1.575 (0.903)
Asia 17.015 (12.239)
Africa 5.653 (3.228)
Latin America 45.817 (49.004)
(Intercept) 0.048 (0.053) 0.005 (0.007)
ln(p) −1.118 (0.072) −0.520 (0.142)
N 103 103
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level.
Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty
mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Figure A.1: Survival Curves
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Figure A.2: Cumulative Hazard Curves
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Table A.11: Cox Proportional Hazard Models: Duration of Post-Agreement Peace
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.158 (0.433) 0.462 (0.343)
Redundancy 0.205 (0.105) −0.150 (0.187)
Impartial Mediation 0.891 (0.948) −0.126 (0.508)
Unbalanced Mediation 0.377 (0.985) −0.516 (0.568)
Single-Party Mediation 0.364 (0.360) −0.027 (0.403)
Uncoordinated Multiparty 0.240 (0.638) −0.062 (0.352)
Territorial Conflict −0.273 (0.340)
Conflict Duration 0.000 (0.020)
Conflict Intensity 0.777 (0.402)
Polity −0.135 (0.043)
Central Command 0.327 (0.245)
Rebel Strength 0.337 (0.203)
Peacekeeping −1.128 (0.334)
Europe 0.489 (0.609)
Asia 1.936 (0.621)
Africa 1.000 (0.599)
Latin America 2.470 (0.807)
N 103 103
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level.
Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation, coordinated multiparty
mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
Cox Proportional Hazards Model
As previously mentioned, the Weibull model assumes that the baseline hazard is either monotoni-
cally increasing, monotonically decreasing, or flat. The appropriateness of the Weibull model for du-
ration analysis is dependent upon the validity of this assumption. The Cox proportional hazard model
does not require such an assumption as it does not estimate the baseline hazard. Therefore, the results
of both the basic model and the full model with controls from Table 4.8 were also estimated as Cox
proportional hazard models. The results from the Cox proportional hazards estimates are presented in
Table A.11.
The results from the basic model without controls are qualitatively similar to those from the Weibull
model. A few noticeable differences do arise when comparing the full models with controls, although
the coefficients on the mediation dream team characteristics all remain insignificant. The coefficient on
115
impartial mediation changes sign. Impartial mediation in the Weibull model increases the risk of failure
relative to balanced mediation; in the Cox model, impartial mediation decreases the risk of failure
relative to balanced mediation. The effects of the control variables on the risk of peace failure are in
the same direction in both models, although the coefficients on conflict intensity, central command, and
Africa all lose significance.
Selection Effects: Duration of Peace
Just as the selection into an agreement could influence the effect of mediation on the likelihood an
agreement halts the violence, the selection into an agreement could influence the effect of mediation on
the duration of peace post-agreement. Therefore, Table A.12 reports the results of a Weibull model with
selection. The selection equation estimates the probability of reaching a peace agreement and then the
effect of mediation characteristics on the duration of post-agreement peace is estimated.
The characteristics of mediation efforts included in this model do not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the duration of post-agreement peace. Complete mediation and an additional redundant
mediator both increase the hazard of peace failure. Impartial mediation is at a greater risk of failure
than balanced mediation, while unbalanced mediation is at a lower risk of failure than balanced me-
diation. Uncoordinated multiparty efforts are expected to endure longer than coordinated multiparty
efforts, which in turn are expected to endure longer than single-party efforts. The control variables for
the duration equation both have a statistically significant effect. Conflicts with stronger rebels are at a
greater risk of failure, while those with peacekeepers present are at a decreased risk.
Interacting Complete and Redundancy
As previously mentioned, complete mediation efforts could potentially mitigate the expected nega-
tive effects of additional redundant mediators. To explore this possibility, the main analyses presented in
Chapter 4 are repeated with the inclusion of an interaction between complete mediation and redundancy.
Truly complementary efforts, those in which the effort is both complete and the number of redundant
mediators is zero, are empirically a very rare event. In the sample considered here, none of the cases are
truly complementary. Future studies on mediation attempts should examine the causes of overcrowding
and how it can be avoided
Table A.13 reports the effects of the variables, including the interaction term, on the first measure
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Table A.12: Weibull Duration Model with Selection
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Duration
Complete Mediation 0.821 (0.708)
Redundancy 0.147 (0.150)
Impartial Mediation 0.682 (0.866)
Unbalanced Mediation −0.136 (0.928)
Single-Party Mediation 0.331 (0.483)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −0.332 (0.956)
Rebel Strength 0.752 (0.300)
Peacekeeping −1.343 (0.438)
(Intercept) −4.133 (1.160)
Selection
Complete Mediation 0.329 (0.308)
Redundancy −0.211 (0.119)
Impartial Mediation 0.169 (0.361)
Unbalanced Mediation −0.285 (0.300)
Single-Party Mediation −0.845 (0.207)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.321 (0.480)
Territorial Conflict −0.333 (0.135)
Conflict Duration −0.003 (0.008)
Conflict Intensity −0.098 (0.189)
Polity 0.064 (0.019)
Central Command −0.397 (0.140)
Europe −0.128 (0.321)
Asia 0.090 (0.287)
Africa 0.307 (0.293)
Latin America −0.647 (0.383)
(Intercept) 1.233 (0.461)
ρ (Error Correlation) −0.250 (0.000)
ln(p) (Duration Dependence) −0.924 (0.082)
N (Selection) 301
N (Duration) 103
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.13: Ordered Logistic Regression: Interaction Complete & Redundancy
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation −0.095 (1.185)
Redundancy −0.441 (0.203)
Complete x Redundancy 0.113 (0.477)
Impartial Mediation −0.715 (0.483)
Unbalanced Mediation −1.329 (0.438)
Single-Party Mediation −1.208 (0.282)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −1.593 (0.440)
Territorial Conflict −0.435 (0.187)
Conflict Duration −0.009 (0.011)
Conflict Intensity −0.277 (0.301)
Polity 0.089 (0.026)
Central Command −0.358 (0.214)
Europe 1.460 (0.695)
Asia 1.865 (0.596)
Africa 2.303 (0.642)
Latin America 1.368 (0.671)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) −2.933 (0.741)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace) −0.302 (0.743)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace) 1.002 (0.756)
N 302
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.14: Logistic Regression: Interaction Complete & Redundancy
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation −4.281 (1.946)
Redundancy 0.468 (0.311)
Complete x Redundancy 2.176 (1.237)
Impartial Mediation −3.348 (1.255)
Unbalanced Mediation −3.051 (1.223)
Single-Party Mediation 0.191 (0.683)
Uncoordinated Multiparty −0.666 (0.891)
Territorial Conflict 1.279 (0.629)
Conflict Duration −0.093 (0.040)
Conflict Intensity −3.175 (0.850)
Polity 0.154 (0.065)
Central Command −0.502 (0.454)
Rebel Strength −1.068 (0.384)
Ceasefire −1.083 (0.536)
Europe −1.970 (0.567)
Asia −3.665 (0.970)
Africa −3.348 (0.948)
Latin America −4.807 (0.997)
(Intercept) 10.306 (2.611)
N 183
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant at the
p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced mediation,
coordinated multiparty mediation, and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
of mediation success—the type of agreement, if any, reached at the end of the mediation attempt. Com-
plete mediation has a negative and insignificant effect on reaching a more comprehensive agreement for
efforts with no redundant mediators. Redundancy has a negative effect for both incomplete and com-
plete efforts. This effect is only statistically significant for incomplete efforts.1 The negative effect of
redundancy does seem to be mitigated for complete efforts. The sign and significance of the coefficients
for the other variables in the model are unchanged from the original model in Table 4.6.
I explored the effect of mediation characteristics on halting the violence post-agreement. Table
A.14 reports the results of a logistic regression including the interaction term. Complete mediation
1The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is -0.327 with a standard error of 0.564.
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has a negative and statistically significant effect for efforts with no redundant mediators. Redundancy
has a positive effect for both complete and incomplete efforts, with the effect only reaching statistical
significance for complete efforts.2 In this case, redundancy appears to have a substantially larger positive
effect for complete efforts. The sign and significance of the coefficients for the other variables in the
model are unchanged from those in Table 4.7.
Finally, Table A.15 reports the results for the duration model with the final measure of success
(duration of post-agreement peace). Columns 1-4 report the coefficients and hazard ratios of the model
without control variables. Columns 5-8 report the coefficients and hazard ratios of the full model with
controls. In both models, complete mediation has a positive effect; complete mediation efforts are at
greater risk of failure than incomplete efforts when there are no redundant mediators. Redundancy has a
positive and statistically significant effect for incomplete efforts, increasing the hazard of peace failure,
in the model without controls. For complete efforts, however, redundancy decreases the risk of failure.3
For the model with controls, redundancy decreases the risk of failure for both complete and incomplete
efforts.4
Interacting Balance and Multiparty
The effect of balance on both reaching a comprehensive agreement and halting the violence post-
agreement is both strong and robust. When impartial and unbalanced mediation efforts are broken into
single- and multiparty efforts, the strength of balance (relative to other types of mediation) be assessed,
and the impact of multiparty mediation can also be considered. To highlight the variation on mediation
outcomes that occurs within the category of multiparty mediation, Tables A.16 and A.17 present the re-
sults of impartial single-party, impartial multiparty, unbalanced single-party, and unbalanced multiparty
mediation relative to balanced mediation for the first two measures of mediation success—reaching an
agreement and halting the violence. Figures A.3 and A.4 show the predicted probabilities of reaching a
comprehensive agreement and of halting the violence respectively.
Both the results in Table A.16 and Figure A.3 illustrate the strength of balanced efforts relative to
other types of mediation in reaching a more comprehensive settlement. The predicted probability of
2The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is 2.644 with a standard error of 1.212.
3The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is -0.410 with a standard error of 0.391.
4The coefficient on redundancy for complete efforts is -1.488 with a standard error of 0.827.
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Table A.16: Ordered Logistic Regression: Interaction Balance & Multiparty
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation 0.068 (0.506)
Redundancy −0.462 (0.219)
Impartial Single-Party −1.596 (0.436)
Impartial Multiparty −0.763 (0.453)
Unbalanced Single-Party −2.316 (0.472)
Unbalanced Multiparty −1.279 (0.446)
Territorial Conflict −0.524 (0.194)
Conflict Duration −0.006 (0.010)
Conflict Intensity −0.309 (0.319)
Polity 0.104 (0.027)
Central Command −0.228 (0.222)
Europe 1.670 (0.505)
Asia 1.842 (0.408)
Africa 2.576 (0.480)
Latin America 1.369 (0.536)
(Failure/Limited Commitment) −2.247 (0.733)
(Limited Commitment/Partial Peace) 0.286 (0.771)
(Partial Peace/Comprehensive Peace) 1.559 (0.780)
N 302
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant
at the p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced
mediation and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
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Table A.17: Logistic Regression: Interaction Balance & Multiparty
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Complete Mediation −1.067 (0.815)
Redundancy 0.519 (0.312)
Impartial Single-Party −3.845 (1.102)
Impartial Multiparty −4.317 (1.121)
Unbalanced Single-Party −3.775 (1.365)
Unbalanced Multiparty −3.922 (1.181)
Territorial Conflict 1.205 (0.610)
Conflict Duration −0.096 (0.039)
Conflict Intensity −3.315 (0.847)
Polity 0.148 (0.063)
Central Command −0.446 (0.456)
Rebel Strength −1.115 (0.386)
Ceasefire −1.145 (0.541)
Europe −1.907 (0.611)
Asia −3.659 (0.958)
Africa −3.346 (1.019)
Latin America −4.917 (1.023)
(Intercept) 11.172 (2.648)
N 183
Note: Coefficients and standard errors in bold are statistically significant
at the p = 0.05 level. Standard errors are clustered by conflict. Balanced
mediation and the Middle East are the baseline categories.
123
Pr
(C
om
p. 
Ag
re
em
en
t)
Balanced Impartial Unbalanced
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
l
l
l
l
l
Single−Party
Multiparty
Figure A.3: Predicted Prob. of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (with 95% CIs)
reaching a balanced settlement is a little over fifty-five percent, while the second most likely category to
end in a comprehensive peace agreement has a predicted probability of just under forty percent. Inter-
estingly, multiparty efforts outperform single-party efforts for both impartial and unbalanced mediation
efforts.
The predicted probabilities for halting the violence show that not only does balance have a strong
and substantively interesting effect on the probability of halting the violence post-agreement, but that
for impartial and unbalanced efforts, single-party mediation outperforms multiparty mediation. For
impartial mediation, the difference between single-party and multiparty efforts is about ten percentage
points. For unbalanced efforts, this difference is much less.
These analyses provide additional evidence that variation within multiparty efforts (balanced com-
pared to impartial or unbalanced) has a substantial impact on mediation outcomes and that considering
this variation can provide a more nuanced understanding of mediation success. From earlier analyses,
whether the multiparty effort was coordinated led to different expectations for mediation success. Here
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Figure A.4: Predicted Prob. of Halting the Violence (with 95% CIs)
whether the multiparty effort is balanced, impartial, or unbalanced has a meaningful impact on expec-
tations that a comprehensive peace agreement will be signed as well as whether an agreement would
put a temporary stop to the violent conflict. Together with the analyses in Chapter 4, Tables A.16 and
A.17 provide strong evidence that not all multiparty efforts are the same and that the composition of the
mediation team can have meaningful implications for mediation outcomes.
Operationalizing Contextual Knowledge
Selecting a good operationalization of contextual knowledge that simultaneously includes media-
tors that can be expected to have contextual knowledge while excluding those mediators who do not
have such knowledge is a difficult task. The operationalization chosen as the main measure of con-
textual knowledge was intentionally narrow. Here I consider alternate codings that are broader in their
identification of mediators with contextual knowledge.
First, ninety-three of the 302 mediation attempts had a neighboring country at the negotiating table
(30.8 percent). As neighbors are likely to be invested in nearby crises and to have knowledge of the
actors and grievances at the core of the conflict, including neighbors in the category of mediators with
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Table A.18: Alternative Operationalizations of Contextual Knowledge
Original Neighbors Neigh & 2 Yrs Neigh & 5 Yrs
Attempts Present
117 151 166 173
38.7 50.0 55.0 57.3
Attempts Absent
185 151 136 129
61.3 50.0 45.0 42.7
Counts and percentages for the presence of contextual knowledge, including neighbors
and mediators who succeeded previously within two and five years of the current
effort as having contextual knowledge.
contextual knowledge is the appropriate next step. Additionally, I relaxed the constraint around previous
successful mediation. While the one-year threshold was chosen to exclude mediators who had lost touch
with the disputants or failed to stay current on the causes of continued conflict and obstacles to renewed
negotiations, this threshold may be unnecessarily strict. I relaxed the threshold to include mediators who
had successfully mediated in the country within two to five years of the current negotiations. Table A.18
illustrates how including these additional mediators changes the number of mediators with contextual
knowledge. Table A.19 shows how these different thresholds for contextual knowledge influence the
number of complete efforts in the sample of cases.
While the number of efforts with contextual increases quite substantially across these codings,
truly complementary efforts remain very rare, even with more relaxed conceptualizations of contextual
knowledge. When including neighbors and relaxing the threshold for previous success to a five-year
window, the number of complete mediation attempts only increases from twenty to twenty-nine. The
distribution of redundancy is not substantially influenced by these changes. Redundancy’s minimum
and maximum values across all conceptualizations of contextual knowledge are 0 and 6, respectively.
The median and mode remains at 1 for all conceptualizations as well. Including neighbors generates
one truly complementary effort. Relaxing the threshold for previous successful mediation to two years
increases this to two complementary efforts, and relaxing the threshold to five years does not add any
new complementary efforts.
With the number of complete, redundant, and complementary efforts varying little across opera-
tionalizations, the results of the analyses do not change substantially when these alternative operational-
izations are used. Tables A.20–A.22 present the results of ordered logistic, logistic, and Weibull models
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Table A.19: Complete Mediation by Coding of Contextual Knowledge
Original Neighbors Neigh & 2 Yrs Neigh & 5 Yrs
Attempts Complete
20 25 28 29
6.6 8.3 9.3 9.6
Attempts Incomplete
282 277 274 273
93.4 91.7 90.7 90.4
Counts and percentages for complete mediation efforts, including neighbors and mediators who
succeeded previously within two and five years of the current effort as having contextual knowledge.
of the three measures of mediation success. Each table reports the results when adding neighbors in the
first two columns, the results when also relaxing the threshold for previous successful mediation to two
years in the third and fourth columns, and the results when relaxing the threshold for previous successful
mediation to five years in the last two columns.
When modeling the type of agreement, if any, produced by a mediation attempt, the sign and sig-
nificance of the main mediation variables are unchanged both across models in Table A.20 and when
comparing those models to Table 4.6. Territorial conflict is the only variable that sees a noteworthy
change, continuing to have a negative effect on reaching a more comprehensive agreement but not
reaching statistical significance in any of the models in Table A.20.
Comparing the results reported in Table A.21 to those in Table 4.7, once again, few differences
are apparent. Redundancy has a positive effect in all models, increasing the likelihood of reaching the
two-month threshold for peace, although this effect only reaches statistical significance when neighbors
and a two-year threshold for previous mediation success are used in the operationalization of contextual
knowledge. No other mediation characteristics see changes in the sign or significance of the estimated
coefficients. Two control variables, territorial conflict and ceasefires, lose statistical significance in the
models in Table A.21.
The results for the Weibull models of post-peace duration are more interesting when considering the
more relaxed definitions of contextual knowledge. Complete mediation efforts and redundancy continue
to have the unexpected effect of increasing and decreasing the risk of failure respectively. In the models
in Table A.22, however, these effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. None of the other
characteristics of mediation teams are affected, and the only control variable that changes significance
across models is rebel strength.
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Overall, this indicates that the results for complete and redundancy are robust to operationalizations
of contextual knowledge. The change in significance in the Weibull models across specifications and the
surprising direction of the results in these models provides an interesting area for additional research.
More research on the long-term effects of mediation, as well as more research on the long-term prospects
for post-agreement peace, could shed light on this surprising finding. It could also provide additional
insights into why the presence of additional mediators encourages disputants to abide by the peace
process, despite the risks of forum-shopping and free-riding.
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